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COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATION AND NATIONALIZATION 
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The Contribution of the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal 
by 
Mohammad Shamsaei 
This study encompasses an examination of the awards of the Iran-U. S. 
Claims Tribunal in cases of expropriation and nationalization of 
Foreign Investment. 
The question of compensation for expropriation and nationalization of 
alien property has always been a controversial issue in the 
relationship between the foreign investors and investees particularly 
in the third world countries. This question has been a major point 
of discussion in international law as well. 
The Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal is the most recent body to deal with 
the question of expropriation; nationalization and compensation. In 
this study I have attempted to see what the awards of the Tribunal 
have contributed to the resolution of the controversial question of 
compensation for expropriation and nationalization. In 1982 when the 
Tribunal began work, the International law standard to be applied in 
determining compensation in cases of expropriation and 
nationalization was a controversial issue. The period from 1982 
onwards might be considered as a new era in international law. Thus 
to explore the present status of the international law of 
compensation the awards of the Tribunal have been examined. I have 
attempted to find out what standard of compensation has been applied 
in the awards of the Tribunal; what has been the governing law; what 
has been the context of that. law; and finally what have been the 
justifications' for the application of that law. These issues are 
discussed within eight chapters. The ninth chapter, however, reviews 
the findings of the study and contains some general conclusions. The 
final assessment of this study is that, the decisions of the Tribunal 
have been given against a background of the increasing recognition of 
the need for foreign investment in the developing countries and have 
made an important contribution to the law in this field. 
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Introducclon 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a review of those awards of the Iran-U. S. Claims 
Tribunal which relate to the expropriation of foreign owned property. 
The Tribunal has made many such awards and, as we shall see. they are 
highly significant. However. the question of compensation for 
expropriation or nationalization(') of alien property has been a 
major point of discussion in international law for decades. Numerous 
international institutions, including the United Nations, have tried 
to enhance and structure economic and industrial co-operation 
throughout the world. Several efforts have been made to create 
general rules that would be universally acceptable to foreign 
investors and their governments. However, due to the contradictory 
views of countries at different levels of industrial development and 
varying econo-political systems the results have remained 
incomplete. (2) 
Despite the widespread recognition of an urgent need for foreign 
capital and expertise in the less developed (or developing) countries 
of Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin America, many of these 
countries show mixed feelings towards foreign investment. 
(3 ) An 
increasing amount of foreign investment during past decades has been 
in accordance with economic development programmes of such countries. 
Nevertheless, many developing countries still view foreign investment 
particularly the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as 
remnants of old colonialism. 
(4) This is especially the case in 
countries where foreign investment pervades vital industries and 
influences the economic and political life. 
i 
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Foreign companies naturally and generally follow a policy of profit 
maximising. 
(5) However, this policy may not always conform with 
governmental plans for the development of national economy. 
Moreover, foreign investments may be perceived as maintaining the 
dependence of the capital- importing countries on the capital- 
exporting state. 
Nevertheless, the desirability of foreign capital; advanced 
technology; know-how; and the increased willingness of the 
industrialized countries to contribute to the infrastructures of 
developing countries has made most governme nts respond to the wishes 
of investors. Such responses include bilateral arrangements, and 
unilateral enactment of investment laws which ensures favourable 
treatment and various incentives such as tax exemptions etc to 
foreign investors. (6) 
In spite of this, during recent years a substantial amount of 
investment in capital importing countries were expropriated. 
Actually the post-war period was characterized by massive waves of 
expropriation, first in Eastern Europe and then in some of the newly 
independent states. 
(7) From 1960 onwards in each decade the world 
community witnessed an increase of such expropriation cases. For 
instance the number of expropriations of foreign property in 1975 was 
four times higher than in 1970 and fifty times higher than in 1961. 
In the 1960s, 
iifty 
nine non-Communist countries of the third world 
nationalized American assets in their country. Most notably, forty 
nine percent of all expropriations in that period took place in the 
Latin American countries. (8) 
ii 
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In the 1970s the Arab countries; North Africa and the Middle East 
including Israel, were responsible for twenty seven per cent of all 
nationalizations, the black African countries for thirteen percent 
and Asia for eleven percent. 
(9) 
Kolvenback points out American practice during the two World Wars: 
"induced many ... countries, notably in the third world to 
expropriate foreign investments some times without 
compensation. Former colonies in Africa and Asia, and also 
Latin American countries regarded foreign investments in 
certain industries as an undue limitation of 9 
their 
sovereignty and, therefore, confiscated such assets. "( 
) 
To the above mentioned nationalization and expropriation cases must 
now be added the expropriation of American assets in Iran which took 
place in early 1980, following the Islamic revolution. American 
investment was both extensive and massive in Iran during the time the 
Shah's government was in power. Most if not all of the property so 
acquired was expropriated by the Islamic revolutionary regime. 
(10) 
Certainly these takings have contributed mightily to the intensity of 
the confrontation between the third world and the developed 
countries. As Neville points out: 
"As a result of these confrontations the line has been 
clearly drawn between the industrialized nations and those 
developing countries of the world that subscribe to the 
precepts of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), as 
emotiona appeal for redistribution of the world's 
wealth". 
111) 
Both groups of nations advance well-defined and contrasting arguments 
in support of their positions in expropriation of property, the law 
governing such expropriations, and the terms and conditions of 
compensation. 
11]. 
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The conflicting attitudes towards alien property are reflected in the 
discussion on the state of customary international principles of 
expropriation and nationalization. Despite numerous articles and 
various efforts to establish a uniform international standard on the 
conditions of an compensation for expropriation, the classic 
controversy between the two main and extreme views has remained 
unsolved. To see what the awards of the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal 
have contributed to the resolution of this controversy we must begin 
by considering the legal background. 
iv 
CHAPTER ONE 
EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Expropriation in International Law 
1.1 NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN OWNED PROPERTY 
Nationalization of foreign property is legal in itself in 
international law, unless it is in breach of the provisions of a 
treaty, or it constitutes violation of a specific principle of 
customary international law. In the absence of a specific treaty not 
to do so, a country is free in its discretion to nationalize for 
public purposes the properties located in its territory of foreign 
nationals as well as that of its own citizens. 
(12) 
This right to nationalize is recognised as an aspect of the 
sovereignty of nations, their freedom to govern territories as they 
see fit unless restricted by an international rule to which they have 
explicitly or tacitly assented. 
Ar6chaga goes so far as to state that: 
"Contemporary international law recognises the right of 
every state to nationalize foreign-owned property, even if a 
predecessor state or a previous government engaged itself, 
by treaty or by a Contract, not to do so. This is a 
corollary of the principle of permanent sovereignty of a 
state over all its wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities as proclaimed in successive General Assembly 
resolutions and particularly in Article 2, Paragraph 1, of 
Chapter II of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. The description of this sovereignty as permanent 
signifies that the territorial state can never lose its 
legal capacity to change the destination or the method of 
exploitation of those resources, whatever arrangemen have 
been made for their exploitation and administration. "ýb) 
Traditional international law considered any interference by a state 
with foreign-owned property a violation of acquired rights, which 
were internationally protected and thus an international unlawful 
act. 
(14) But today it seems that an act of nationalization or 
2 
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expropriation constitutes the exercise of a sovereign right of a 
state and is consequently lawful. 
(15) 
Nationalization, however, raises the question whether a 
nationalization that is lawful in itself involves a liability in 
international law for the nationalizing state to pay compensation to 
the foreigner who is affected by it, and if so, what the standard is 
for determining the amount of compensation. 
To examine these questions this chapter will discuss the 
international legal rules of compensation in the period before the 
Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal was set up in 1980. As it is our aim in 
this study to show the present state of these rules, the awards of 
that important Tribunal will then be examined in the subsequent 
chapters. 
The reason for adopting this approach is that we would like to 
examine whether the awards of the Tribunal have clarified these old 
rules or have made new law in this regard. 
1.2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMPENSATIO 
The legal rules concerning compensation for the taking of foreign- 
owned property have been the subject of on-going controversy at least 
since the end 9f World War II. In the pre-World War II period the 
"overwhelming practice and the prevailing legal opinion" supported 
the view that customary international law requires full ("prompt, 
adequate and effective") compensation for the property taken. 
(16) In 
recent years the relative unanimity in both the practice and 
scholarly views has been subjected to considerable erosion. Dolzer, 
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when summarising the current situation of international law (as 
distinct from 'traditional') has stated that: 
" the opinions expressed by industrialized states and 
developing states with respect to the rules of international 
law are widely divergent, and the conduct of states in 
actual tice coincides with none of these expressed 
views , . 
(151c 
It is interesting to point out that less than twenty years ago, a 
large majority of the United Nations General Assembly declared the 
customary international law of expropriation dead. 
(18) Eighty six 
governments supported the Resolution 3171 which stated that a state 
expropriating foreign property, 
"is entitled to determine the amount of possible 
compensations and the mode of payment, and any dispute 
which might arise should be settled accordance with the 
national legislation of (that] state. 
ý49) 
Scholars cited this and other General Assembly resolutions as 
evidence that international law no longer required full compensation 
for the expropriation of foreign property. 
1.2.1 THE LAW GOVERNING DISPUTES ARISING FROM A TAKING 
one of the most complex questions posed by expropriation cases is the 
threshold inquiry: which law governs the propriety of taking and 
determines the measures of compensation to be paid. Normally there 
are two possiýle sources of legal standards predictable: municipal 
law and international law. These two sources often dictate widely 
different results. 
Prior to World War 1, a number of Latin American governments had 
taken the position that expropriated aliens were entitled only to 
%national treatment' (as opposed to %an international minimum 
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standard') that is, they treat the property of aliens in the same 
manner in which they treat the property of their own nationals. (20) 
Some Latin American states also resisted the proposition that a state 
has any right to present an international claim on behalf of its 
national who has been expropriated. These countries have frequently 
insisted on the insertion of clauses in concession and other 
investment agreements (known as Calvo Clauses, after their 
originator) by which the investing Company submits to the 
Jurisdiction of the local Courts and authorities and surrenders any 
right to the diplomatic protection of its state of incorporation. (21) 
Many such clauses are still in effect. However Latin American states 
in practice have usually been willing at least to negotiate with 
states of expropriated owners, and subsequently to reach settlements 
with them or with the owners themselves. These states are generally 
averse to international adjudication or arbitration but have some 
times agreed to the resolution of claims by mixed-claims commissions. 
The U. S. S. R. also following the Bolshevik revolution in the 1920s and 
Mexico following the upheavals in that state in the 1930s argued that 
all states possess full authority over all property within their 
borders and no international law rule existed that diminished this 
fundamental principle of sovereignty. They contended, that all such 
property, whether owned by nationals of the state or foreigners, was 
wholly subject to the national law of the state within which it was 
located and was not a proper subject of international law. However, 
this view has never been recognised by international tribunals and it 
seems settled now that international law is to be applied in claims 
of-expropriation or nationalization. 
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However, in 1929 a decision supporting the position that a state's 
municipal law was to be applied to disputes arising from contracts 
between foreign investors and their host states was rendered by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Serbian Loan 
Case. The Court held that: 
many Contract which is not a Contract between states in 
their capacity as subjects of intern M onal law, is based on 
the municipal law of some country . 
Neville has pointed out: 
"Despite the general applicability of a municipal body of 
law implied by this language an exception has been created 
for long-term economic development agreements which allows 
private concessionaires to contract for the right to develop 
or extract a state's natural resources without subjecting 
the agreement to the dM ers of subsequent re-interpretation 
under municipal law. "( 
However, the developing countries have taken the position that even 
with regard to long-term economic development agreements, the 
governing law must be the municipal law of the host state. As we 
mentioned earlier, they claim that termination of a long-term 
contract for public purpose is an aspect of their sovereignty. They 
add that international law gives priority to state sovereignty rights 
over contractual rights to natural resources. To support their claim 
they rely mainly on U. N. General Assembly Resolution Number 3281. In 
this resolution the General Assembly proclaimed: 
"l. Every state has and shall freely exercise full 
permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and 
disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and 
economic activities. 
2. Each state has the right ... (c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be 
paid by the state adapting such measures, taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any 
case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of 
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the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is 
freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that 
other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign 
equality of states and accordance with the principle of 
free choice of means. "(21Y 
To strengthen their position developing countries also point to a 
decision which was rendered by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the Anglo-Iranian Oil case. In this case, the Court 
rejected by the view that a concessionary Contract between a 
government and a foreign private corporation would be considered an 
international treaty. (25) In keeping with this view, a former 
president of the ICJ dismissed the idea that there is an 
international law of Contracts, and argued that, even if there were, 
the principle of a state's permanent sovereignty over its wealth and 
natural resources would be recognised as a controlling principle of 
international law. (24) 
However, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States has been 
dismissed by many commentators as a mere declaration of principles. 
They have noted that the U. S. and five other industrialized countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the 
U. K. ) voted against it. Ten other industrialized nations (Austria, 
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain 
and Sweden) abstained from voting. Since the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States was not supported by such a number of 
industrialized countries with significant international trade 
engagements, it has been argued that the charter cannot be considered 
to be an expression of a consensus among nations equivalent to a new 
norm of customary law. 
(27) 
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Dupuy also in TOPCO arbitral award, analysing the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States concluded that: 
"International law may operate as a factor limiting the 
freedom of the state should foreign interests be affected, 
even though rticle 2 [of the Charter] does not state this 
explicitlyll. 
tfl) 
However, applicability of such view with regard to short-term 
agreements, 'may not be feasible. 
In these agreements, for reasons of national prestige and pride as 
well as a more rational desire not to be dependent on an unfamiliar 
and uncontrollable foreign law, host states are rarely permitted to 
subject themselves to the laws of a foreign country, and often 
require that the Contract be governed 'in all its aspects by the law 
of their sovereign. 
(30) Distinguishing between ordinary and extra 
ordinary Contracts Westberg points out that: 
"In ordinary Contracts with state parties ... the applicable law clause is usually not negotiable. If the foreigner 
wants the Contract, he must accept ý%applicable law clause 
prescribed by the state party 
Nevertheless, with regard to long-term Contracts the law of the 
sovereign generally will not be accepted as the law applicable to all 
aspects of the Contract including disputes. The most compelling 
reasons for this are the power of the sovereign to change the law to 
its own advantage an the fact that this power has been exercised from 
time to time, as shown by the international arbitrations. Other 
reasons might be the rudimentary state of the sovereign's legal 
system and uncertainty as to what the law is. 
(32) Concession 
agreements of international oil companies are probably the best 
examples of such long-term agreements with state parties. The 
creative drafting techniques used by oil company lawyers to avoid the 
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law of host states are evident in the awards of a number of 
international arbitrators involving such agreements. (33) 
Turning to expropriation claims not involving contractual rights, the 
applicable legal issue requires a somewhat different analysis. Since 
there is no Contract, normally there will be no applicable law clause 
to construe. The problem in the expropriation context involves, 
rather the broader issue as to what law governs the claim of 
expropriation in all its aspects, particularly, the fundamental 
questions as to whether an expropriation has taken place and, if so, 
what the remedy should be. The broader issue refers to the on-going 
controversy over the law of expropriation between the industrialized- 
developed countries of the world on the one hand and the third world- 
developing and socialist states on the other. The applicable law 
issue is central to the controversy because the latter involves the 
question whether the legal rights of aliens within the territory of a 
sovereign state derive from, and therefore must necessarily be 
subject to, the law of the sovereign, or whether there are certain 
international law rules governing the treatment of aliens that exist 
apart from traditional prerogatives. The practical significance of 
the question exist primarily in the fact that the answer in a given 
case of expropriation may determine whether the expropriating state 
will be free to fix the compensation at whatever level it deems 
appropriate in(ýluding zero. 
However, within the sphere of international tribunals, the complex 
question of applicable law is a less serious problem. 
While the Calvo Doctrine and other extreme legal positions have not 
been universally rejected, the many reported international tribunal 
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awards that have dealt with the issue all accept that expropriation 
claims are the subject of customary international law or that such 
law prevails over any contradictory national law of either the state 
or foreign party involved. As we shall see in Chapter Five of this 
study with regard to expropriation cases, the Iran-U. S. Claims 
Tribunal, notwithstanding the contention of the Iranian parties 
before the Tribunal in one way or another, has applied international 
law as the proper law governing the expropriation cases. Therefore, 
in expropriation claims the lawyer's task is to identify and argue 
the compensation rules to be followed under international law. 
However, the international law standard has remained an embattled 
issue. While, for instance, Clagett, (34) argues that Hall Doctrine 
remains the rule of customary international law, Dolzer(35) on the 
other hand argues that neither Calvo Doctrine, nor Hall rule 
represents existing customary law. 
1.2.2 THE TRADITIONAL LAW 
The traditional standard as it has been stated in text books(36) and 
other writings, 
(37) 
and in statements(38) issued by capital-exporting 
states is that where property belonging to a foreign national is 
expropriated or nationalized by a state, that state should pay 
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation". In a case where an 
expropriation in breach of contractual obligations is involved, it 
was stated that "restitutio in integrum is ... under the principles 
of international law, the normal sanction for non-performance of 
contractual obligations and that it, is inapplicable only to the 
extent that restoration of the status quo ante is impossible". 
(39) 
The principles of rescirutio in integrum and of equity have been used 
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. to suggest that adequate compensation means at least the payment of 
the market value of the expropriated property. (40) 
The traditional standard is often described by reference to the 
famous 1938 note of the U. S. Secretary of State (Cordell Hull) to the 
Mexican Government on the expropriation by Mexico of foreign oil 
interests. Responding to the refusal of the Mexican governments to 
compensate Americans for properties that it had expropriated the 
Secretary's note declared that the American claimants were entitled 
under international law to prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. 
(41) 
The most central element in the above triple-standard formulated by 
Hull concerns the adequacy of the compensation. To meet this 
requirement the compensation must reflect the full, fair market value 
of the property as of the date of the taking. 
(42) The requirement 
that the compensation be 'prompt' was generally held to mean that the 
compensation must be paid at or near the time of the taking, or that 
some provision at least will have been made at that time. Failing 
which, interest from the date of the taking would be payable. 
(43) 
The third point of the standard that the compensation be 'effective' 
means that the payment must be made in realizable exportable 
form. (44) Of course, payment in non convertible currency, that is, 
unmarketable b9nds is not effective. In other words payments must be 
provided in a freely convertible currency or some other form that has 
measurable value and is useable by the foreign party. 
In the case of property for which a market existed; adequate or full 
compensation standard was held to mean the fair market value of the 
property. 
(45) That is, the amount a willing buyer would pay a 
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willing seller. Where no market existed (as often is the case), the 
standard has been found to require valuation on the basis of various 
methods such as replacement cost and book value. (46) In the case of 
on-going businesses or property complexes with future profit 
expectations, the going concern approach has been regarded as 
suitable in most cases. This method not only considers the value of 
the physical assets but also "takes into account the loss of future 
profits, and often such intangible assets as good will as well.,, (47) 
The replacement cost less actual depreciation, in some circumstances, 
notably in case of certain tangible things, has been accepted as an 
a lternative to the going concern approach. 
The replacement value and particularly the going concern approach are 
often contrasted with the net book value of the property. 
(48) Book 
value method is as carried on the owner's books; their value as fixed 
in insurance policies; and their valuation for tax purposes in the 
records of the respondent state. Therefore this method is only 
seldom acceptable as reflecting the fair market value. 
(49) 
However, the requirement that market value must be paid as 
compensation is not accepted by the developing countries, which have 
been responsible for most of the expropriation in recent times. 
As it will be discussed later, in the U. N. fora as well as within the 
related international tribunals, these countries have challenged the 
requirement of market value for a nationalized property. 
Surprisingly, in a number of situations, capital exporting countries 
have accepted or permitted their own nationals to accept amounts less 
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than the market value of the property taken. 
(50) Sornarajah points 
out that: 
"The conflict between the views on compensation, ... 
reflects the unwillingness on the part of newly independent 
nations to accept the norms of law developed in the period 
of European hegemony. Adequate compensation reflects, free 
market n ons of property which are alien to non-European 
people. 1'elf) 
Merillat also states: 
"In developing countries state regulation and intervention 
in private property rights in order to accelerate 
developments is well-entrenched and compensation on the 
basis of mark t value would be seen as a deterrence to such 
development752) 
Much of the debate concerning the proper standard of compensation for 
the expropriation of foreign owned property by a state, as distinct 
from that of its own nationals, has been carried out in the light of 
policy considerations. Before proceeding any further we must examine 
these policy considerations. 
1.2.3 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Proponents of the traditional law claim that adequate compensation 
must be paid in case of expropriation of an investment made by an 
alien. They believe that the flow of capital and technology that 
foreign investments generates is beneficial to developing countries. 
Since expropriation without compensation would hinder such investment 
taking place, ýt has been argued that international law must maintain 
a rule requiring payment of adequate compensation. 
(53) 
By stressing the benefits that foreign private investments brings in, 
Weston has said that: 
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H ... world-wide economic growth cannot do without private investment" 
and added that: 
"host country deprivation regulations that counteract the 
flow of private wealth and other important values across 
national boundaries, may be seen to work against global 
well-being. n(54) 
These assumptions which support the traditional norm of full 
compensation are based on the economic premise, that foreign 
investment flows have been uniformly beneficial in, their effect on 
development. 
There is little doubt that foreign investment does have beneficial 
effects on the host economy. otherwise, governments of developing 
countries would not have invited foreign investors into their 
countries. However benefits are not one sided. Foreign investors do 
not invest for benevolent purposes. Thus they are naturally more 
concerned with profit maximizing than the development of the host 
country. In many situations, benefits of investment flow 
substantially to the foreign investor. Disproportionate benefits 
secured and repatriated by foreign investors could deter development. 
Such obstacles to development would be particularly significant in 
cases where the foreign investors are multinational corporations 
which had acquired a stranglehold on the domestic economy. 
(55) In 
such cases it has been suggested that the host economy could become 
integrated into the multinational system, making it dependent upon 
the economies of the home countries of foreign investors. 
(56) 
Therefore the notion that foreign investment is entirely beneficial 
to the host economy seems to be unacceptable. Besides the free flow 
of investment and technology, the world community has expressed other 
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goals which bear relation to this subject. One of these goals is the 
elimination of the growing disparity between the rich and the poor. 
Realizing that goal has given rise to a new international law of 
development. (57) It is believed that the acceleration of the 
development of the countries of the third world will be in the mutual 
interest of both developing and developed countries. (58) Since a 
norm which requires the payment of full or market value of an 
expropriated property, in pursuance of development programmes, could 
be regarded as inconsistent with the universally accepted goals of 
development of the third world, it could be argued that such a norm 
should not be regarded as obligatory. Since development objectives 
have been accepted by the international community, rules which 
facilitate development must be preferred. Therefore it is necessary 
to make a distinction between investments which are beneficial and 
those which are not beneficial to the host economy. While higher 
standards of compensation would be appropriate in the case of 
expropriation of investments having beneficial results, other 
considerations may apply in the case of expropriations which have a 
harmful effect on the host economy. (59) Payment of full compensation 
in any case of expropriation irrespective that the investment has 
been beneficial or detrimental would hinder the pursuit of socio- 
economic objectives by governments of developing countries. 
(60) 
However, capiLl-exporting states claim that in any case of 
expropriation full compensation is due. Judge Carneiro in his 
dissenting judgement in the Anglo-Iranlan Oil case argued that full 
compensation for expropriated property must be paid, as such a rule 
is "a pre-requisite of international co-operation in the economic and 
financial fields". (61) 
15 
Expropriation in International Law 
Similarly in the Barcelona Traction Case, (Belgium v. Spain) Judge 
Gros, in a separate opinion made the statement that: 
any nationalization of a regular kind would have been 
accompanied by compensation. "(62) 
Clagett points out: O'customary international law has long recognised 
the obligation of a state to pay compensation upon the expropriation 
of property of foreign nations, including contract rights and other 
intangibles ... " 
He adds that: "This obligation derives from elementary principles of 
fairness and justice. In addition, the obligation encourages 
transnational investment, thereby promoting development of national 
resources and providing economic benefits throughout the world by 
ensuring foreign investors the value of their legitimate 
expectations". 
(63) Below we shall examine the authoritative 
pronouncements that have been made in this area. 
1.3 JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL DECISIONS IN PRE-WORLD WAR 11 PERIOD 
(a) The decision of Permanent Court of International Justice in 
Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v Poland) 1928 
In the Chorzow Factor7 case(64) the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) ruled in 1928 that Poland's seizure of a nitrate 
factory owned 8y German nationals was in violation of a convention 
concluded between Germany and Poland. The judgements of the court in 
this case are often cited as the origin of the traditional 
international law rules applicable to the compensation issues in 
expropriation cases. The PICJ declared in that case that reparation 
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
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expropriation and re-establish the situation which would in all 
probability have existed if the act had not been committed. (65) In 
doing this the Court had appointed experts to assist with the 
calculation of the compensation owing and instructed them to include 
in their calculation of damages the value of the factory and its 
future prospects at the time of the taking. Although the case was 
ultimately settled by agreement of the parties, this instruction has 
since been cited for the principle that lost profits should be 
included in the compensation payable by a state when it expropriates 
a foreign-owned business property. 
Some authorities, however, maintain that the inclusion of lost future 
profits is required only when the taking has been unlawful. 
(66) 
Accordingly, they point out that a distinction must be made between 
lawful and unlawful takings. As a result, they believe that a 
different standard of compensation is required for lawful takings 
from that required for unlawful takings. 
Nevertheless, the judgement as a whole indicates that the minimum 
monetary obligation in all cases was the payment of full value of the 
property taken. What distinguished unlawful from lawful takings was 
the additional obligation in the former cases, if rescituclo In 
Integrum was impossible, to compensate for consequential loss. 
Strictly speaking, what the Court said about the standard of 
compensation for lawful taking supported the standard of full 
compensation. 
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(b) - Arbitral tribunals 
Another often cited case with regard to the question of compensation 
is the Norwegian Shipowners (Norway v U. S. ) case which was decided in 
1922by Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In that case involving 
rights under a shipbuilding contract, the Tribunal described the 
applicable standard as just compensation. 
(67) It maintained that: 
"Just compensation implies a complete restitution of the 
status quo ante, based, not upon future gains of the United 
States or other powers, but upon the loss of profits of the 
Norwegian owners as compared with other owners of similar 
property. "(68) 
In assessing the compensation due to the Norwegian shipowners from 
the U. S. for the confiscation by the latter of their ships and 
contracts for the construction of the ships during the First-World 
War, the Tribunal held that the shipowners were entitled to the fair 
market value of their property. Because of the special war time 
situations, the Tribunal decided that the actual market value was a 
distortion of the real market value. Therefore, it ruled that the 
value must be assessed ex aequo et bono. 
(69) Consequently, the 
claimants were awarded compensation for profits they would have 
realized if they had sold the contracts just before the 
expropriation. 
In the Goldenberg case (Germany v Romania) (1928), also the same 
formula was apýlied. The Tribunal decided that, even in the case of 
lawful requisition, the property had to be "equitablement pay le plus 
rapidement possible" and that the payment of one-sixth of the market 
value of the property taken amounted to a wrongful confiscation of 
the other five-sixths. 
(70) 
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In addition, in 1956 the PCA added a further element to the 
traditional standard of full or adequate compensation. In the 
arbitration between France and Greece known as the Lighthouses 
arbitration the Tribunal held that the French owner of a concession 
for the operation of lighthouses seized by the Greek government 
during World-War II was entitled to compensation based on the future 
nett profits that the owner would have realized were it not for the 
expropriation. 
(71) 
In calculating these profits, the arbitrators refused to consider 
Greece's contention that the subsequent upheaval of World-War II 
would have reduced the profitability of the lighthouses in the hands 
of the French owner. The Tribunal declared: 
"To assess the compensation, reference must be made to the 
date on which took place the wrongful act ... of the Greek 
Government which gave rise to the right of compensation and 
the damage suffered by the firm can only be assessed by 
reference to data existing at the time when the concession 
was taken over. Subsequent events, which were unforeseen at 
that time both by the firm which was dispossessed of it, 
cannot be taken into consideration in a case of a grant of 
compensation which ought to have been not only determined 
but also put at the disposal of a concessionaire before the 
latter's removal.. 
(72) 
Thus full compensation was determined according to the anticipated 
profits as of the time of seizure without consideration being given 
to the conduct of Greece and subsequent wartime events. Accordingly 
it became a principle in international law that the events after a 
taking should not be taken into account in the calculation of the due 
compensation. 
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1.4 THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE-U. S. (73) 
In 1960 the Restatement articulated the full compensation standard as 
follows: 
187: Just compensation as required by Section 186 must be: 
(a) adequate in amount as indicated in Section 188 
(b) paid with reasonable promptness ... and, 
(c) paid in form that is effectively realizable by the aliens to the 
fullest extent that circumstances permit, as indicated in Section 
190. 
188: Adequacy of Compensation 
(1) Compensation, to be adequate in amount within the meaning of 
Section 187, must be in an amount that is reasonable under the 
circumstances, as measured by the international standard of justice 
indicated in Section 165. Under ordinary conditions, including the 
following, the amount must be equivalent to the full value of the 
property taken, together with interest to the date of payment. 
(a) If the property was acquired or brought into the jurisdiction of 
the state by the alien for use in a business enterprise that the 
alien was specifically authorized to establish or acquire by a 
concession, contract, licence, or other authorization of the state, 
or that the alien established or acquired in reasonable reliance on 
the conduct of'the state designed to encourage investment by aliens 
in the economy of the state; 
(b) If the property is an operating enterprise that is taken for 
operation by the state as a going concern; 
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(c) If the taking is pursuant to a program under which property held 
under similar circumstances by nationals of the state is not taken, 
or; 
(d) If the taken is wrongful under international law as stated in 
Section 185. 
(2) In the absence of the conditions specified in sub-section (1), 
compensation must be nevertheless be equivalent of full value unless 
special circumstances make such requirement unreasonable, 
Claims for adequacy of compensation continued to be made by capital- 
exporting developed countries in the late 1960s. In this regard, 
more sophisticated theoretical bases have been presented by 
international lawyers in justifying such claims. These theories will 
be examined below. 
1.5 LEGAL THEORIES 
1.5.1 THE THEORY OF ACQUIRED RIGHTS 
The concept of acquired rights according to the developed countries 
as applied to nationalization of foreign property, means that respect 
must be had for rights which, being lawfully acquired under the 
relevant municipal law and international law, were recognized by the 
municipal law of the nationalizing state. 
0 The effect of this concept of respect for acquired rights is that 
rights of foreigners which are created under or recognized by the 
host state may not be abrogated unless in virtue of a permissible 
rule of international law. 
(74) 
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O'Connell defines acquired rights as "any rights ... properly vested 
under municipal law", stated that "such rights cannot be cancelled 
without full satisfaction of the equities attaching to them. " 
(76), 
In the context of international law of compensation the theory of 
acquired rights is used to support the norm of adequate compensation. 
However, the extent to which the theory of acquired rights forms part 
of international law is uncertain. 
Sornarajah points out that: 
"resort must be had to a weak source of international law to 
argue that acquired rights are recognized by civilized 
nations. Even if the hoary fallacy that only the legal 
systems of civilized nations should be taken into account be 
accepted, it would still be difficult to show that there is 
such respect for property within the legal systems of 
developed states to justify the 5levation of acquired rights 
as a general principle of law. "( 
7) 
PellonpAd examining arbitral practice in the last two decades has 
also concluded that nthe arbitral practice ... cannot be said to 
support any rigid 'acquired rights' theory as the doctrinal 
foundation of the duty to pay compensation. Rather the practice 
while it recognizes the foreign owner's right to full compensation, 
at the same time also recognizes the state's economic sovereignty and 
its power to formulate its policies without having to pay 
compensation for any such diminution of the market value of the 
property as is brought about by changes in the general socio-economic 
orientation of the state. "(78) 
1.5.2 THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
It has been argued that, in a case of expropriation or 
nationalization when the host goverment takes property which does 
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not belong to it, it has enriched itself to the value of the taken 
property, "if not also to the extent of future profits that would 
arise from the property. n(79) Therefore, it has been suggested that 
the expropriating state is obliged to pay full compensation for the 
expropriated property. 
The application of the principle of unjust enrichment is justified on 
the grounds that it is a general principle of law recognised by 
civilized nations within the terms of Article 38 (1)(c) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (, Cj). 
(80) 
In awards of international tribunals, occasional references to the 
principle of unjust enrichment may be found. The award issued with 
regard to Lena Goldfields case (1930)(81) is an example. In this 
case the Soviet government granted a concession to Lena Goldfields in 
1925 during the time of the New Economic Policy. Five years later 
the Soviet government changing her policy, annulled all its 
obligations under the concession agreement. Thereupon the government 
was sued by the company for compensation in the amount of 
approximately E13 million. The arbitrators awarded the amount 
claimed, but only the amount of E3 million in non- interest -bearing 
rates was paid over twenty years. (82) As a basis of the claim the 
arbitrator considered both breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 
For reasons not stated, they preferred unjust enrichment and added 
that the result was the same anyway - damages including loss of 
profits. 
(83) 
In the Libyan American Oil Company (LIAM CO. ) v Libyan Arab Republic 
(1977) case, the sole arbitrator awarded, as he put it, equitable 
compensation for a claim based on the breach of a concession 
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agreement. 
(84) The awarded amount of $66 million exceeded the amount 
allegedly due under unjust enrichment principles by $9 million. But 
it remained $120 million short of the amount that the company had 
claimed to represent the value of its concession as calculated in 
view of future profits. The arbitrator refrained from giving any 
reasons for his own assessment. (85) 
With regard to the application of unjust enrichment principle in 
matters of nationalization, authors have presented different views. 
Francioni has pointed out that the view maintained by the large 
majority of authors who advocated the adoption of the principle of 
unjust enrichment with regard to nationalization cases, rests on "an 
ill-conceived interpretation of the principle and on an explicit or 
implicit intent to preserve or restore, under this different label, 
the theory of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, including 
interests and future profits". 
(86) 
Furthermore, Lord McNair believed that international law does not 
import private law rules and institutions but regards them "as an 
indication of policy and principles". 
(87) 
What makes the principle of unjust enrichment highly relevant in the 
field of nationalizations is its equitable foundation. Accordingly, 
it requires that account must be taken of the entire past 
relationship between the parties, the profits made by the investor 
and the harm, if any, suffered by the host economy as a result of the 
investment. It also requires that the undue enrichment acquired by 
foreign companies during a period of monopoly or of highly privileged 
economic position, as, for instance, during a period of colonial 
domination should be taken into account. 
(88) If this view is 
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accepted, the principle of unjust enrichment cannot be used uniformly 
to support the requirement of full compensation. Rather, it may even 
provide the view that excess profits which accrued to the investor 
must be taken into account in assessing the compensation. With 
regard to application of this principle in the context of the Iran 
U. S. claims Tribunal, some more discussion has been given in Chapter 
7 of this study. 
To preserve adequate compensation and to avoid compensation conflicts 
at an early stage, developed capital-exporting countries have 
negotiated bilateral investment protection treaties with developing 
capital-importing countries. 
1.6 BILATERAL TREATIES 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between states have been a 
feature of recent international business relations. Most of the 
developed countries of Europe as well as the United States of 
America, have concluded such treaties with developing countries 
throughout the world. Many Latin American states, which have 
traditionally challenged for national control over foreign 
investment, very recently have also entered into such treaties. 
(90) 
Some socialist countries have also taken part in such treaties. 
(91) 
The U. S. bilateral treaties concluded with other nations, are known 
as treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (F. C. N. ). Since 
the end of World-War II, the U. S. government has negotiated a total 
of 44 of these treaties. 
(92) While both F. C. N. and bilateral 
investment treaties are planned for the same identical purposes, 
provisions included in these treaties might contain some 
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differences. (93) However, for the purpose of our study we treat both 
types of treaties equally as devices for preserving the traditional 
norms of customary international law. 
1.6.1 REASONS FOR BILATERAL TREATIES 
Bilateral treaties came into fashion after several multilateral 
efforts on the protection of foreign investment failed. Issues in 
foreign investment particularly those made by multinational companies 
(MNEs) involve sensitive factors such as national sovereignty, 
exploitation of national resources and national economic 
policies. 
(94) As we mentioned earlier, there is unlikely to be an 
international consensus, particularly in view of the claims made by 
developing countries to a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 
As we discussed earlier, the traditional norm of state responsibility 
has been the subject of an on-going controversy. Because of the 
uncertainty in the law on investment protection, bilateral treaties 
have been negotiated between developed and developing countries. 
These treaties have included provisions for the protection and 
treatment of direct foreign investment. Both BITs and F. C. N. S. 
treaties contain clauses concerning expropriation and compensation. 
The majority of the treaties protect foreign investment from a wide 
range of takings by the state including creeping expropriation. 
I 
1.6.2 COMPENSATION CLAUSES 
Compensation clauses in these treaties require the payment of full 
compensation. 
(95) The Hull formula of %prompt, adequate and 
effective' compensation is found in some of these treaties. Article 
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6 of the Sri Lanka-Switzerland Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion 
and 'Protection of Investments, describes the compensation payable 
upon the nationalization of property of Swiss nationals as follows: 
"Investments of nationals of either contracting party shall 
not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalization ... except 
for a 
public purpose and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the value 
of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
expropriation, or the impending expropriation became public 
knowledge and shall include interest at a normal commercial 
rate until the date of payment. Payments of compensation 
should be made without delay and shall be freely 
transferable at the official rate of exchange prevailing on 
the date used for the determination of value. The national 
or company effected shall have a right, under the law of the 
contracting party making the expropriation to prompt 
determination of the amount of compensation either by law or 
by agreement between the parties and to prompt review, by a 
Judicial or other authority of that Contracting Party, of 
its case and of the valuation of his or its investment * 
accordance with the principles set out in this article". 
(9ýP 
In treaties with some other developing countries also such references 
to the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation may be 
found. Another formula used in these agreements is referred to as 
"Just compensation" and to define just compensation as the full value 
of the nationalized property. Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty 
of Amity, Economic Relations and Consumer Rights concluded between 
the United States'and Iran provides that: 
"Property shall not be taken except for a public purpose, 
nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just 
compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively 
realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of 
the pýoperty taken; and adequate provision shall have been 
made at or prior to thý time of taking for the determination 
and payment thereof. "(97) 
Relying on bilateral treaties particularly, on clauses in these 
treaties referring to the "prompt, adequate, effective" compensation, 
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the Legal Adviser to the U. S. Department of State has recently argued 
that the Hull standard continues to be accepted. He stated that: 
"States have shown their legal practice by establishing a 
network of international treaties - provisions controlling 
compensation in expropriation are often contained in 
bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) 
treaties. In the case of the United States, many of these 
are with developing nations. They contain provisions 
calling for compensation in terms equivalent to the 
traditional standard, although there are slight drafting 
variations. The history of these agreements indicates that 
the parties recognized that they were thereby making the 
customary rule of international law exfiicit in the treaty 
language and re-affirming its effect. n( 
) 
Mann has also asserted that these* treaties establish, strengthen and 
enlarge the force of traditional conceptions. 
(99) 
obviously, bilateral treaties create obligations between parties and 
give protection to investors who are nationals of the state parties 
to the treaty, in that compensation must be paid them in accordance 
with the standards specified in the treaty in the event of 
nationalization. Where a nationalization is effected without payment 
of compensation in accordance with the standard specified in the 
treaty an international wrong is committed. As it is discussed in 
the Chapter 6 of this study, with regard to many expropriation cases 
and the compensation due for these cases, the U. S. claimants before 
the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal, have relied heavily on the Treaty of 
Amity. To the surprise of some, the Tribunal has also applied the 
Treaty's provibions in some of its decisions in such cases. 
However, the existence of bilateral treaties referring to the norm of 
full compensation cannot be regarded as evidence of a customary 
principle that full compensation must be paid upon nationalization or 
expropriation of foreign property. There is little uniformity in the 
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principles employed in the bilateral treaties. Metzger pointed out 
that in the U. S. practice, "Just compensation in local currency which 
need not be converted if exchange controls are maintained and the 
exchange is needed for the local population" 
(100) is sufficient. It 
has been maintained that the specific purpose of these treaties was 
not the formulation of a rule on compensation for nationalization. 
The treaties are concluded to secure mutual interests of value to 
both parties. The availability of raw materials and markets, the 
economic development of the host country and the resulting political 
friendship and the host country's perception of the role of foreign 
investment in development are the governing points in the conclusion 
of such treaties. 
(101) Many of Latin American states have refused to 
participate in such treaties. Some developing states which are 
members of the non-aligned movement, such as India, Mexico and 
Nigeria have not participated in these treaties. 
(103) It i's true 
that a large majority of third-world socialist and non-socialist 
countries have entered into such treaties. But these countries have 
asserted different norms on the international plane. From the 1960s 
onwards, particularly in the 1970s, developing countries have been 
challenging customary international law. They have voted for 
resolutions of the General Assembly which reject the standard of 
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation and assert the 
exclusive competence of the national courts to assess the 
compensation for nationalization property. Therefore it can be 
concluded that it is unlikely that these treaties will have a role in 
settling the dispute as to compensation for expropriation in 
international law. 
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So far we have been dealing with customary international law as a 
source of law supported by developed countries. We have also 
examined some other possible sources which according to developed 
states support and strengthen the customary international law of 
compensation. The case law in pre-World War II supported the 
traditional law of compensation. However, the principles of acquired 
rights, unjust enrichment and, also bilateral investment agreements 
did not bear out this rule. 
However, the decisions of arbitrations in post-World War II, arguably 
in principle, support the traditional full compensation standard 
although decisions do not refer to the specific formula of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. 
1.7 POST-WAR CASES 
Between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, a series of arbitrations 
discussed the international law of expropriation. The first series 
of these arbitrations were*Abu Dhabi (1951). 
(104) Qatar (1953); (105) 
ARAMCO (1958); (106) and Sapphire (1963). 
(107) These arbitrations 
arose out of termination or renegotiation of long term petroleum 
concessions by the governm ents of the Middle East countries. Since 
none of these concession agreements had a clear choice-of-law clause, 
consequently, ! ach tribunal applied, in one manner or another, 
"general principles of law". 
('08) In ascertaining the content of 
that law the arbitrators frequently cited as precedents the decisions 
of earlier international arbitral tribunals that had applied similar 
general principles or public international law. 
(109) Moreover, "in 
every instance the tribunal held the concessionary state to the terms 
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of its concession, or to damages for its breach, largely on the basis 
of the body of international precedents. "(110) The decision of the 
Tribunal in Sapphlre case is a clear example. The arbitrator 
referring to international precedents, recognised that the -full 
compensation standard applied to claims based on the abrogation of 
concession rights by a state instrumentality, and held this meant the 
compensation must include both the loss suffered (damnum emergens) 
and the profit lost (lucrum cessans): 
"According to the generally held view, the object of damages 
is to place the party to whom they are awarded in the same 
pecuniary position' that they would have been in if the 
contract had been performed in the manner provided for by 
the parties at the time of its conclusion The 
creditor should thereby be given full compensation. This 
compensation includes the loss suffered .... and the profit lost ... . The award of compensation for the lost profit for the loss of possible benefits has been f--Ruently 
allowed by international arbitral tribunals ... . 
(f'r) 
Therefore it can be concluded that these decisions continued a 
precedent-based jurisprudence of expropriation and can reasonably be 
argued to support a continued requirement under international law as 
of the mid 1960s for the payment of full compensation for 
expropriated property. 
However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, dozens of new states 
obtained their independence and challenged customary international 
law. Many of these governments found themselves saddled with foreign 
ownership of large sectors of their economies which they believed to 
have been imposed on them during colonial rule on unfair terms. 
(112) 
They desired to expropriate on a large scale, and they resisted the 
notion that they were subject to international standards in doing so, 
particularly with regard to compensation. Many of these states 
refused to consider themselves bound by a law in whose formation they 
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had not participated. They maintained that that law did not reflect 
their own cultural and legal traditions. 
(113) The law of 
expropriation and nationalization attracted their special animus as 
it purported to place strict limitations on how they could deal with 
foreign investors in control, of many of the new states' natural 
resources at the time of independence. 
(114) As far as the 
compensation issue is concerned, they contended that, if the 
traditional requirement of full compensation were applied to 
extensive expropriation, it would give the developed countries a veto 
over attempts to undertake fundamental reform of their economic and 
social structures. Accordingly, they adhered to the principle of 
partial compensation. Further, they pointed out that state practice 
in the post-World War II period has substantiated such requirement. 
PARTIAL COMPENSATION 
Adherents of partial compensation contend that modern international 
claims settlement practice has modified the traditional standard of 
full compensation, at least in the context of the modern extensive 
expropriation in pursuance of major reform of a country's social and 
economic structure. 
(115) Supporters of partial compensation, 
including Iran, argue that their view is more consistent than the 
traditional position with contemporary international practice. To 
substantiate týeir arguments, adherents of partial compensation rely 
on the predominant post-World War II practice of settling 
international claims controversies involving extensive expropriations 
through the use of the lump sum settlement device rather than through 
international adjudication. 
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1.8.1 LUMP SUM SETTLEMENTS 
The post-war lump sum settlements between capital exporting states 
negotiating on behalf of their deprived nationals and the 
nationalizing states demonstrate that even the western market states 
have settled for less than full value of the expropriated property in 
a substantial number of cases. 
(116) Such settlements were then 
cited, in turn as evidence of state practice demonstrating that 
international law no longer required full compensation. 
Nevertheless, the partial cpmpensation view is merely a 
generalization of past state practice rather than a statement of an 
accepted legal standard that is capable of reconciling post-war 
settlement agreements, which have ranged from minimal compensation in 
some cases to almost full compensation in others. 
(117 ) As a result 
controversy over the compensation standard remained to be resolved. 
In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly debated these different 
standards of compensation in connection with Resolution 1803. 
1.9 THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF 1803 ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY 
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
1.9.1 BACKGROUND 
In 1955 the Third Committee of the General Assembly approved a draft 
article, as a part of the Human Rights Covenants, on the right of 
self determination. The second paragraph of that article stated: 
"The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out 
of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
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mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence. " 
(118) The concept of 
economic self-determination derived from a General Assembly 
resolution of 21 December 1952. Approximately 10 years later, work 
in the UN Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
and the Economic and Social Council culminated in the adoption of 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) by the General Assembly on December 1962. 
1.9.2 THE U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF 1962(119) 
This resolution was in the form of a Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. The resulting compromise 
resolution created a new requirement of appropriate compensation. 
Paragraph 4 of Resolution provides that: 
"Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be 
based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or 
the national interest which are recognized -as over-riding 
purely individual or private interests, both domestic and 
foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate 
compensation in accordance with the rules in force in the 
state taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In 
any case where the-question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the state taking 
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreements 
by sovereign states and other parties concerned, settlement 
of the dispute should be(lT&de through arbitrators or 
international adjudication. " 
Approval was overwhelming, only France and South Africa voted against 
the resolution, with most Communist countries abstaining. 
Paradoxically, the compromise resolution purported to state a new 
requirement of appropriate compensation for expropriated property, 
while simultaneously reaffirming adherence to international law. 
However some western states, notably the United States, argued that 
the reference to international law reaffirmed the requirement of 
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traditional law of compensation and that appropriate compensation 
meant prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
(121) 
1.10 MODERN CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL LAW OF COMPENSATION 
1.10.1 BANCO NATIONAL DE CUBA v SABBATINO (1963) 
There were doubts as to the general acceptance of the traditional 
rule prior to, and contemporaneous with the passing of Resolution 
1803. The U. S. Supreme Court with regard to the above case stated 
that: 
"There are few if any issues in international law today on 
which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a 
state ower to expropriate the property of aliens IZ2 
"The disagreement as to relevant international law standards 
reflects a ... basic divergence between the national interests of capital importing and capital exporting nations 
and between the social ideologies of those countries that 
favour state control of a considerable portion of the means 
of production and those that adhere to a free enterprise 
system. (123) 
This division of opinions stems from the fact that many developing 
countries believe that the traditional rules of international law 
formulated in the nineteenth century were inapplicable to them. 
(124) 
These countries did not take part in the formulation of the rules and 
they did not consent to them either. Further, they believe that the 
traditional rul. es were not only formulated in their absence but were 
in fact formulated against their interests. 
(125) This challenge to 
the validity of the traditional rule was accompanied by pressure from 
developing countries for the formulation'of a new set of rules which 
would reflect the current state of the world and serve the interests 
of all nations. The challenge to the traditional rule was maintained 
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in the period between 1962 and 1973. In this period, the U. N. had 
extended its membership to approximately thirty new nations, the 
majority of which were developing nations in Africa and Asia. With 
the strength of the developing cotintries this enhanced in the General 
Assembly, a new resolution concerning permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources was passed. 
1.10.2 GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3171 (1973) 
Resolution 3171(126) clearly manifested a rejection of the 
traditional rule. As we saw earlier, Resolution 1803 was essentially 
a restatement of the traditional rule. It provided that in the case 
of nationalization, "the owner shall be paid appropriate 
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the state 
taking such measures ... and in accordance with international 
law.,, (127) In contrast, Resolution 3171 provided that "each state is 
entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the 
mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be 
settled in accordance with the national legislation of each -state 
carrying out such measures. w(128) Clearly, the requirements that the 
owner "shall be paid compensation" and that "disputes be settled in 
accordance with international law" are absent. 
Six months aftpr passing Resolution 3171, the U. N. General Assembly 
passed the Declaration(129) and Program of Action(130) on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order. That Resolution 
called for the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States ("Charter'). (131) 
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The call was met and the Charter was adopted in 1974 as General 
Assembly Resolution 3281 (120 votes in favour. 6 against, 10 
abstentions). 
1.10.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPENSATION IN THE 'CHARTER' 
The relevant principles of the Charter are to be found in Article 2 
as follows: 
1. Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent 
sovereignty including possession, use and disposal, overall 
its wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 
2. Each state has the right: 
... (c) to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of 
private property, in which case appropriate compensation 
should be paid by the state adopting such measures, taking 
into accounts its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any 
case where the question of compensation give rise to a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of 
the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is 
freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that 
other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign 
equality of states and 12 accordance with the principle of 
free choice of means. "(' ) 
Recall that the traditional rule called for compensation as one 
element of a legal expropriation. In contrast, the Charter seems to 
make compensation optional (at the option of the expropriating 
state). Therefore whereas the traditional rule inserted in 
Resolution 1803 provides that compensation "shall" be paid, the 
Charter provides that compensation "should" be paid. By providing 
only that appr opriate compensation should, but not necessarily must, 
be paid and that any controversy regarding compensation "shall be 
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its 
tribunals" the Charter reflected the traditional standard by simply 
ignoring it. 
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1.10.4 LEGAL EFFECT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND THE CHARTER 
CONTROVERSY 
General Assembly Resolutions are generally considered to be 
recommendations only and therefore are not legally binding. 
(133) 
Under Article 10 of the U. N. Charter, the General Assembly only 
issues "recommendations" and its resolutions have no binding force as 
obligations for member nations. Clagett believes, "resolutions ... 
should be regarded as having a political rather than a legal 
significance". He adds "voting for resolution became in the early 
1970s in effect a means for a state to establish "anti-imperialist" 
credentials at little cost in discouraging foreign investment, since 
many if not most of the states in question maintain investment codes 
or enter into bilateral treaties or agreements with foreign investors 
which give foreign investment far great protection than the recent 
General Assembly resolutions would suggest.. 
(134) 
Brownlie, however, points out that "such resolutions are vehicles for 
the evaluation of state practice and each must be weighed in 
evidentical terms according to its merits. " 
(135) PellonpAd also has 
stated that: 
"This is far from saying that resolutions per se - could 
create binding law, and none of the cases under review has 
so held. It is rather that such resolutions in certain 
specified circumstances may be regarded as evidence of 
customýary international law or can conjýi)ute - among other 
factors - to the creation of such law 0 
It should be pointed out that much of the difficulties in the 
assessment of the state of customary law is attributable to the 
debatable evidentiary value of certain sources on which arguments 
concerning this law are commonly based. Among these sources U. N. 
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Resolutions have attracted the most arguments. Therefore, as a 
preliminary question arbitral tribunals have had to decide what value 
U. N. resolutions have from the point of view customary international 
law. 
However, from 1963 to 1974 no international tribunal rules on an 
expropriation dispute. As a result, the evidentiary value of 
resolutions; and also the state of customary international law of 
compensation remained unclear. However, arbitrations concerning 
post-charter cases -of -expropriation have discussed both the 
evidentiary value of U. N. resolutions as well as the state of 
customary law of compensation. 
1.11 POST-CHARTER CASES 
The main post-charter cases are mainly BP v LIb7a 
(137) 
; the 
Texaco(138); Liamco(139); and the Aminoll(140) cases, and all 
concerned nationalization of oil concessions belonging to the 
companies in question. 
With regard to the question of evidentiary value of the U. N. 
resolutions, the decision issued in relation to the Texaco case seems 
an authoritative one. In that case, sole Arbitrator Dupuy, made the 
legal value of a particular resolution dependent on the circumstances 
surrounding itg adoption, particularly the voting conditions and on 
an analysis of its contents, i. e., whether the provision purports to 
state "the existence of a right on which the generality of the states 
has expressed agreement" or put forward propositions de lege 
ferenda. (141) 
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Examining these factors, Dupuy made a contrast between the Charter 
and the Resolution 1803. The Charter, Article 2 of which appears to 
leave the amount of compensation to the unfettered discretion of the 
state as well as certain other resolutions with similar contents, 
"were supported by a majority of states but not by any of the 
developed countries with market economies which carry on the largest 
part of international trade., '(142) The arbitrator concluded that 
"Article 2 of this Charter must be analyzed as a political rather 
than as a legal declaration. n(143) 
By contrast the Resolution 1803 "was supported by a majority of 
Member States representing all of the various groups", Dupuy stated 
that "on the basis of the circumstances of the adoption ... and by 
expressing an opinlo juris communis, Resolution 1803 ... seems to 
this Tribunal to reflect the state of customary international law 
existing in this field.,, 
(144) The decision in the Texaco case has 
been shared by those rendered in Aminoil and the U. S. Court case 
Banco Naclonal de Cuba. (145) As we will see in Chapter 6 of this 
study the decision of the Iran-U. S. -claims Tribunal in Sedco case 
also follows the same approach. 
Therefore according to the "post-charter arbitral practiceff it is 
still Resolution 1803 that expresses the requirements of 
international law concerning, compensation for the taking of alien- 
owned property. 
However, the requirement of "appropriate compensation in 
accordance with international law" as it was inserted in paragraph 4 
of the Resolution 1803, and the acceptance of this provision as the 
definition of customary international law, is only a step towards the 
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clarification of the legal situation. As PellonpA& points out HBy 
requiring "appropriate compensation ... in accordance with 
international law" Resolution 1803 only confirms the existence of an 
international law standard concerning compensation". 
(146 ) Therefore, 
in order really to understand the state of customary international 
law of compensation, we must go beyond such general linguistic 
formulations as Nappropriate compensation". We should examine 
whether a more concrete definition of the standard of compensation 
can be derived from the relevant court case. 
1.11.1 LIBYAN CASES - (THE POST-CHARTER JURISPRUDENCE) 
Between 1971 and 1974 the Libyan Arab Republic nationalized the 
interest and properties in Libya of B. P. 
(147); TOPCO and 
CALASIATIC(148); and LIAMCO(149); all foreign oil companies. These 
nationalizations created the disputes that set the stage for three 
major international arbitrations. (150) Three separate arbitral 
tribunals adjudicated the lawfulness of these nationalizations and 
the remedies of the companies. 
- The B. P. Arbitration 
On December 7,1971, all of the interest and properties of B. P. 
Exploration Corppany (Libya) Limited, (B. P. ), a subsidiary of British 
Petroleum Company Limited, were expropriated and the case went to 
arbitration. Firstly, sole arbitration, Lagergren, found that 
Libya's taking of B. P. 's interests and properties "violated public 
international law as it was made for purely extraneous political 
reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character He 
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added that "the fact that no offer of compensation has been made 
indicates that the taking was also confiscatory. "(151) 
To identify principles of international law common to Libyan law, as 
required by the choice-of -law provision in the concession agreement, 
the Arbitrator mainly relied on "the case law of international 
tribunals". (152) After examining that case law and after an attempt 
to distinguish Chorzow Faccor/153) as dictum, he concluded that: 
Poresritutio in integrum is available as a remedy under 
public international law for a state in breach of a 
"? gageement 
but only as a vehicle for establishing concessio 15 damages . 
Lagergren had not been required to calculate damages. However, his 
reference to reparation "as a vehicle for establishing damages" 
appears that he endorsed damages in full, at least in cases of 
unlawful expropriations. 
(155) 
- TOPCOICALASIATIC Arbitration 
The claims of the Texas Overseas Petroleum Company (TOPCO) and the 
California Asiatic Oil Company (CALASIATIC)(156) were heard jointly 
by Dupuy, as Sole Arbitrator. With regard to the law governing the 
arbitration, Dupuy determined that the arbitration was directly 
governed by international law. 
(157) While theoretically, municipal 
law of Libya c9uld be applicable, the arbitrator stated that "all the 
elements of this case support .... the adoption of a ... solution 
which is to consider this arbitration as being directly governed by 
international law'. (158) Like Lagergren, Dupuy relied heavily on the 
case law of international tribunals and held that rescirutlo In 
integrum was the appropriate remedy in international law for a 
wrongful expropriation. As we saw earlier, the arbitrator did state 
42 
Expropriation In International Law 
in dicta that the 1962 U. N. Resolution 1803, unlike the Charter, 
reflected the state of customary international law on 
compensation. 
(159) Again, we saw that this resolution referred to 
the payment of "appropriate compensation in accordance with 
international law,,. (160) Since the arbitrator stated that Resolution 
1803 expressed an opinlo jurls communIs, in the context of awarding 
the remedy of restitutio In Integrum, it is fair to conclude that he 
viewed the compensation standard under international law to be full 
value compensation. 
- LIAMCO Arbitration 
The Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (161) owned 25.5% of a 
concession, and it was expropriated by the Libyan government in two 
stages in September 1973 and February 1974. 
The concession agreement contained a choice of law clause. That 
clause provided that the agreement would be governed by and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of Libya common to the 
principles of international law, and, in the absence of commonality, 
in accordance with general principles applied by international 
tribunals. Analyzing this provision, the arbitrator declared that 
initially the proper law to apply in dispute was Libyan law. when 
consistent with international law and then general principles of 
law. (162) 
Determining the standard of compensation required in international 
law, the arbitrator analyzed opinions and U. N. Resolutions. Firstly, 
the arbitrator concluded that under both Libyan and international 
law, the nationalizing state had a duty to pay compensation and that 
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at a minimum the state should include the actual damage, the value of 
nationalized property. Secondly, he concluded that there was 
diversity of views with respect to the obligation to compensate for 
incorporeal property, such as the rights under the concession and 
whether that determination should include cessans, meaning lost 
profit. 
(163) 
The arbitrator found that Libya law required good faith observation 
of the concession agreement and therefore entitled Liamco to both 
damnum emergens and Lucrum cessans. (164) However, he pointed out 
that international law was less clear with this regard. He added 
international arbitral precedents were too dated to be relied on and 
the General Assembly resolutions, although not binding were 
represented "the recent dominant trend of international 
opinion". 
(165) Also he explained that post lump sum settlements 
contradicted a full compensation standard; and resticutio In integrum 
as opposed to damages would infringe on the authority of a sovereign 
within its own territory. 
(166) Accordingly, he stated that although 
"the classical formula of prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
remains as a maximum and a practical guide for assessment", it was 
not the only compensation standard applicable under international 
law. (167) After a general review of various sources of law, the 
arbitrator concluded that the right to compensation for all loss of 
future profit; for the unexpired term of a concession still is 
unsettled. He stated: 
"In such confused state of international law, ... it appears 
clearly that there is no conclusive evidence of the 
existence of community or uniformity in principles between 
the domestic law of Libya and international law concerning 
the determination of compensation for nationalization in 
lieu of specific performance and in particular concerning 
the problem whether or not all or part of the loss of 
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profits (lucrum cessans) should be included in that 
compensatioý '8 
ýn addition to the damage incurred (damnum 
emergens). ( 6 
Therefore, since under the choice of law clause he could find no 
commonality between Libyan law and international law on the 
compensation standard, the arbitrator resorted to equity, a general 
principle recognized as a supplementary source of law in both Libyan 
and international law to adopt a standard of equitable compensation. 
- AMINOIL Arbitration 
The AMINOIL Arbitration grew out for the nationalization of the 
American Independent Oil Company's (AMINOIL) Oil concession, by 
Kuwait in 1977. Kuwait agreed that it owed monetary compensation, 
but the parties disagreed over the method of valuation. As a result, 
the parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. 
(169) 
The tribunal noted that the applicable law to the dispute was 
international law which is also an integral part of the law of 
Kuwait. (170) Applying this choice of law AMINOIL was entitled only 
to appropriate compensation for a lawful taking of its property 
interests. The Tribunal referred to this standard as the most 
general formulation of the rules applicable to lawful 
nationalization, a standard which codified positive principles and 
wa: s not contested by the parties in this proceeding. 
The tribunal then held that the determination of "appropriate 
compensation" required an inquiry into all the circumstances relevant 
to the particular case". 
(171) And that compensation "must be 
calculated on a basis such as to warrant the upkeep of a flow of 
investment in the future"; and that, for such an important, long-term 
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contract, "there must necessarily be economic calculations, and the 
weighing up of rights and obligations, of chances and risks, 
constituting the contractual equilibrium". 
(172) As far as the method 
of valuing the expropriated interests is concerned, the tribunal 
accepted in principle, the proffered discounted cash flow method of 
valuing. 
(173) However if it held that the parties had agreed that 
AMINOIL would only receive a "reasonable rate of return" from its 
investment. (174) 
The tribunal's valuation analysis is an important international 
precedent because of its extensive discussion of valuation methods. 
As Gann also points out, although the tribunal adopted the standard 
of appropriate "compensation, the specific content given by the 
tribunal to that standard is totally consistent with the content 
given by the Department of State to the standard of "adequate" and 
"prompt" compensation". (175) In the valuation process the Tribunal 
rejected the nett book value method to the expropriation of an 
operational enterprise. Instead the tribunal held that fixed assets 
should be valued at their replacement value at the date of the 
taking, thereby taking into account not only the effects of 
depreciation and other market factors. 
(176) Second, it decided that 
an operational enterprise should be valued as a going concern which 
included compensation for future lost profits and takes inflation 
into account. 
(177) However, the method of going concern value has 
not uniformly been used in all nationalization cases. As we will see 
below, the American Federal Court in Cuba v Chase Manhattan Bank Case 
(1981) rejected application of such standard. With regard to 
valuation methods in general and the application of going concern 
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value in particular, some more consideration will be given in Chapter 
8 of this study. 
1.12 JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
As a result of the 1959 Cuban Revolution all branches of Chase 
Manhattan Bank were nationalized. In the Cuba v Chase Manhattan Bank 
case which arose out of that Revolution, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided an appeal involving claims for compensation for 
nationalized bank branches that had operated in Cuba from 1925 until 
1959. (179 This decision is the only recent judicial decision to 
consider the international standard of compensation for 
expropriation. The decision included a concise exposition of the 
history of the debate over the compensation standard and then 
rejected going concern value as at the date of the taking as the 
measure of compensation payable by Cuba on the facts of this case. 
It applied instead a standard which it described as providing both 
full and appropriate compensation. 
(180) The Court asserted that such 
a standard in some cases might require full compensation. However, 
on the facts of the Chase Manhatten Case the Court awarded nett asset 
or book value of the nationalized bank branches. 
(181) Rejecting the 
going concern value method with regard to this case, the court 
concluded that the revolution and its economic consequences, such as 
the emigration of wealthier nationals and the nationalization of 
other sectors of the Cuban economy made it unlikely that Chase could 
operate profitably after revolution. 
(182) Some more explanations 
about the effect of events or circumstances subsequent to the taking, 
in fixing the compensation due, will be given in Chapter 8 of this 
study. 
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Finally, a decision similar to the above was made by the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case of James and Others, concerning the 
application of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which provides Inter alla that every natural or 
legal person is entitled to the "peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions". 
(183) In its judgement the Court made it clear that in 
the event of taking of property Article I does not "guarantee a right 
to full compensation in all circumstances". 
(184) The Court continued 
"Legitimate objectives of public interest, such as pursued in 
measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater 
social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full 
market value". 
(185) 
The relevance of this decision to the INA case in the context of 
Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal has also been discussed in Chapter 8 of 
this study. 
Examining the post-charter case law (1971-82) it could be concluded 
that: (I) no tribunal has expressly adopted traditional standard of 
prompt, adequate and effective standard of compensation; (II) 
TOPCOICALASIATIC and AMINOIL Arbitrations concluded that the 
"appropriate compensation" standard as inserted in1803 Resolution is 
the international law standard. This standard was also supported in 
the Second Circuit's opinion in the Chase Manhatten Bank, although 
the Court asserted that such a standard in some cases might require 
full compensation. The LIAMCO arbitration concluded that equitable 
compensation is an acceptable formulation under general principles of 
law which are incorporated into international law. In LIAMCO, the 
award recited and then rejected the arguments for an established full 
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compensation standard that included lost profits. Nevertheless, as 
Norton points out it "based the largest part of the award of 
equitable compensation on a calculation of the claimant's lost 
profits. " 
(186) 
1.13 CONCLUSION 
It can be concluded that up to the year 1982, the international law 
standard to be applied in determining compensation in cases of 
expropriation and nationalization remained a controversial issue. 
The traditional standard of prompt, adequate and effective, meaning 
full compensation, including lost future profits in the case of 
ongoing business enterprises, was being challenged by proponents of a 
new, contemporary standard. The impact of this challenge was 
subsequently to be seen in the United States in the Section 712 of 
the Restatement (Third) which restated the standard as requiring 
"appropriate" or just compensation or an amount equivalent to the 
value of the property taken. 
(187) 
However, with regard to the issue of international law of 
compensation, the period from 1982 onwards could be considered as a 
new era in international law. In this period, as we mentioned 
earlier, the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal was established. With a broad 
jurisdiction,, for about a decade this Tribunal has been handling many 
expropriation and nationalization cases under international law. 
According to many international lawyers, this Tribunal is likely to 
have considerable influence on articulating and shaping principles of 
international law. Thus there must be examined: 
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(I) What standard of compensation has been applied in the awards of 
the Tribunal; and; 
(II) What has been the governing law i. e. public international law or 
the law of expropriating state in application of that standard; and 
(III) in application of any of these two laws what have been the 
contents of that law; and finally 
what have been the justifications in the application of any of 
these laws. 
Analyzing the awards of the Tribunal, requires some general 
explanation of the origins and the legal framework of the Tribunal. 
This will be presented in the next Chapter. 
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TRIBUNAL 
As we mentioned in the previous Chapter, the main purpose of this 
study is exploring the present status of the law of compensation in 
the awards of the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal. However, we are not 
examining the Tribunal itself in detail. Therefore, the material in 
this chapter is limited to a general description of the Tribunal and 
certain key provisions of the international agreements under which it 
was established. -Accordingly, this chapter will serve as a 
background for the chapters. that follow. 
2,1 THE ORIGINS OF THE TRIBUNAL 
2.1.1 THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
In the 1960s and the 1970s the Shah's Iran was adopted as the 
protector of the U. S. interest in the Persian Gulf region. (') There 
was a special state to state relationship between Iran and the U. S. 
This relationship led to a wide range of economic and financial ties 
between Iran as an oil-rich developing state and the U. S. Private 
Sector as an industrialized market. Hundreds of American 
Corporations were involved in Iran in projects worth many billions of 
dollars. As a result, by the end of the 1970s, more than 40,000 
Americans were living in Iran. (2) However, the presence of many 
Americans invoived in different areas of governmental machineries, as 
well as in private sectors, resulted in Iranian politicians in the 
early 1978, claiming that the Shah was under the control of Americans 
and served mainly their interests. 
(3) This attitude towards the 
Shah's regime provoked strikes in the oil and other industries, which 
were signs of protests against the Shah's relationship with týe U. S. 
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Politicians and revolutionary groups supported these strikes and 
claimed for self-reliance in the economy. In the autumn of 1978, 
strikes and anti-American incidents became more and more frequent in 
Iran. Thousands of Iranians were killed during that period of the 
Revolution. Foreigners also suffered in the process; American 
nationals, perhaps, more than the others. 
(4) 
There were many groups with different political ideals involved in 
revolutionary activities. Their ideals were ultimately channelled by 
the late Ayatollah Khomeini and other religious. leaders into an all 
out attempt to oust the Shah and, also, the American economic and 
military influence, which was claimed by the revolutionaries as the 
source of the Shah's power and the root of their difficulties. On 
the 16 January, 1979, the Shah left Iran never to return. The 
Islamic Revolution which forced the Shah to give up his power claimed 
complete victory on 11 February, 1979. 
During the Islamic Revolution in 1978 and early 1979, most projects 
involving American businesses in Iran were disrupted. As the 
Revolution advanced, contacts with various U. S. business interests 
were abrogated and their assets were expropriated or abandoned. 
(5) 
2.1.2 THE HOSTAGE CRISIS 
At the end of 'October 1979 the deposed Shah arrived in the U. S. for 
medical treatment. The Shah's reception by the U. S. provoked Iranian 
students to occupy the U. S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979. 
(6) 
As a result, the students took the staff of the Embassy as hostages. 
In exchange for the release of the hostages, the students demanded 
that the Shah and his assets be returned to Iran. After that the 
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Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi). proposed a plan to withdraw all 
its funds from U. S. banks. (7) 
2.1.3 THE U. S. RESPONSES 
In response to the above plan and the hostage-taking the U. S. banned 
oil imports from Iran and froze Iranian assets on 14 November, 1979. 
These were valued at some 12 billion dollars. (8) Other Western 
countries and Japan also imposed sanctions against Iran. This 
basically amounted to a prblAbition against the export of military 
supplies to Iran and an agreement not to extend new credit to Iran. 
Notably, some states and particularly Japan, which had been the 
largest purchaser of Iranian oil, at first refused to pay premium 
prices for Iranian oil and eventually stopped buying oil from 
Iran. (9) 
Concurrently, many American nationals and companies which had 
suffered losses in Iran in 1978 and early 1979, rushed to the Courts 
to obtain judicial attachments of Iranian property in the U. S. 
However, these law suits did not progress to any judgement or any 
decree. This was because a presidential order was made forbidding 
"entry to any judgement or of any decree or order of similar or 
analogous effect" against Iranian property. The U. S. Justice 
Department alsq requested that "no action be taken pending resolution 
of the hostage crisis". 
In December 1979, following to the efforts 'for release of the 
hostages the U. S. made an application against Iran before the 
I. C. J. (11) Ruling on the application in 15 December, the Court 
indicated interim measures which called for the immediate termination 
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of the detention of the Embassy's personnel; return of premises; and 
for reparation to be made to the U. S. for injury caused to it by 
hostage-taking. Iran did not take part in the proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the efforts for release were continued. These efforts 
were military as well as diplomatic. However, the military rescue 
attempt which took place in April 1980 and therefore preceded the 
I. C. J. final judgement was unsuccessful. 
(12) 
Coincidentally on 27 July 1980 the Shah died and two months later the 
Iran-Iraq broke out. The situation was very complicated. Following 
intense diplomatic activity and the abortive military episode, the 
mediation of a friendly power, to end the captivity of the hostages 
began. (13) Negotiations to end the crisis were conducted through 
good offices of the Algerian Government. For political reasons no 
Iranian official met with any American official. The process of 
negotiations -was an extremely complex one and as Judge Lagergren has 
pointed out "it was unique in legal history. n(14) 
Iran was under great pressure to negotiate the release of the 
hostages. (15) As a result, at last on 19 January 1981, Iran and the 
U. S. reached agreement on their release. 
2.2 THE ALGIERS ACCORDS 
The Iran-U. S. accord of 19 January 1981 could be said to be the 
biggest financial deal in history. (16) In simple terms, Iran agreed 
to release the hostages, and the U. S. agreed to effect the return of 
Iranian assets and the dismissal of litigation against Iran in U. S. 
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Courts. The agreement compromised two declarations of commitment and 
various technical arrangements. 
(17) 
2.2.1 THE DECLARATION OF ALGIERS 
This Declaration which is also called 'General Declaration' 
(18) 
records the Central Commitments of the Parties. 
In fact, in this Declaration the U. S. and Iran made Commitments 
regarding their future political relations, the release of the U. S. 
nationals held in Tehran and the freeing of Iranian assets frozen by 
the U. S. That Declaration also contained a pledge of non- 
intervention in Iranian affairs by the U. S. and several agreements 
concerning the return of Iranian assets and the settlement of U. S. 
claims. The Second Declaration, the Claims Settlement Agreement, 
provided for the establishment of the Iran-U. S. Claims Settlement 
Tribunal. (19) 
Following the Revolution, hundreds of claims had been filed in the 
United States Courts against Iran and a substantial portion of Iran's 
frozen assets had been attached in these judicial proceedings. 
Restoration of the financial status of Iran required that these 
judicial attachments be nullified. Therefore as a substitute for the 
U. S. Courts proceedings, the two governments agreed to establish an 
arbitral body (the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal) to hear and adjudicate 
claims by U. S. nationals against Iran and, additionally, certain 
claims by Iranian nationals against the U. S. government and between 
the two governments. The U. S. also waived its right to proceed 
further before the I. C. J. 
(20) Accordingly, the Ceneral Declaration 
provided that the U. S.: 
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"agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in the United 
States Courts involving claims of United States persons and 
institutions against Iran and its State enterprises, to 
nullify all attachments and judgements obtained therein, to 
prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to 
bring about te termination of such claims through binding 
arbitration". 
bl) 
The Claims Settlement Declaration (Agreement) established the Iran- 
U. S. Claims Tribunal as the mechanism for settling the related claims 
of Iran and the U. S. through binding Third-party arbitration. 
(22) It 
declared that: 
Claims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of the 
date filing of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Cour s of Iran, or of 
the United States, or of any other Court". 
(B) 
2.2.2 FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Following the above agreements, on 20 January 1981 $8 billion held by 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank and by overseas branches of U. S. 
banks was tranferred to an escrow account agreed to by Iran, and the 
hostages were released. 
(24) Other Iranian assets subsequently were 
released. Actually most of that unfrozen money went to pay off bank 
loans owed by Iran. Accordingly, the U. S. banks were repaid and were 
thus excluded from the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal. The non- 
bank U. S. claimants and all Iranian claimants, including Iranian 
banks, were obliged to seek remedies through the Claims Tribunal. 
out of the t6tal sum released to Iran by the U. S., some $3.667 
billion had to be transferred to American banks on account for their 
claims against Iran. 
(25) The remainder of this amount was allocated 
to a third party escrow account to meet Iran's claims. It is out of 
this source that Iran has been awarded $514 million, most of which 
was frozen Iranian assets. 
(26) 
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On the other hand, following its agreement with the U. S. in 1981, 
Iran deposited $1 billion in a third escrow account. This special 
security account was held in escrow by the Central Bank of Algeria, 
with a subsidiary of the Central Bank of the Netherlands and intended 
for the payment of the awards to U. S. claimants made by the Iran-U. S. 
Claims Tribunal. (27) Iran agreed to replenish this when occasion 
demanded in order to maintain a minimum of $500 million in the 
Security Account. Judge Lagergren believes that that "Security 
Account was established as compensation for the annulled attachments 
in the United States". (28) 
Soon after the accords were ratified by the U. S. government, the 
latter suspended all lawsuits in U. S. Courts against Iran that-were 
within the Tribunal jurisdiction. There were several hundred 
lawsuits pending by United States firms seeking some billions of 
dollars from Iran in payment of contracts or commercial agreements. 
These disputes concerned hundreds of incomplete construction 
projects, expropriation or nationalization of oil, gas and mineral 
properties as well as uncompleted contracts for both military and 
civilian goods. Claimants of lawsuits objected to the Algiers 
Declaration requiring the release and transfer of attached assets and 
the suspension of litigation in U. S. Courts in favour of Tribunal 
arbitration. 
(29) Nevertheless, the Algiers Declaration was 
eventually ratified by President Reagan and on 4 February 1981 he 
signed an executive order to implement the Declaration. 
(30) 
Following this order, the U. S. -Justice Department took action on 
26 
February 1981, to suspend most private lawsuits against Iran and to 
free attached Iranian assets for their transfer by 19 July 1981. 
(31) 
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In the Dames and Moore case, the Supreme Court also affirmed the 
President's power to accomplish this objective. The Court decided 
that the claim by Dames and Moore that suspension of its claims 
constituted a taking was not ripe and upheld the President's 
constitutional power to implement the Claims Settlement Declaration, 
resulting suspensions of lawsuits and transfers of the Iranian frozen 
assets. 
(32) 
Claimants with lawsuits felt that they might not be given the quality 
of justice or quantity of recovery that they might have obtained 
through a U. S. Court. However, as Brower and Davis point out, "those 
claimants who have recovered benefited greatly by access to the 
Security Account for payment and by the fact that Iran could not 
assert state or sovereign immunity defenses in proceedings before the 
Tribunal". (33) 
2.3 THE COMPOSITION AND CHARACTER OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The Tribunal consists of nine members, three appointed by Iran, three 
appointed by the United States and three others from third countries 
who are either selected by agreement of the six Iranian and the 
United States arbitrators, or appointed by an independent appointing 
authority. The nine members sit in three separate chambers, each 
consisting of 
in American, Iranian and third-country member, to hear 
and decide the claims. They also sit together as a full Tribunal to 
decide questions of interpretation of the Accords and basic legal 
issues common to a number of claims. 
The Tribunal has been described as "a unique international 
institution" (34 ) and its awards as "a gold-mine of information for 
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perceptive lawyers". 
(35) However, in a recent international 
commercial arbitration an arbitrator stated that "the decisions of 
the Tribunal, were not persuasive because the Tribunal after 
all involves a special type of arbitration". 
(36) 
The status of the Tribunal has aroused the curiosity of many academic 
lawyers since its formation. Is the Tribunal a private arbitral 
Tribunal created to resolve private law disputes arising under 
different systems of law, and to hear private law claims against Iran 
and the U. S.; or is the Tribunal an interstate Tribunal charged with 
ruling on the responsibility of the respondent state under public 
international law; or is it, as a further possibility, performing 
both functions? 
Academics have tried to answer the above questions by reference to 
various aspects of the Tribunal's jurisprudence. 
(37) Thus, while 
Lake and Dana have argued that the arbitrations of the Tribunal 
are"a-national", 
(38) 
another American' lawyer, the late Ted Stein, 
stated that "the lex -forl of the Tribunal is public international 
law". (39) Finally, a British scholar, Lady Hazel Fox, 
' 
states that 
the Tribunal "is the latest example of how a private party may .... 
have its private claims taken up by the state and presented through 
an interstate arbitration. 
(40) 
0 
The Tribunal's statement in Esphahadan v. Bank Tejarat, indicated 
that in its view, it is performing a dual function. 
(41) 
In that case which involved a dual nationality issue, the full 
Tribunal stated that while it was clearly an international tribunal 
established by treaty, and while some of its cases involved disputes 
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between two governments and involved interpretation and application 
of public international law, most disputes (including all those 
brought by dual nationals) involved a private party on one side and a 
government or government -controlled entity on the other, and many 
involved primarily issues of municipal law and general principles of 
law. It stated that in such cases it was the rights of the claimant, 
not of his nation, which were to be determined by the Tribunal and 
that this should be contrasted with the situation of espousal of 
claims in international law. 
(42) Furthermore, the Tribunal described 
itself in this context - as "a subsýtitute forum"' for the national 
courts of both counties and concluded that although the Tribunal was 
not an organ of a third state, it was not a tribunal where claims 
were espoused by a state at its discretion and decided solely by 
reference to public international law. 
(43) Thus the Tribunal not 
only has to decide issues of responsibility in public international 
law, it is also an arbiter of the private law duties of the 
respondent state. 
(44) On this view the Tribunal is a hybrid which 
rule on both the responsibility of the respondent state in 
international law and on its liability in private law. 
(45) 
Westberg points out that "the Tribunal was organized and operates on 
" (46) the pattern of earlier mixed international arbitral Tribunals . 
In the post-World War I period, mixed arbitral tribunals came into 
fashion as a consequence of the peace treaties, which established 
them to settle disputes arising out of claims of individuals affected 
by the war. 
(47) One of the features of mixed arbitral tribunals was 
that individuals were permitted to present their cases themselves. 
These tribunals enjoyed jurisdiction over claims of individuals 
against the foreign state as well as claims of individuals against 
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each other. The mixed arbitral tribunals, were usually composed of 
three members: one member named by each of the treaty parties and the 
third 'neutral' chairman, chosen by mutual agreement. If the parties 
failed to reach agreement on the chairman, a variety of alternatives 
were provided, including appointment by the Council of the League of 
Nations. (48) 
The mixed arbitral tribunals applied the law contained in the Peace 
Treaties and in some cases the national law of the parties, according 
to conflict of law rules. 
(49) The Peace Treaties provided a variety 
of procedures for the enforcement of the judgements of these 
tribunals, including payments to a clearing office. The workload of 
these tribunals was enormous. The Franco-German Arbitral Tribunal, 
for example, alone dealt with more than 20,000 cases. 
(50) 
Norbert Wuhler points out that, 
"For the development of international courts and tribunals 
the most important contribution rendered by the mixed 
arbitral tribunals was the 5 fyanting 
to individuals of direct 
access to the Tribunals". 
( 
Considering the above descriptions of the mixed arbitral tribunals, 
it seems that the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal is very similar. 
However, as Fox also points out, the Tribunal has its own novel 
features which distinguishes it from those Tribunals. 
(52) This 
Tribunal was iýtended to be a court, to proceed like a court and to 
give decisions like a court. The machinery for execution of the 
Tribunals' awards was provided under the Constitutive instruments 
that created it. i. e. a billion U. S. dollars escrow fund, with a 
promise by one treaty party to replenish that fund whenever it fell 
below U. S. $500 million. 
(53) Through this account private parties' 
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claims, as well as state parties claims, can be paid. As Khan points 
out, this enforcement machinery greatly strengthens the judicial 
character of the Tribunal. 
(54) The General Principles in the General 
Declaration also emphasised the intention to achieve a settlement of 
outstanding private law claims, as well as public international law 
claims against either state. 
(55) Thus Principle B of the General 
Declaration stated that "it was the purpose both parties ... to 
terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and 
the nationals of the other and to bring about the settlement and 
determination of all such claims through binding arbitra*tion". 
(56) 
Article II(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement provides that: 
"An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of 
deciding claims of nationals of the United States against 
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United 
States, and any counter-claim which arises out of the same 
contract, transaction of occurrence that constitutes the 
subject matter of that national's claim, if such claims or 
counter-claims are outstanding on the date of this 
Agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise 
out of debts, contracts (including transactions which are 
the subject of letters of credit or bank guarantees), 
expropriations or other measures affecting property rights, 
excluding claims described in Paragraph 11 of the 
Declaration... and claims arising out of the actions of the 
United States in response to the conduct described in such 
paragraph, and excluding claims arising under a binding 
contract between the parties specially providing that any 
disputes there under shall be within the sole jurisdiction 
of the comp )ent 
Iranian Courts in response to the Majlis 
, 
5n 
position. ---' 
) 
Taking the Principle B of the - General Declaration and the above 
Article together not only shows the international character of the 
Tribunal, but also clearly indicates the fusion of state and private 
party claims in one procedure. 
(58) 
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Article V of the Claims Settlement Agreement states the basis on 
which claims before the Tribunal are to be decided and "is of 
fundamental importance to any understanding of the nature and 
function of the Tribunal. "(59) It declares that "the Tribunal shall 
decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such 
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international 
law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account 
relevant usages of the trade, Contract provision and changed 
n(60) circumstances. 
The requirement that the Tribunal's awards be made on the basis of 
law "evokes a particular conception of international 
arbitration". 
(61) This has been the conception since the 1899 Hague 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 
(62) 
For Article 15 of that Convention states: "International arbitration 
has for its object the settlement of differences between states by 
judges of their own choice and on the bas1s of respect for law. ý(63) 
This conception, of course, is not restricted to public international 
law arbitrations. The UNCITRAL rules apply it in the area of private 
arbitration as well. However, the Tribunal's applicable law clause 
differs from that specified for similar claims tribunals in the past, 
as the Tribunal is not limited to a single body of law or legal 
principles bu. t "must consider that seemingly broader concept of 
respect for law". 
(64) This, as Judge Mosk has pointed out: 
"The Tribunal invoýý? s an amalgam of public and private 
international _. 
6) 
All these special features of the Tribunal have led Stewart and 
Sherman to conclude that: 
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"The Tribunal is a unique institution, representing of the 
most ambitious and complex international claims adjudication 
programmes ever undertaken. "(66) 
, 
2.4 THE TRIBUNAL'S RULES OF PROCEDURE 
2.4.1. UNCITRAL RULES 
Article III, Section 2 of the Claims Settlement Declaration 
prescribed the procedural rules to be followed in conducting the 
business of the Tribunal. These are the arbitration rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law or UNCITRAL. 
(67) 
UNCITRAL's main objective is to harmonize and unify the law of 
international trade as well as to co-ordinate the work of 
organizations active in this field. 
(68) In order to assist with the 
resolution of international trade disputes, UNCITRAL adopted 
Arbitration Riles in 1976, Conciliation Rules in 1980, Guidelines for 
Administering Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 
1982 and the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 
1985. (69) 
With regard to application of the UNCITRAL Rules by the Tribunal, 
Judge Bellet states that: 
"One yarticularly beneficial opportunity proved by the 
Algiers negotiators was in fact, the occasion to apply the 
UNCITRAL Rules - which only date from 1976 - on a large 
scale to a multi-case arbitral Tribunal. By enacting the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the United Nations had sought to establish a 
body of procedural rules embodying a compromise between 
common and civil law systems. It was to this compromise 
that the Iranian jurist... and the American jurýn)agreed, 
and the Tribunal benefited considerably thereby. " 
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2.4.2 MODIFICATION OF THE UNCITRAL RULES 
The Claims Settlement Declaration permits parties to modify UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules as considered necessary by the two Governments. 
(71) 
Also the Tribunal is allowed modification of the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules with respect to arbitral proceedings to ensure the efficient, 
just and equitable management of a substantial case load through a 
bilingual judicial process. 
(72) 
The UNCITRAL arbitration rules, as modified by the Tribunal and 
adopted as "Tribunal's Rules' apply to all proceedings before the 
Tribunal. In accordance with these Rules the Tribunal, for each 
case, generally receives four written submissions as well as 
documentary evidence. These are a statement of claims, a statement 
of defence which may contain a counter-claim, a reply and a 
rejoinder. 
(73) If the Tribunal cannot reach a conclusion on the 
basis of written submissions, it will proceed to hold a hearing. In 
most complex cases the Tribunal may invite the parties to a pre- 
hearing conference with a view to clarifying issues and perhaps 
settling points of order to be observed at the hearing. 
The rules, in general, have provided the Tribunal and its constituent 
chambers with a large degree of flexibility in determining the 
procedures suiýable for the handling of individual arbitrations and 
various types of cases. 
(74) The Tribunal however, has been 
criticized by some Americans for being too flexible in certain 
respects, particularly in granting time extensions to Iranian 
respondents that have delayed proceedings and increased the 
claimant's cost. 
(75) 
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Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the Tribunal has not only 
demonstrated the usefulness of international arbitration in general, 
but its procedural decisions also provide useful interpretations of 
the UNCITRAL Rules and demonstrates their usefulness. 
With reference to the modified UNCITRAL Rules (Tribunal Rules), Judge 
Bellet has accurately summarised the position in his statement that: 
modification has had at least three beneficial effects. 
First it permits the parties to evaluate their likelihood of 
success before the Tribunal; second, it assists the 
arbitrators by assuring consistency in their jurisprudence; 
and third, the modification encourages c ntators critical 
analysis of the evolving jurisprudence. "FT" 
2.5 THE SCOPE OF THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION 
The Tribunals' Jurisdiction is dealt with in three separate sections 
of Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Section 2 grants 
jurisdiction over certain "official claims of the United States and 
Iran against each other., 
(77) Section 3 confers the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction in deciding "any dispute as to the interpretation of 
performance of any provision of" the General Declaration. 
(78 ) For 
our purposes however, the Tribunal's most important jurisdiction is 
included in Section 1 of Article II. That section empowers the 
Tribunal, on the basis of respect for law, claims of U. S. nationals 
against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the United States 
arising "out of debts, contracts ... expropriation or other measures 
" (79) affecting property rights ... 
other jurisdictional requirements, affecting claims under Article 
II(l) are that the claims and counter-claims have been outstanding on 
19 January 1981, the date of the Algerian accords, and that the 
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claims have been filed with the Tribunal no later than 19 January 
1982. (80) 
Certain types of claims were expressly excluded from the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction and should be mentioned. 
2.5.1 DIRECT IRAN CLAIMS AGAINST U. S. NATIONALS 
The Tribunal is interpretive case Number A/2 determined that it had 
no jurisdiction to hear claims by Iranian government entities against 
U. S. nationals. 
(81) So while Iran could make a counter-claim against 
any U. S. national which made a claim against, Iran at The Hague. Iran 
could not make a direct claim against those U. S. nationals who did 
not submit their claims to the Tribunal. There were many cases in 
which the U. S. party chose not to go to the Tribunal. Consequently, 
following this decision, Iran withdrew 1330 claims from the 
Tribunal. (82) 
2.5.2 THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE 
. 
Article II of the Claims Settlement Declarations excludes from the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal claims arising under a binding contract 
between the parties specifically providing that any disputes 
thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the component 
Iranian courts . This was 
in response to the Majlis position. 
(83) 
The Majlis (Iranian Parliament) position was expressed in a single 
article Act of Parliament, which authorized the Iranian government to 
proceed with the settlement through arbitration. The Act states: 
"The (Iranian) government is authorised with regard to 
financial and legal disputes between the Government of the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran and the American Government not 
stemming from the Islamic Revolution of Iran or the 
occupation of the American Centre of Conspiracy, to take 
action through mutually agreed arbitration, taking into 
account the provisions approved by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly, and to resolve and settle the said disputes. 
Note: Regarding the disputes the handling of which by 
Competent Iranian Courts has been envisaged in the relevant 
agreement, such disputes will 
. 
Tr be covered by the 
provisions of the single article.. 
( 4ý 
Accordingly, in the Iranian view, any contract which included a 
clause suggesting Iran as a possible forum was excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. However the U. S. parties argued that a 
claim could be excluded only where (1) the claim arose under a 
contract between the arbitrating parties, (2) the contract 
specifically provided that any dispute thereunder was to be within 
the sole jurisdiction of the Competent Iranian Courts and (3) the 
contractual selection of Iranian Courts was binding on the 
parties. 
(85) In a series of interlocutory awards the full Tribunal 
decided that it had no jurisdiction to determine if the choice-of- 
forum clauses were binding because the Claims Settlement Agreement 
did not expressly grant such power. 
(86) As a result in World Farmers 
Trading Inc. v Government Trading Corp, for example, Chamber one of 
the Tribunal dismissed a claim against one of the respondents because 
it was based on a Contract which states that "eventual disputes must 
be finally and exclusively settled in Iranian Courts". 
(87) However, 
the Tribunal In other cases has construed such clauses strictly, 
upholding only those that "unambiguously restrict jurisdiction to the 
Court of Iran". 
(88) The decision of the Tribunal in the TCSB Inc. v 
Iran is an example. The related clause of the Contract in this case 
provided for referral of disputes to a joint committee and then 
settlement "according to the laws of Iran and if necessary by 
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arbitration or by reference to Competent Courts". (89) Nevertheless, 
the Tribunal found that it did not confer sole jurisdiction on the 
Iranian Courts, and so the Tribunal was found to have 
jurisdiction. (90) 
In addition, claims of either the United States Government or former 
hostages arising out of the hostage taking in the American Embassy in 
Tehran were excluded from the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 
Furthermore claims arising out of injury to the United States 
nationals on their property as a result of popular movements in the 
Course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the 
Government of Iran were excluded. (91) 
2.6 THE WORK OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The Tribunal has addressed an enormous caseload. As Lillich has 
stated, "In recent history no arbitral tribunal has faced the 
enormous task now before the Tribunal". (92) 
As we mentioned earlier, all claims, other than interpretive disputes 
had to be filed with the Tribunal by 19 January 1982. A total of 
3,816 claims were filed before the deadline. These included 965 
cases of more than $250,000, or in other words, "large claimsn, 2782 
*#small claims"' (claims of less than $250,000), and 69 nB" cases 
(disputes directly between the two goverrunents). In addition, 24 "A" 
cases, that is disputes about the interpretation or compliance with 
the accords, have been filed. Of the cases filed as originally 
classified, the U. S. or U. S. nationals filed 3 "A" cases, 18 nB" 
cases, 558 large claims and all of the small claims. Iran, or 
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Iranian nationals, filed 21 "A" cases, 51 "B" cases, 407 large claims 
and no small claims. 
(93) By contrast, the Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, between 1977 
and 1981, averaged 243 requests for arbitration annually and 
constituted approximately two hundred panels each year. These ICC 
cases involved less than $250,000 and would be small claims in the 
Tribunal. (94) 
The cases filed by American claimants generally involved alleged 
breaches of contract and expropriations and nationalizations. In 
this study however, we will focus on the expropriation and 
nationalization cases. Claimants in the cases included many of the 
largest American companies. Claims under $250,000 (the small 
claims), unlike the other claims are presented by the government on 
behalf of the claimants. The precise total of the claims brought 
before the Tribunal has never been tallied. However, estimates have 
ranged as high as $60 billion. 
(95) 
The majority of American claimants in large cases conforms to the 
following pattern: 
(a) The claimant is a national of the U. S. as defined in Article 
VII, paragraph l(b) of the Claims Settlement Declaration; 
(b) each resýondent named is a party against which the claimant is 
entitled to file a claim before the Tribunal pursuant to the Claims 
Agreement; 
(c) the claim concerned was outstanding on 19 January 1981, the date 
of the Claims Agreement; and 
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(d) the claims in question arises out of a contract, an 
expropriation, or other measures, affecting property rights and is 
not a claim excluded from jurisdiction pursuant to Article II, 
paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
2.7 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISPRUDENCE 
The Tribunal has made awards on a wide range of issues of a 
substantive nature, many concerning nationalization and breaches of 
contract. Up to September 1990, the Tribunal had issued 489 awards, 
76 interlocutory and interim awards and 838 case terminations. 
(96) 
Over the ten years the Tribunal has been dealing with claims, it has 
completed 10198 case depositions or an average of roughly 458 cases 
per year, or 38 per month. As Westberg states, this is "a record 
that must compare favourably around the world". 
(97) In addition, the 
Tribunal's awards are being published in both English and Farsi. 
Significantly separate and dissenting opinions of arbitrators with 
regard to different cases and concerning many of the fundamental 
issues of law are also being published. These, together with the 
Tribunal's judgements, provide a rich deposit of legal authority on 
international business transactions. As Judge Mosk had declared: 
"These opinions should be of value to practitioners who 
advice on international transactions, to those who are 
involved in international Commercial litigation, and to 
whose who will be involved in e tablishing dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the future". 
(Al 
Examining the awards of the Tribunal, Swanson has commented that: 
"In terms of the sheer number of decisions, it will be 
difficult for international legal scholars to ignore the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal". 
( , 99) 
85 
The Legal Framework of the Tribunal 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the international law of state responsibility 
for injury to foreign investors presents a number of unresolved 
problems. Because so many measures, both formal and informal, taken 
by the Iranian government affected the business of the U. S. 
investors, the Tribunal is an unusually good position to affect 
development of the law in this area. 
(100) 
As we saw earlier, the Islamic Revolution was characterized by strong 
anti-American rhetoriC. This was increasingly accompanied by mass 
demonstrations, political disturbances and also strikes and riots. 
Key industries, including oil production and processing, and banking, 
were from time to time disrupted by strikes. Naturally, it was 
difficult for U. S. Companies to operate normally and to carry out 
routine business transactions. As a result, many American businesses 
evacuated the dependents of their expatriate employees. They hoped 
that conditions would improve shortly. However, when the situation 
continued to deteriorate, the bulk of American businesses withdrew 
all or most of their employees between December 1978 and January 
1979. 
After the Revolution, during March-June 1979, some businesses made 
tentative contact with the new government in an attempt to return to 
Iran and resume work. The new government also contacted others with 
invitations td return. However, some companies took the position 
that force majeure conditions had totally interrupted their 
contractual obligations. 
(101) Others which had subsidiary or 
affiliate operations, attempted to continue to manage their business 
through their local staff and directors by exercising their 
shareholders' rights. 
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The new government initiated several steps to bring the Iranian 
economy more under its control. Beginning in June 1979 the new 
government embarked on a systematic programme of 
nationalization. 
(102) Banks were nationalized on 7 June 1979, and 
insurance companies on 25 June 1979. (103) In addition, Iran 
nationalized all metal production, ship building, automotive and 
aircraft industries. 
(104) As far as the objective of these 
nationalizations are concerned they were intended (1) to re-order 
Iranian industry, which was in turmoil after the departure of the 
Shah; (2) to redistribute wealth and ameliorate the harsher aspects 
of the capitalistic system; and (3) to remove Iran's dependence upon 
foreign capital. 
(105) 
In addition, to consolidate the political and financial objectives of 
the Revolution, the Iranian government introduced laws for the 
replacement of business management under a variety of circumstances. 
As a result many of the remaining U. S. companies operations in Iran 
were informed that their designated managers had been "provisionally" 
replaced with managers or directors appointed by the government. 
(106) 
These measures resulted in many claims before the Tribunal. While 
American claimants in these cases have argued that such designations 
have deprived them of their properties, the Iranian respondents have 
generally maintained that the appointment of Provisional Managers 
took place to keep the companies in a good order and productive. 
(107) 
The Tribunal's decisions have thus had to deal with many different 
issues. Accordingly, while some authors(108) have seen the 
significance of the Tribunal's decisions in their discussion of what 
level of host state interference amounts to a taking, others put the 
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emphasis on its treatment of the amount of compensation 
required. 
(109) It is certainly clear that, as Lee points out there 
has been "a tremendous opportunity for the Tribunal to make 
contributions to the law of international claims covering such 
complex areas as diplomatic protection of aliens abroad, state 
responsibility for injuries to aliens, expropriation of aliens, 
property, compensation for expropriation, as well as valuation, 
etc". 
(110) 
In this study, Chapter 3 will examine the concept of a "taking" in 
the context of the Tribunal. Since proof of the date of the taking 
is a necessary element in a successful claim and at the same time has 
a great impact on the valuation of the dispossessed property Chapter 
4 will discuss the issue of timing in the decisions of the Tribunal. 
Chapter 5 then deals with the general issue of the standard of 
compensation, while Chapter 6 discusses the compensation standard 
under the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the U. S. 
A crucial area of the Tribunal's awards which has close links to the 
standard of compensation is the issue of how to actually calculate 
damages (or compensation) based on the designated compensation 
standard. Accordingly, Chapter 7 discusses the quantification of 
damages in the awards of the Tribunal. 
Having examining the view points of both parties before the Tribunal 
with regard to the full compensation standard in the Chapter 7, 
Chapter 8 examines the Tribunal's own interpretations of the concept 
of full compensation. Some general conclusions will round off this 
survey of the Tribunal's jurisprudence in Chapter 9. 
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In the previous Chapter it was briefly mentioned that the Tribunal 
has issued significant decisions relating to the taking of foreign 
investment. Here we will examine selected decisions of the Tribunal 
concerning interferences by the host state which amount to 
expropriation under contemporary standards of international law. 
However, before examining the Tribunal's decisions with that regard, 
we shall analyse some general legal issues with regard to taking in 
international law. 
3.1 TAKING IN GENERAL 
As Verwey and Schrijuer have also pointed out it is almost a truism 
to say that "few subjects are as controversial in international law 
today as the taking of foreign property". 
(') 
As we mentioned in Chapter One since the Soviet Revolution and the 
extention of the public sector in many economies, both socialist and 
non-socialist, the conflict of interest between foreign investors and 
host states, seeking to obtain control over their own economies, has 
become more acute. However, it must not be forgotten that even in 
laissez-faire economies, the taking of private property for certain 
public purposes and the establishment of state monopolies have long 
been familiar. (2) 
Takings are diificult to define under international law. Traditional 
scholars have attempted to define and distinguish different types of 
taking such as nationalization, expropriation, and confiscation. An 
expropriation has been defined as the state's taking "possession of 
personal, individually held assets and rights of foreigners and 
usually making prompt and fair payment for them". (3) In contrast in 
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nationalizations the host state takes property in the larger 
interests of society to advance a program of economic and social 
reforms "in order to have the ownership of wealth and natural 
resources, as well as the means of production perform a social 
function". (4) A confiscation has been defined as "the deliberate 
seizure of property by a state without provision for adequate 
compensation; it usually implies the denial of any right to 
restitution or damages". 
(5) 
However, as it has been pointed out by Brownlie, the relevant 
terminology remains unsettled. He states that: 
"The terminology of the subject is by no means settled, and 
in any case form should not take precedence over substance. 
The essence of the matter is the deprivation by state organs 
of a right of property either as such, or by perManent 
transfer of the. power of the management and control". (b) 
Brownlie has also provided us with a brief explanation of the 
meanings of the related terms, "Confiscation", "nationalization", and 
"socialization": 
"If the compensation is not provided, or the taking is 
regarded as unlawful, then the taking is sometimes described 
as confiscation. Expropriation of one or more major 
national resources as a part of a general new programme of 
social and economic reform is now -generally referred to as nationalization or socialization". (/) 
The U. S. position embraces a broader definition of expropriation 
including within its scope certain economic interests in addition to 
the traditional concept of property rights. This position has most 
recently been articulated in the 1986 Revision of the Restatement of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: 
"712 ... A state is responsible under international law for 
injury resulting from: 
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of 
another state that is (a) not for a public purpose, or (b) 
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discriminatory, or (c) not accompanied by provision for just 
compensation.... 
(3) other arbitry or discriminatory acts or omissions by the 
state that impair properC7 or other economic Interests of a 
national or another state". (8) 
However, the word 'taking' in this study is used as a general concept 
of deprivation by the state of alien-owned property, and as such it 
encompasses both 'expropriation' and 'nationalization'. By the 
former expression we mean single, more or less isolated cases of 
deprivation, while the term nationalization indicates large scale 
takings, especially those which affect a whole industry or natural 
resource. 
As we saw in the previous Chapter, by applying Article II(l) of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal can resort to a wide 
range of legal rules for the wide variety of claims arising in an 
economic context. However, the scope of the present Chapter is 
limited to the Tribunal's contribution concerning one category of 
such rules and one area of subject matter, i. e., international law as 
applied to the taking of foreign property. Considering the 
controversiality of the concept of 'taking' in international law and 
taking into account the relatively low number of judicial and 
arbitral precedents, it seems this subject is a topic in which the 
Tribunal has the potential role of clarifying the law in a manner 
that is important. The legal position of the U. S. and its nationals 
(which it can be said to be a representation of the western legal 
position) is confronted by the legal position of Iran (which could be 
said to be a representation of the third world position) in cases 
involving the various circumstances of alleged 'takings. When 
applying international law to the various factual settings the 
Tribunal is in a position to give rulings which will be treated as 
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authoritative statements of law by other tribunals and decision- 
makers. Remembering this we will attempt to present the Tribunal's 
practice and thereby to highlight its possible contributions. 
However, in a discussion on the "taking of property" the first issue 
which however should be addressed is, the basic question of what is 
property in the meaning of the relevant legal rules. Accordingly 
first we will examine that basic issue. 
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
Property has been defined by municipal legal systems including land 
as well as various kinds of tangible objects. However, the notion of 
property is not restricted to mere physical or tangible objects. 
Sometimes rights that fall under the category of contracts rights are 
treated as property too. Lawson and Rudden in their monograph on the 
law of property explain that: 
"If the right created by contract can be transferred from 
one person to another, the law regards them as a species of 
property. Indeed English law call them thiR through it 
uses the old French jargon choses in action". 
Therefore alongside physical objects the law treat certain "abstract 
things" as property including for example, debts, and shares in 
Companies; contractual rights; and intellectual property such as 
patents and copyrights. However, in international law the question 
of non-material rights, particularly contractual rights such as 
property susceptible to a taking has been rather more controversial. 
Therefore, it is necessary for tribunals involving in international 
petroleum agreements, for example, to analyse the legal nature of 
petroleum concessions. Whether they are property rights or mere 
contract rights is a critical issue affecting the right of the state 
to interfere with such rights. In the LIAMCO arbitration, the Sole 
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Arbitrator considered property as covering both corporeal and 
incorporeal property, with the latter being "those rights that have a 
money value". 
(10) He found concession rights to be included under 
the category of incorporeal property. He explained that: 
"This assertion is recognized by international precedents, 
as was held for instance by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in its Award delivered on 13 October 1922 in the 
dispute the dispute betweey the United States of America and 
the Kingdom of Norway". (" 
He further explained that that view was in harmony with the municipal 
law of most legal systems, including that of Libya and with Islamic 
Jurisprudence. (12) 
In clarifying the concept of concession rights, Higgins points out: 
the attack on the inviolability of concession rights 
comes not from a rejection of concessions as property 
rights, but from changing views about permitted 
interferences with property rights. 
For the moment, it should be noted that there are today 
certain jurists who seek to enlarge the matters covered as 
property... . The so called New Property Theorists have 
argued that the conception of property should be broadened 
to include non-proprietary rights that fulfil th same 
economic and social functions as rights of property". 
t13) 
In addition, international law and practice has generally adopted a 
wide property concept(14) and, as we shall see below, the practice of 
the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal also has followed such approach. This 
Tribunal in several cases has accepted that elements such as goodwill 
and future profitability, as well as the question of contractual 
rights can be the object of expropriation. 
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3.2.1 THE TRIBUNAL'S CASE 1AW 
- Starrett v Iran(15) 
In this case concerning the expropriation of Shah Goli housing 
Company, the claimants argued that the expropriation was not limited 
to items such as buildings, but also included contractual rights to 
complete the project as well as the earned reasonable profits. 
Accepting this the Tribunal declared that: 
"There is nothing unique in the Claimant's position in this 
regard. They rely on precedents in international law in 
which cases ... of expropriation or taking, fare] primarily 
aimed at physical property. In this case it appears from 
the very nature of the measures taken by the Government of 
Iran in January 1980 that these measures were aimed at the 
taking of Shah Goli. The Tribunal holds that the property 
interest taken by the Government of Iran must be deemed to 
comprise the physical property as well as the right to 
manage the project and to complete the construction in 
accordance with the Basic Project Agreement and related 
agreements, and to deliver the apartments and collect the 
proceeds of the sale as provided in the Apartment Purchase 
Agreements". (16) 
This case could be construed as a confirmation of the susceptibility 
of contractual rights to a taking only to the extent that such rights 
are related to expropriation or nationalized physical property. 
However the decision of the Tribunal in Mobil Oil Iran ec al confirms 
that "there is no inherent qualification of that kind". 
(17) 
Generally speaking, in cases concerning the alleged taking of 
concession rijhts affecting Iran's natural resources, the Tribunal 
has held that such rights may constitute objects of a taking under 
international law, and this not withstanding the fact that the law 
chosen by the parties to be applicable in their contractual relations 
is other than international law. 
(18) Therefore, in the Mobil Oil 
case, which concerned the alleged taking of the Sales Purchase 
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Agreement (SPA) (19) concluded between Iran and a consortium of major 
oil companies, the Tribunal stated that: 
73. "In these cases ... the lawfulness of an expropriation 
must be judged by reference to international law. This 
holds true even when the expropriation is of contractual 
rights. A concession, for instance, may be the object of 
a nationalization regardless of the law the parties chose (20) as the law of the contract". 
Yet in the Amoco International Finance Corporation Case(21) the 
Tribunal pointed that: 
108.11 ... expropriation which can be defined as a compulsory 
transfer of property rights, may extend to any rights 
which can be -ýhe- object of a commercial transaction, 
i. e., fýý , T)ly sold and 
bought, and this has a monetary 
value". ,, 
Accordingly, as we mentioned earlier, the Tribunal's practice also 
confirms the idea that any challenge against the inviolability of 
concessions or other contractual rights "comes not from a rejection 
of concessions as property rights, but from changing views about 
permitted interferences with property rights". 
(23) In addition, in 
the Amoco case, the Tribunal confirmed that the property rights may 
be extended to any rights and is not limited, for instance, to 
contractual rights. However, in the Starretc case the Tribunal held 
that the property rights in the agreement was limited only to 
contract rights which are closely related to physical property which 
has also been expropriated. 
0 
3.3 FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS OF A TAKING 
As we mentioned in the first chapter, a state's right to expropriate 
or nationalize foreign property is not as such in dispute. However, 
Verwey and Schrijver, while confirming such a right, also point out 
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circumstances that may render a taking illegal under international 
law. They say: 
There is no doubt, in any case, that in the course of our 
century multilateral negotiations, international reactions 
to "nationalizations" and treaty practice have proven the 
correctness - at least with respect to the taking of foreign 
property which (a) is not explicitly prohibited by treaty or 
contract (as in the case of "stabilization clauses" or 
trunassailablility clauses". and which (b) serves a public 
purpose- of the thesis that "in legal doctrine the righ to 
nationalize as such is no longer the subject of debate 
N) 
Thus in the absence of specific treaty obligations to the contrary, a 
taking does not per se mean an illegal act in international law. 
However factors or circumstances which render a taking illegal under 
international law and the consequences of such an illegality as 
compared to the consequences of a legal taking are less clear. 
Western industrializing countries declare that expropriation may 
occur but it must be in accordance with an "international minimum 
standard". Accordingly while "a state possesses the right to 
nationalize a property belonging to foreign nationals in its 
territory, ... it is 'entitled to do so only subject to conditions 
laid down by that law". (25) 
These conditions, the real essence of the "international minimum 
standard", have been reaffirmed on numerous occasions particularly by 
the U. S. Government as follows: 
"Under- international law, the United States has a right to 
expect: 
That any taking of American private property will be non- 
discriminatory; 
That it will be for a public purpose; and 
That its citizens will receive prompt, adequate end 
effective compensation from the expropriating country". (2 
The Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution also provides: 
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"nor shall private MY erty be taken for public use, without 
just compensation". 
'Public purpose' as a requirement for a legal taking has also been 
included in some important U. N. Resolutions. For instance, paragraph 
4 of Resolution 1803 provides that: 
"Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be 
based on grounds or reasons of public utilit or the 
national interest, both domestic and foreign"718)* 
Accordingly, we may note that international law has always required 
that a taking be for a public purpose. A public purpose may indeed 
be for reasons of public utility, but it may readily be appreciated 
that not all public purposes necessarily entail the transfer of 
property to a public utility. Reference to the national interest is 
obviously much wider than public purpose, but perhaps it covers those 
public purpose reasons that do not lead to public utility. 
It is remarkable that even developing countries in one form or 
another have maintained that nationalization or expropriation must be 
based on consideration of public utility. Examining the constitutions 
of capital importing countries Weinstein states that almost all 
constitutions of Asian or African countries which contain 
expropriation provision specify the intent of, or reason for 
expropriation. He further points out that, "Cenerally, the 
constitutional provisions speak in terms of 'public utility' , while 
the more recent constitutions also refer to the element of "social 
interest". (29) 
Thus it could be concluded that there is considerable unanimity that 
a taking, to be legal, should be for a public purpose. Now we will 
examine the Tribunal's approach to the basic legal conditions of a 
taking. We shall start with two inter-related conditions of 'public 
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purpose' and non-discrimination as conditions which are seldom 
denied. 
3.3.1 THE PRACTICE OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The Tribunal, relying on customary international law and the Treaty 
of Amity, has in several cases confirmed the requirement of the 
%public purpose' for a taking. The decision of the Tribunal in the 
American International Croup v Iran(30), is one such case. This 
case, was concerned the alleged taking of 35 percent of the shares of 
an insurance company by virtue of the Law of Nationalization of 
Insurance Companies(31) the Tribunal stated that: 
Examining the facts the Tribunal could not be hold that the 
nationalization of the insurance company was by itself unlawful, as 
there was not sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to show that 
the nationalization was not carried out for a public purpose as part 
of a larger reform program or was discriminatory. (32) 
In addition, in the INA case, which concerned a taking of 20 percent 
shareholding in an Iranian Insurance Company (Bimeh Shargh), the 
Tribunal pointed out that not only nationalizations, but also 
expropriations, are subject to the fundamental condition in question. 
The Tribunal stated that: 
"It has long been acknowledged that expropriations for a 
public purpose and subject to conditions provided for by law 
- notably that category which can be characterised as 
It national iz ations" - are not per se unlawful. A lawful 
nationalization will, however, impose on te government 
concerned the obligation to pay compensation 
t34) 
In neither case was the Tribunal called upon to discuss the contents 
of the requirement of public purpose. This perhaps indicates that 
the limits imposed on the expropriating state by the public purpose 
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condition are relatively modest. 
(35 ) This was confirmed by the 
Tribunal in the Amoco Incernacional Finance Corporacion. This case 
arose out of the taking of the "Khemco Agreement" which had been 
executed on 12 July 1966 between the claimant's Swiss subsidiary, 
Amoco International S. A. on the one hand, and the Iranian National 
Petrochemical Company (N. P. C. ), on the other hand. The Khemco 
Agreement was established between the parties on a fifty-fifty basis 
as a joint stock company under the laws of Iran. Its purpose was to 
install and operate a plant with a view to the extraction and sale of 
natural gas and related - products by virtue of contractual 
arrangements. 
In this case the Tribunal in a partial award stated: 
145. "A precise definition of the public purpose for which an 
expropriation may be lawfully decided has neither been 
agreed upon in international law nor even, suggested. It 
is clear thak as a result of the modern acceptance of the 
right to nationalize, this term is broadly interpreted, 
and that st t in practice, are granted extensive 
discretionm. (161s' 
However, the Tribunal did accept that in principle there are certain 
limitations on the discretion referred to. For instance "an 
expropriation, the only purpose of which would have been to avoid 
contractual obligations of the state or of an entity controlled by 
it, could not .... 
be considered as lawful under international 
law". (37) It was also mentioned that "a state has no right to 
expropriate a foreign concern only for financial purposes". 
Nationalization with a view to obtaining the revenues "from the 
exploitation of national resources (for] the development of the 
country" however, would not as such be illegitimate "under this 
condition". 
(38) 
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Nevertheless, in that case the Tribunal accepted that the Single 
Article Act which authorized the nationalization of the oil industry 
in Iran, was sufficient for the nationalization in question to be for 
a clear public purpose. The Tribunal stated: 
146. "It could not be doubted that the Single Article Act was 
adopted for a clear public purpose, namely to complete 
the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran initiated 
by the 1951 nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry 
Act, with a view to implementing one of the main economic 
and politiýfý objectives of the new Islamic 
Government". .3) 
This suggests that if legislation in respect of nationalization or 
expropriation indicates that it has been enacted for the public 
purpose this is prima facie sufficient proof of such a purpose. 
Accordingly, as Pellonpdd and Fitzmaurice have pointed out: 
"In present day international law is up to the state itself 
to determine what is public good requires, and such a 
determination is likely to be over-ruled by an ingynational 
tribunal only in very exceptional circumstance. . 
An example of such exceptional circumstances could be the case where 
the expropriating state clearly and openly admits that the taking was 
resorted to for political considerations unrelated to any public 
purpose in a socio-economic sense. Another example could be where a 
dictator resorts to a taking for his private benefit. The illegality 
of takings which are arbitrary or which are motivated by 
considerations of a political nature, unrelated to the internal well- 
being of the taking state, was clarified by the Sole Arbitrator in 
B. P. case. The arbitrator in that case held "the taking by the 
respondent of the property, rights and interests of the claimant 
clearly violates ... international 
law as it was made for purely 
extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in 
character". 
(41) 
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The existence of the requirement of non- discrimination was also 
confirmed by the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal in the Amoco case. In 
that case both the parties held widely different views on the 
contents of the prohibition of discrimination. Claimant alleged that 
the taking of "Khemco Company" was discriminatory on the grounds that 
while all comparable American interests were expropriated, in an 
another of NPC's joint ventures, the Japanese share of a consortium, 
the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company (IJPC) was not expropriated. 
The respondents denied discrimination. They asserted that the Single 
Article Act applied to the entire oil industry and the exclusion of 
the IJPC contract was an exception due to the specific circumstances. 
Furthermore they mentioned that the operation of the IJPC joint 
venture was not closely linked with other contracts relating to the 
exploitation of oil fields, whereas the operation of the Khemco plant 
was linked to the supply of gas from the oil fields operated jointly 
by Amoco and NIOC. 
(42) In addition, the respondents emphasized that 
11IJPC was not yet an operational concern at the relevant time, a 
point that was confirmed by the claimant". 
(43) 
The Tribunal pointed out that discrimination is widely held as 
prohibited by customary international law in the f ield ' of 
expropriation. Nevertheless it found it difficult, "in 'the absence 
of any other evidence, to draw the conclusion that the expropriation 
of a concern Vas discriminatory only from the fact that another 
concern in the same economic branch was expropriated". 
(44) In 
explaining this conclusion the Tribunal stated: 
142.11 .... reasons specific to the non-expropriation 
enterprise or to the expropriated one, or to both, may 
justify such a difference of treatment. Furthermore, as 
observed by the arbitral tribunal in Kuwait and American 
Independent Oil Company (Amin Oil) ... a coherent policy 
of nationalization can reasonably be operated gradually 
in successive stages. In the present case, the 
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peculiarities discussed by the parties can explain why 
IJPC was not treated in the same manner as Khemco. The 
Tribunal decline Z4ý0 find that Khemco's expropriation was 
discriminatory". 
Thus the Amoco case suggests that while non- discrimination is a 
condition of lawful expropriation at the same time, however, it 
recognises that it is not an absolute requirement. Accordingly, as 
Professor Harris has correctly concluded "discrimination that is 
reasonably related to the public purpose that underlies the 
expropriation is not illegal". 
(46) 
In addition as the Amoco case itself indicates different treatment of 
various persons or classes of owners of property does not 
automatically amount to prohibited discrimination. Such 
differentiation is wrongful only if it is unreasonable, or it is 
without some objective justification. While distinction between 
foreigners on the one hand and nationals of the host country itself 
on the other is clearly justifiable, specific reasons may also 
justify differential treatment of various classes of foreigners. 
Accordingly, it could be concluded that "while the requirements of 
%public purpose' and %non-discrimination' in takings are well 
established, a certain shift in favour of the state's economic 
sovereignty appears to be discernible in the way they are interpreted 
today". 
(47) 
0 
In addition to "public purpose" and "non- discrimination", "provision 
of compensation" is the third aspect concerned in the legality of a 
taking. Since this condition is a core issue in foreign investment 
disputes and raises special questions, and this study is focussed on 
the compensation issue in the awards of the Iran-U. S. Claims 
Tribunal, this requirement is discussed extensively in other 
110 
Taking of Foreign-owned Propert7 
chapters. Here therefore we shall only examine the requirement of 
the "due process of law" that is occasionally suggested as a further 
requirement, but not unanimously accepted as international law. 
3.4 THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS OF IAW 
The notion of "due process of law" has been described as stipulating 
that: 
"The measures must be based upon (domestic) law, taking in 
accordance with procedures prescribed in the Constitution or 
(relevant) laws, subject to the possibility of appeal, and 
not applied in an arbitrary manner .. 
(48) 
The meaning of this requirement is sometimes described in much 
simpler terms like "the property must be amenable to the jurisdiction 
of the expropriating state". In whatever terms the definition of due 
process of law encompasses not only the requirement of compatibility 
with domestic law safeguards, but also including certain minimum 
standards existing apart from the domestic law. 
(49) 
3.4.1 THE PRACTICE OF THE TRIBUNAL 
Generally speaking the Tribunal's case law suggests that the lack of 
due process of law is not an independent ground for arguing the 
legality of taking. For instance, in the Sedco case, which concerned 
the taking of the Claimant's share in SEDIRAN Drilling Company as 
well as the taking of oil drilling and related equipment belonging to 
the claimant's Panamanian subsidiary, Judge Brower, examining this 
issue, stated that it is unlikely that denial of justice in customary 
sense constitutes a basis separate from those recognized above (i. e. 
non-discrimination, public purpose, violation of a specific 
obligation". Further he explained: 
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"For example, when the alleged denial of justice is lack of 
notice of the taking or the lack of an opportunity to 
challenge judicially the propriety of the taking, that 
taking itself is not a damage resulting from the denial of 
justice. To the degree that alien has a customary right to 
due process, the denial of justice does not render the 
previous taking unlawful, but rather is a wrong itself for 
which proximately caused damages may be sought. Although 
judicial review might have revealed discrimination or the 
lack of public purpose, it is those aspects and not the lack 
of opportunity for mupicipal Judicial review that renders 
the taking unlawful". 
( 0) 
The issue of due process also arose in Amoco which the claimant based 
its argument concerning the wrongfulness of the taking on the alleged 
violation of Iranian law, both substantive and procedural. 
(51) The 
claimant contended that the expropriation of its rights in the Khemco 
Agreement was unlawful. It stated that: 
119. ". ... expropriation of its right in the Khemco Agreement 
was a violation of the 1965 Act concerning Development of 
Petrochemical Industries, which was in force at this time 
and which provided for the enforcement of such an 
agreement, once entered into and approved by the 
government and the competent parliamentary committees". 
The Claimant alleged furthermore that "no statute or decree 
authorized the expropriation, which is therefore devoid of any legal 
basis". (52) 
The Tribunal stated that: 
120. "Conformity with domestic law is not usually cited as a 
condition for an internationally lawful nationalizaElon and 
the Treaty (of Amity] specifies no such condition--. - 
) 
But it should be stated that in the Amoco case, the Tribunal did not 
have to adopt a definite position, as it found that in any event the 
taking was in accordance with Iranian law, i. e. the Single Article 
Act and the procedures established by it. 
(54) Yet the Tribunal 
expressed doubts as to whether compatibility with domestic law could 
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be regarded as a requisite of international law, given the lack of 
case law supporting such a proposition. (55) 
The Tribunal (as did Judge Brower) referred to the fact that 
"violation of domestic law, when invoked, is most often analyzed as 
evidence of the lack of fulfilment of one of the conditions imposed 
by international law, such as the existence of public purpose ... or 
of the payment of compensation". (56) Therefore the Tribunal's 
limited case law suggests that the lack of due process or 
incompatibility with domestic law are not independent grounds for 
challenging the legality of a taking. While violation of domestic 
law may indirectly reveal breaches of the requirements of public 
purpose and non- discrimination, this cannot per se be characterized 
as a basic legal condition of expropriation or nationalization. 
3,5 THE RELEVANCE OF THE STATE CONTRACTS 
Another controversial issue in the taking context might be the 
requirement that a taking should not be in conflict with a "state 
contract" i. e. a contract or agreement between the state and the 
foreign investor. 
3.5.1 GENERAL REMARKS 
State contracts or investment agreements are transnational contracts 
between a state, its agencies or state-owned companies acting on its 
behalf and a foreign investor, usually a multinational company, 
relating to an investment in an oil, mining, or other industrial 
venture within the territorial jurisdiction of that state. 
(57) These 
agreements are in the form of a concession, an equity or contractual 
joint venture, or a service contract. Agreements which are involved 
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in the exploitation of natural resources are sometimes described as 
Concession agreements. The Contracting state may act in breach of 
Contract, use its powers under domestic law to annul the Contract, or 
repudiate the Contract by means illegal in terms of domestic law. 
Now the question might be what is the position of international law 
in respect of repudiation of such Contracts. 
In principle, the position is regulated by the general principles 
governing the treatment of aliens. Therefore the act of the host or 
contracting state will incur state responsibility if it constitutes a 
denial of justice or an exp. ropriation contrary to international law. 
The general view is that a breach of a contract, provided of course 
it is not a confiscatory annulment, does not create state 
responsibility on the international plane. 
(58) Accordingly, a 
situation in which the host state exercises its executive or 
legislative authority to destroy contractual rights, comes within the 
law relating to expropriation. Such action will therefore lead to 
state responsibility tinder the same conditions as expropriation. 
As a result, it is often stated that the repudiation of the Contract 
is illegal if it is arbitrary and, discriminatory. For instance 
action directed against persons of a particular nationality or race 
is discriminatory, and action which lacks a normal public purpose is 
arbitrary. A government acting in good faith may enact exchange 
control legislation or impose trade restrictions which incidentally 
lead to the annulment or non-enforceability of contractual rights. 
It is difficult to treat such action as illegal in international law. 
However, there are some international lawyers who argue that the 
breach of a state Contract by the Contracting government of itself 
creates international responsibility. For instance, Jennings has 
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argued that there are no basic objections to the existence of an 
international law of Contract. (59) He points out that in the field 
of nationality, for instance, rights created in municipal law may be 
evaluated according to international law standards. Exponents of the 
international law character of state Contracts also use arguments 
based upon the doctrine of acquired rights and the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. 
(60) However, there are some other lawyers who on the 
other hand, contend that state contracts are not concluded between 
states and do not have an international status, because private 
companies are not subjects of international law. (61) 
This latter view receives some support from the decision of the 
International Court in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company(62) case. 
The Court in that case could not accept the view that a concessionary 
Contract signed between a government and a foreign private 
corporation could be considered to be an international treaty. 
(63) 
Consequently, the cancellation of a concession of this nature, before 
the expiry of its term, as a consequence of a measure of 
nationalization, cannot be considered as breach of an international 
treaty. Instead, such a measure would constitute the expropriation 
of the contractual rights of a foreign company which means, of 
course, that such a measure would require the payment of appropriate 
compensation. . In other words, in a taking involving a concession 
agreement or a state contract the mere existence of the agreement or 
contract does not render the taking unlawful under international law. 
This is confirmed by the practice of the Tribunal where, as will now 
be explained, is noticeable that the mere existence of a state 
contract does not render a taking unlawful. 
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3.5.2 THE TRIBUNAL'S PRACTICE 
In the Amoco case, which involved a state contract, the Tribunal in 
its partial award stated that: 
179. "In international practice, and notably in the cases 
submitted to international arbitration, the dispute has 
focussed on the question of the so called 'stabilization 
clauses'. For the reasons set forth in the [case] it is 
not seriously questioned that, in the absence of such a 
stabilization clause, a contract does not constitute a 
bar to nationalization. That is an aspect of the 
evolution of international law in this area and of the 
4 general recogition of the right of states to nationalize". ( 4) 
Accordingly the state contract per se does not prohibit a taking, but 
a "stabilization clause" in a state contract could possibly have such 
an effect. 
3.5.3 STABILIZATION CLAUSES 
The term 'stabilization clause' has been defined as a clause 
contained in an agreement between a government and a foreign company 
by which the government party undertakes neither to repudiate nor to 
cancel the agreement nor to modify its terms, either by legislation 
or by administrative measures. 
(66) 
The Stabilization Clause concept was characterized by the Tribunal 
as: 
166. ". . contract language which freezes the provisions of a 
national system of law chosen as. the law of the contract 
as the date of the Contract, in order to prevent the 
application t? ýhe Contract of any future alterations of 6 this system". 
The legal significance of such clauses is controversial because the 
clause involves a tension between the legislative sovereignty and 
public interest of the state party and the long term viability of 
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contractual relationships. If we take the position that state 
Contracts are valid on the plane of international law then a breach 
of such a Contract is unlawful and to be compensated as a form of 
expropriation. Another view is that that stabilization clauses as 
such are invalid in terms of public international law. Arechaga 
supporting this view states: 
"We do not believe that there is an international law of 
contract, but even if it were so, international law contains 
the fundamental and overriding principle of the permanent 
sovereignty of the state over all its wealth and natural 
resources". 
(67) 
Furthermore, he points out that stipulation of a stabilization clause 
in a contract "does not achieve the purpose of a real stabilization 
clause because international law does not forbid a nationalization, 
nor the resulting cancellation of the Contract, provided appropriate 
compensation is paid". (68) 
In the Amoco case the Tribunal stated that the right to nationalize, 
a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty... cannot easily be 
considered surrendered and that it would be advantageous to construe 
any provision of a contract as forbidding nationalization. (69) As a 
result the Tribunal did not take a definite standpoint on the legal 
relevance of the stabilization clause in the agreement in question. 
However the Tribunal's reasoning in its partial award in the Amoco 
case is not without interest. It suggests that the language of a 
contract provision, in order to make that provision a "stabilization 
clause", should be quite explicit in obliging the state not to use 
its legislative power to terminate the contractual relationship. 
This perhaps can be seen as another "aspect of the evolution of 
international law in the area and of the general recognition of the 
right of states to nationalize". 
(70) 
117 
Taking of Foreign-owned Property 
The second Tribunal award involving stabilization clause issues was 
that in Mobil 011. As we saw earlier, Mobil 011(71) involved a long 
term agreement for the purchase of oil between Iran's NIOC and 
several American oil companies known as the Consortium. Article 29 
of the agreement provided that it was to be interpreted in accordance 
with the laws of Iran but that: 
"The termination before expiry date or any alteration of 
this agreement shall be subject to the mutual agreement of 72) the parties". 
Article 30B of the agreement also provided that the agreement would 
be "duly enacted as a part *of the law of Iran". 
(73) The claimant 
argued that the agreement was subject to the international rule of 
pacta sunt servanda which governs contracts between states and 
private persons as well as interstate agreements. 
(74) Iran argued 
that pacta sunt servanda is simply inapplicable in that it is a rule 
of international law specifically framed to govern treaties, i. e. 
interstate agreements, and thus it cannot be interpreted to limit the 
right of a sovereign state to legislate, even if such legislation 
varies contractual rights. 
(75) 
The Tribunal found that the original agreement had not been breached 
by either party but had been ended by mutual agreement as required by 
the stabilization clause quoted above, and that this agreement was 
evidenced by the conduct of the parties over an extended period of 
time. 
(76) Thus the majority award avoided a direct ruling on the 
stabilization cause. However, Judge Brower in a concurring opinion, 
relying on the above mentioned Articles of the Agreement and 
contemporary international precedents concluded that Iran's 
expropriation of the claimant's property interests in the agreement 
constituted a breach of the stabilization clause in this case. 
(77) 
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In summary, the majority awards in Amoco International Finance and 
Mobil Oil avoided holdings on the question of stabilization clauses 
by ruling in the former that Iran was not a party to the agreement 
and therefore not bound by the Stabilization Clause and in the latter 
by holding the parties had ended the agreement by mutual agreement so 
that there was no breach of the clause in that case. In Amoco 
International Finance, however, it was noted that the general 
principle of law known as pacta sunt servanta is not applicable to 
contracts between states and foreign private parties. 
(78) 
3.6 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SOME MEASURES OF COMPENSATION 
It is generally recognised that a taking should not only be for a 
public purpose and non- discriminatory, but that it should also be 
accompanied by some measure of compensation, at least as a matter of 
principle. 
(79) A detailed discussion of the standard and calculation 
of compensation will be presented in the following chapters. In this 
section we examine whether the duty to pay compensation promptly is a 
condition similar to those related to public purpose and non- 
discrimination, and whether non-payment of compensation renders the 
taking ipso facto wrongful, or could be considered an independent 
consequence of taking. The latter is suggested by the INA and 
ArnerIcan International Group cases. 
As stated in the passage quoted earlier, 
(80) in the INA case the 
Tribunal seemed to make a distinction between factors relating to 
%per se unlawfulness', on the one hand, and the obligation to pay 
compensation on the other. Similarly in American International 
Group, after characterizing the nationalization as lawful with 
reference to the requirements of public purposes and non- 
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discrimination, the Tribunal went on to state that it is a 'general 
principle of public international law that even in a case of lawful 
nationalization the former owner is normally entitled to 
compensation 
(81) Therefore in both cases the Tribunal has clearly 
distinguished such basic conditions of lawfulness as the 'public 
purpose' requirement from the duty to pay compensation. Although 
both are connected with the legality of a taking, they do this in a 
different way. Public purpose and non- discrimination are basic 
conditions the non-fulfilment of which makes the taking ipso facto 
wrongful or 'per se unlawful', i. e. a wrongful act under 
international law. Non-payment of compensation as such is not a 
ground of wrongfulness; rather the duty to pay compensation appears 
to be the legal consequence even of a taking which can be 
characterized as lawful. 
(82) 
However the Tribunal in the Amoco case seemed to contradict the above 
analysis by stating: 
116. "The other condition to a lawful expropriation provided 
for in the Treaty of Amity is the 'prompt payment of just 
compensation', an obligation which is also accepted aa 
general rule of customary international law as well". (93) 
This statement might suggest that failure to pay compensation more or 
less immediately renders the taking a wrongful act under 
international law. However, a closer reading of the partial award in 
Amoco does not support such a conclusion. This is shown by the fact 
that despite tHe lack of prompt (or any other) payment by the time of 
the Tribunal proceedings, the Tribunal explicitly found the taking in 
question to be lawful. Hence, prompt payment is not (literally) a 
condition of the legality of a taking. As PellonplA and Fitzmaurice 
have pointed out, 'promptness' rather has to be understood as 
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referring to the requirement, that the compensation be accompanied by 
(84) interest from the date of taking'. 
Although actual non payment does not of itself render a taking 
illegal, the Tribunal's practice does suggest that some indication 
of, or provision for, the payment should be made at the time of the 
taking. In Amoco the Tribunal referred to Article IV(2) of the 
Treaty of Amity, according to which 'adequate provision shall have 
been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination and 
payment of compensation, and stated that such provisions must provide 
the owner of the expropriated assets with a sufficient guarantee that 
the compensation will be actually determined and paid in conformity 
with the requisites of international law'. 
(85) That customary 
international law also contains the kind of requirement is further 
supported by the fact that Iranian parties before the Tribunal have 
accepted that 'the international legal duty to pay compensation 
requires ... an early indication of an intention to 
# (86) compensate... . Also American arbitrators, who are usually 
tempted to impose the strictest requirements on expropriating states, 
do not, as a matter of general principle, seem to require essentially 
more than this. 
(87) 
The opinion of Judge Brower in Sedco (second interlocutory award), 
can probably be taken as both the lowest common denominator of the 
Tribunal practice, and also as a succinct description of the general 
principles. The Judge stated: 
"I must express doubt as to whether, under customary 
international law, a state's mere failure, in the end, 
actually to have compensated in accordance with the 
international law standard set forth herein necessarily 
renders the underlying taking lpso, facto wrongful. If, for 
example, contemporaneously with the taking the expropriating 
state provides a means for the determination of compensation 
which on its face appears calculated to result in the 
121 
Taking of Foreign-owned ProperC7 
required compensation but which ultimately does not, or if 
compensation is immediately paid which, though later found 
by a tribunal to fall short of the standard, was not on its 
face unreasonable, it would appear appropriate not to find 
that the taking itself was unlawful but rather only to 
conclude that the independent obligation to compensate has 
not been satisfied. If, on the other hand, no provision for 
compensation is made contemporaneously with the taking, or 
one is made which clearly cannot produce the required 
compensation, or unreasonably insufficient compensation is 
paid at the time of taking, it wýýld seem appropriate to 
deem the taking itself wrongful". (8 
Considering the practice surveyed above, it is possible to conclude 
that there are three basic conditions of legality; (i) the taking has 
to be for the public purpose; (ii) the taking should be carried out 
in a non-discriminatory fashion; and (iii) it should be followed and 
accompanied by some provision, or indication that such compensation 
as is required by international law will be forthcoming. 
3.7 THE TRIBUNAL AND THE QUESTION OF THE ACTIONS ENGAGING STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR A TAKING 
For a company or an individual alleging expropriation of its property 
two issues are crucial: (i) the liability of the state, for the 
conduct said to constitute expropriation; and (ii) the date at which 
the expropriation occurred. The former is a necessary element for a 
claim to be successful. The latter, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, may have a great impact on the valuation of the 
dispossessed property. 
3.7.1 DETERMINING WHETHER AN EXPROPRIATION HAS OCCURRED 
INA, American International Group and Amoco, which were examined in 
previous sections, are cases which exemplify taking as explicitly 
having been found lawful by the Tribunal. The three cases share the 
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factor that they concerned deprivations of property based on special 
nationalization laws (Iranian public laws expressly nationalizing 
industries or particular entities). In this category of cases there 
can be no doubt that a taking attributable to the state has occurred 
and as a matter of fact, the Tribunal also has had no difficulty in 
recognizing the expropriatory effect of the above Iranian laws. 
(89) 
However, in international law it is accepted that legal, consequences 
can also follow from acts that are not formal expropriations, yet 
constitute an equivalent interference with the property. Firstly, in 
such cases, it must be determined whether such acts or events 
constitute a taking; only then the question of compensation can be 
addressed. 
Most cases brought before the Tribunal belong to the category 
involving the 'gray area' of expropriation in which no formal taking 
is announced by the host government, but the alien argues that the 
property has been seized de facto. 
(90) 
Determining whether and how an indirect taking is attributable to the 
host state's government, requires a two-state inquiry in to the 
nature of the relevant acts and employs the conceptual framework 
developed to determine state responsibility for wrongful acts. As 
stated in Otis Elevator company: 
29. "The Tribunal must... examine the acts of interference 
Otis complains of and determine whether any or all are 
attributable to the Government of Iran and whether any or 
ali, by themselves or collectively, constitute a 
sufficient degree of interference to warranegll finding 
that a deprivation of property has occurred". 
Accordingly, in the first stage, it has to be established that the 
act is attributable to the state which can be called the subjective 
element of state responsibility. The second stage concerns with the 
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objective element of the state responsibility. Here, the priority is 
to determine whether the encroachment, attributable to the state, on 
the property rights of the owner, actually constitutes a taking. 
While the subjective and objective elements are inextricably linked 
and may thus be difficult to examine separately, distinguishing 
between them will provide a useful point of departure for the 
discussion later in this chapter of what kind of interferences by a 
host state will justify a decision that there has been a taking. 
3.7.2 THE QUESTION OF ATTRIBUTABILITY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT 
A basic condition for state responsibility in international 'law is 
conduct consisting of an action or omission which is attributable to 
the state. 
(92) Attributability, however, assumes that a distinction 
exists between public and private acts. Consequently, means are 
needed to differentiate between these two areas. Chapter II (The 
"Act of State" Under International Law) of the ILC Draft Articles on 
State responsibility for wrongful acts can provide authoritative 
guidance in the search for such means. 
The Tribunal has in cases concerned with the taking of property had 
to concern itself with many of the problems addressed in the ILC 
Draf t. Although the Tribunal has jurisdiction under the Claims 
Settlement Declaration over government owned and government 
controlled entities for whose actions Iran would not necessarily be 
responsible under general international law, 
(93) it has from the 
beginning made it clear that where there is a taking the general 
rules of responsibility under international law apply. 
(94) 
Therefore, while in many situations it is not necessary for the 
Tribunal to decide whether the actions of a particular Iranian 
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respondent are attributable to Iran under general principles of 
international law, in expropriation cases the Tribunal does have to 
decide this issue. (95) 
In most cases of expropriation or nationalization the question of 
attributability to the host government has not been difficult. 
Usually the alleged deprivatory acts can be attributed to the 
legislative and/or executive organs of the state acting in those 
capacities. Since it is accepted that the conduct of an organ of the 
state shall be considered as an act of that state, the acts of these 
organs can therefore be characterized as acts of state under 
international law. 
3.7.3 JUDICIAL ORGANS 
Actions by a judicial organ of the state may also be regarded as an 
act of that state and amount to a taking. This was confirmed in the 
Oil Field of Texas case, where the Tribunal said that: 
I it is well established in international law that the 
decision of a court in fact depriving an owner of the use 
and benefit of his property may amount to an expropriation 
of such qppperty that 
is attributable to the state of that 
court, .() 
3.7.4 REVOLUTIONARY ORGANS 
In Sola Tiles(97) the Tribunal held that it is also well settled that 
the so-called Revolutionary Committees are among those organs whose 
acts are attributable to the Government of Iran and consequently the 
government is responsible for them as a matter of law. The same 
applies to the Revolutionary Cuards. The seizure of property by such 
organs has consequently been attributable to Iran as a taking. In 
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fact in international law these entities are regarded as a group of 
persons acting on behalf of the State and thus in the view of the 
Tribunal are regarded as organs of the Iranian state. 
3.7.5 EXCEPTIONAL CASES 
Exceptionally there may be groups of persons for whose acts the state 
is not responsible although they have had a role in seizing property. 
The Workers' Council of the Schering Company of Iran is an example of 
this. (98) In 1980, the assets of the above company was seized by the 
Workers' Council. To examine whether such a Council could be 
characterized as a state organ, the Tribunal, after reviewing the 
purpose and origins of the relevant legislation, concluded that; 
'The Constitutional and regulatory framework for the 
creation of Workers' Councils do not indicate that the 
Councils were to have other duties than basically 
representing the workers' interests vis-a-vis the management 
of companies and institutions and to co-operate with the 
management. That the formation of the Councils was 
initiated by the State does not itself imply that the 
Councils were to function as part of the State (99) machinery' . 
Here, the Tribunal could not find that the acts of the Council were 
presumptively attributable to the State. Thus in order to make Iran 
responsible it had to be specifically established that the Council in 
fact acted on behalf of the government, or that there was direct 
government involvement. However, the Tribunal found no evidence that 
the Council waý in fact acting on behalf of the government of Iran, 
or any of its agencies or entities. Also it noted that there was no 
evidence of any governmental interference or control over the 
election of the various members of the Council. Moreover, there was 
no evidence of any orders, directives, or recommendations by the 
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Goverment to the Council, and no proof that it acted upon any 
instructions of the Covernment. 
In cases in which a taking is allegedly carried out by a private 
commercial entity, the Tribunal appears to follow the same basic 
analysis, except that it assumes that in the ordinary case there is 
no dejure link, since, the separate juridical status of the 
corporation is normally respected. 
(100) Actions taken by such 
commercial entities that may have an adverse impact on the economic 
affairs of those doing business with the entities are not, by virtue 
of the governmental ownership of such entities, thereby transformed 
into expropriations. 
The most recent case supporting this point is Flexi-van leasing Inc. 
v Iran(lol) where the claimant alleged that the Government acquired 
ownership and control of two private commercial corporations with 
which the claimant had been doing business. It charged that the 
failure of the corporations to honour their contracts with the 
claimant constituted an expropriation of those contract rights by the 
government. The Tribunal, however, held that the mere assumption of 
ownership and control over the two corporations did not constitute 
expropriation of the rights associated with the contracts entered 
into by those corporations. It held that in order to establish 
liability of the Government the claimant was required to show direct 
governmental interference with the Contracts, such as 'orders 
directives, recommendations or instructions issues to the 
corporations by the governmental agency controlling the 
(102) 
corporations'. However, the Tribunal has not provided any 
explanation or analysis of the source of this reasoning. This lack 
of explanation as Brower has pointed out: 'appears to be analogous to 
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the traditional piercing-the-veil standard for disregarding corporate 
(103) 
entities' . 
A similar approach to attributability was applied in International 
Technical Products Corp. v Iran(104) In that case the claimant 
alleged that a Government-owned bank, (Bank Tejarat), had 
expropriated a building belonging to the claimant. The bank 
initially argued that it had acquired the claimant's building through 
an authorized sale, then later claimed to have succeeded to title 
through a formal mortgage foreclosure. The Tribunal noted that to 
hold the Iranian government responsible for the alleged taking would 
require one of two findings; (a) that the bank was acting in its 
capacity as a state organ (rather than as a commercial entity); or 
(b) that the Government or one of its organs was an accessory to the 
transfer. 
Emphasizing the separate legal personality of Bank Tejarat the 
Tribunal noted that, although in certain respects the bank "may be 
said to perform governmental functions' (105) when acquiring real 
property the bank presumably acted in its ordinary commercial role. 
Thus the Tribunal held that even if the bank had acted lawfully in 
acquiring the real estate, governmental responsibility under 
international law for an expropriation would not be established. 
In these exceptional cases, the claims were dismissed because the 
evidence which 'was presented did not show that the omissions referred 
to were due to the instructions of the Government. 
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3.7.6 HOW AN ACT OF AN ORGAN MAKES THE HOST STATE RESPONSIBLE 
The next question which arises is what the sort of positive evidence 
of government interference with the actions of a separate legal 
entity is needed to make such actions attributable to the state. 
Among the cases brought before the Tribunal, the Foremost case(106) 
appears to provide the best answer to this question. This case 
concerned the alleged expropriation, through various acts and 
omissions, of the claimant's 31 per cent equity interest in an 
Iranian joint-stock company called Pak Dairy, most of which (52 per 
cent) was owned by the Government. The Claimant alleged that its 
interest had been expropriated due to: (1) the expulsion of its 
expatriate personnel from Iran during the course of the Revolution; 
(2) the corporation's refusal, from 1979 through to the day of the 
award, to pay the claimant any dividends; (3) the forced departure of 
the company's two representatives from the seven-person board of 
directors in late 1981; and (4) interference with the provision to 
the claimant of basic financial information about the corporation 
thereafter. The Tribunal dismissed the claim of alleged 
expropriation. 
(107) But it concluded that, through Pak Dairy's 
refusal to 'pay certain cash dividends to Foremost, the Government 
became guilty of 'other measures affecting property rightsl. (108) 
That this non-payment could 'be attributed beyond doubt to the state' 
was obviously due to the fact that it was the Government 
representativeg on Pak Dairy's board of directors who, with explicit 
reference to government policy, pressed through the decision not to 
pay the dividends to the American shareholders. 
(109) 
The above examination of the Tribunal's case law shows that, before 
attribution can take place, it is vital to ascertain the nature of 
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the organ whose direct acts may be responsible for deprivatory 
events. Sometimes, as we saw in Schering case, it is a kind of 
functional analysis rather than any formal criterion that determines 
whether an entity is regarded as an organ of the state; at other 
times, conclusions in this regard are based on the formal judicial 
status of the organ and so it is concluded that actions of 
corporations entrusted with a separate legal personality, although 
owned or indirectly controlled by the government, cannot be 
attributed to the state. 
3.8 THE TRIBUNAL FINDINGS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES EXPROPRIATION 
In the previous section we examined the question of governmental 
intention as an element of expropriation. However, a positive 
intention to expropriate foreign property is not always required to 
constitute a taking under international law. As the Tribunal in the 
Tippets case declared, the "form of the measures of control or 
interference is less important than the reality of their 
impact'. (110) A taking may occur under international law 'through 
interference by a state in the use of that property or with the 
enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the property is 
not affected'. 
("') However, there is no clear-cut formula for 
determining what is necessary for a taking in international law. 
When deciding cases which have been brought before it the Tribunal 
has consistently ruled that interference by the government with the 
alien's enjoyment of the concomitants of ownership, such as the use 
or control of property, or the income and economic benefits derived 
therefrom, constitutes a compensable taking. (112) The Tribunal's 
pronouncements on the question of the degree of interference 
necessary to a finding of taking has been slightly different, 
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however. In certain cases the Tribunal has used the formula of 
unreasonable interference in the use of the property right; in others 
it has described the standard as requiring an "interference ... to 
such an extent that these (property) rights are rendered so useless 
that they must be deemed to have been expropriated". 
(113) In still 
further cases it has declared that a taking occurs whenever an owner 
is "deprived of fundamental rights of ownership" and the deprivation 
"is not merely ephemeral". 
(114) However, as Tribunal-Member Brower 
pointed out, "the most common bench mark of the Tribunal's discussion 
in this regard, has been reasonableness". (115) In one of the 
earliest cases 
(116) the Tribunal suggested in a dictum that an 
unreasonable interference "with the use of property is sufficient to 
find taking". (117) This standard was followed shortly thereafter in 
Golpira v Iran, 
(118) and more recently in International Technical 
Products Corp. v Iran(119) Nonetheless, the Tribunal's discussions 
of the degree of interference necessary to constitute an 
expropriation, have not focused on semantics, but rather on the 
reality of the impact of the alleged taking. 
(120) As a result, "the 
standard both explicitly and implicitly adopted by the Tribunal 
requires an unreasonable interference with property rights caused by 
(121) 
actions attributable to the Government'. 
However, the 'unreasonable interference' formula is a wide and 
general standaTd. It varies under different circumstances. The 
parameters of attribution of a taking to the Government also may 
vary. Since, in previous sections, the question of attributability 
was discussed, here we examine only the question of unreasonable 
interference. This question will be discussed in connection with the 
three major types of property on which expropriation cases have been 
brought before the Tribunal: (1) Personal property, such as office 
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equipment or other tangible objects; (2) Funds held in bank accounts; 
and (3) entire businesses or major operating assets. 
3.8.1 UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE 
3.8.1.1 TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
The cases involving expropriation of tangible property by Iran have 
involved the physical seizure of these properties. 
In these cases, the Tribunal has had no difficulties in finding a 
taking. Such a finding was made in Dames & Moore v Iran. 
(122) The 
claimant charged that Government representatives physically occupied 
a rented warehouse in which the claimant stored its vehicles, office 
equipment, instruments and other equipment. 
(123) It was declared 
that the warehouse was to be used to house refugees of the war with 
Iraq and that any claimant's private property stored in it was to be 
turned over to the Iranian Army. The Tribunal considered the 
claimant's affidavits and allegations as sufficient proof of this 
occurrence, especially since the Government of Iran did not contest 
claimants' evidence. 
(124) 
The Tribunal held that: 
'the unilateral taking of possession of property and the 
denial of its use to the rightful owners may amount to an 
expropriation eveýl without a formal decree regarding title 
to the property'. 
25) 
The Tribunal also rejected the respondent's alternative assertion 
that the custodian named by the claimant to safeguard the property in 
its absence had previously transferred the property to himself to 
satisfy certain unsubstantiated debts of a vague origin. Having 
found that the property had been taken by the Government of Iran, the 
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Tribunal held that claimant was entitled to compensation for the 
value of its property. 
(126 ) The same result was reached in William 
L. Pereira Assocs., Iran v Iran as well as in Computer Sciences Corp. 
v Iran in which the claimant's affidavit evidence testifying to the 
events was sufficient to establish a taking of its office equipment 
by Iran. (127) In this last case the Tribunal pointed out: "this 
evidence has not been rebutted and the Tribunal is satisfied that 
CSCSI was thus denied the use of its office equipment and that it was 
therefore denied access to the equipment'. 
(128) 
Similarly in Ceneral D7namics Telephone, (129) the Claimant's evidence 
established that it had left test equipment and installation spares 
in locked rooms at Iranian Air Force bases and in Iranian customs 
of f ices. Because the property was left in the custody of Iranian 
government organizations, the Tribunal held that Iran could be deemed 
to be responsible and awarded $72.606, representing the value of the 
equipment claimed. 
(130) 
In the above mentioned claims, the claimants presented evidence both 
as to the taking and the goverrunent's involvement that was convincing 
enough to create at least a presumption in favour of the claim. In 
other cases in which the claimant's evidence was not so convincing, 
the Tribunal denied the claims. The decision of the Tribunal in 
Morrison Knudson Pacific(131) is an example of the denied cases. In 
that case, the claimant alleged that Iran had confiscated certain 
minor-equipment used in its operations, but presented no evidence 
except for the affidavit of its business manager whose statements 
were speculative and vague. Since the evidence was not convincing, 
the claim was dismissed for lack of proof. 
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A similar result on the same reasoning was reached in the AHFI 
Planning(132) case. In that case the claimant alleged that its 
office in Tehran was taken over in November 1979 by a revolutionary 
Committee acting on behalf of the government of Iran, following which 
furniture and equipment were expropriated. The only evidence 
presented by the claimant in support of this claim was an affidavit 
by the international sales manager of the claimant that he had 
received a phone call from the Iranian landlord relating that 
unidentified persons styled as "representatives of a revolutionary 
Committee" had occupied the leased offices and taken possession of 
the AHFI property. The Tribunal held that that was an inadequate 
basis on which to find that the Iranian government was responsible 
and as a result the claim was dismissed for lack of proof. 
Accordingly, in expropriation claims involving the taking of tangible 
assets, the Tribunal awards may be cited for the principle that the 
evidence of a taking by some persons or organizations for whom the 
government is responsible must be clear and convincing. Simply 
showing that property was left behind and alleging expropriation of 
it has consistently been found by the Tribunal to be an insufficient 
basis for holding Iran liable. However, where the evidence has shown 
that the property was in the possession of Iranian government 
organizations, or there was convincing evidence of government action 
of some kind, a finding of expropriation has been made. 
3.8.1.2 BANK ACCOUNTS 
During, and especially after any revolution, there are usually 
restrictions on foreign investors. Although these depend on the 
political circumstances of the revolutionary state, they may include 
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restrictions on withdrawing and repatriating money from the 
revolutionary state. 
This happened to American investors in Iran; many of them were unable 
to withdraw their dollar and rial funds, held in their Iranian bank 
accounts, at the time they departed from Iran. Consequently, they 
claimed before the Tribunal to recover such losses. Their claims 
were based on different theories of liability, for example, breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment; expropriation and so on. However, as 
far as this part of the study is concerned, we examine only those 
claims which were based on expropriation. In resolving these cases 
the Tribunal appears to have applied the same basic standard of 
unreasonable interference with the use of property, but has demanded 
proof of a high degree of interference by Iran before a taking is 
considered to have occurred. This can be seen in the Harza(133) 
case, where the claimant because of administrative problems in 
relation to Bank Melli Iran, was prevented from withdrawing from his 
account on several occasions, but the Tribunal held that the claim 
must be dismissed for want of proof. Reviewing the evidence the 
Tribunal concluded that it did not support a finding that the bank 
had intended to deprive the claimant of its rights to use its bank 
account, nor that the requirements that had been imposed by the bank 
were unreasonable or even inconsistent with normal Iranian banking 
practice. As a result the claim was dismissed. 
Similarly, the Tribunal dismissed the claim in American Housing 
International. (134 ) In that case an Iranian bank had refused to 
honour cheques drawn by the claimant on his account, but there was 
conflicting evidence as to the reasons for the refusal. Claimant's 
evidence consisted of an affidavit by a Company officer that a 
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substantial deposit had been made to the account and that the bank 
had subsequently refused to honour cheques drawn on it. In response 
the bank filed an affidavit by one of its managers asserting that the 
account was without funds. Declaring the only issue was whether 
there were any funds in the claimant's account, the Tribunal held 
that the claimant had not discharged its burden of proving that there 
remained a balance and the claim was dismissed. 
(135) 
In American Bell International Inc. v Iran, 
(136) 
on the other hand, 
the Tribunal clearly found a taking of a bank account. In this case 
the claimant, which in early 1979 left Iran, along with a large 
telecommunications project it had there, left money in an Iranian 
bank account for the settlement of its outstanding obligations. This 
money could be disbursed only upon the joint signatures of the 
claimant's designated agent and the representative of an Iranian 
governmental entity with which the claimant had been doing business 
prior to the Revolution. After having cleared from the account, 
first a 'substantial amount' and then all of its obligation, the 
Claimant several times requested the release of the balance of the 
funds. These requests were denied. -Instead, an agent of the Iranian 
governmental entity demanded that the claimant's agent accede to its 
order to transfer the funds into an account under the sole control of 
the Iranian Government. The agent of the Government threatened that 
these demands must be complied with and non-compliance would, in any 
case, %not prevent' the Government from obtaining access to the 
funds. 
The claimant argued that this constituted expropriation under 
international law. (137) The respondent denied liability, alleging 
that the events did not amount to expropriation under Iranian law 
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which was the governing law of the contracts under which the claimant 
had been performing in Iran. 
(138) The Tribunal had no difficulty 
concluding that the funds had been taken. It stated: 
150. "... In the circumstances of the present case there is no 
need to discuss the applicable law at length Where, as 
here, both the purpose and effect of the acts are totally 
to deprive one of funds without one's voluntarily given 
consent, the finding of a compensable taking under any 
applicable law, international or domestic, is inevitable, 
unless ppere is clear justification for the 
seizure". 
( 
. 
39) 
Since the respondent did not provide any evidence to justify its 
continuing access to those funds, the Tribunal awarded the value of 
the funds so taken. 
When the funds have not actually been transferred and remain subject 
to the control of the owner, the Tribunal has been much more 
reluctant to find that an expropriation has occurred. A question 
which might arise here is whether nationalization of a bank 
establishes the expropriation of the funds which are in it. In 
William L. Periera Associates v Iran, the claimant (along with other 
claims), alleged that the money which it held in two accounts 
maintained in an Iranian bank, had been expropriated by virtue of the 
subsequent nationalization of that bank and by virtue of the fact 
that it had allegedly been unable to withdraw its funds. 
(140) The 
Tribunal denied the claim on the following grounds: (a) the claimant 
had not submitted evidence that it had been prevented from 
withdrawing funds from the accounts; (b) it had failed to show that 
nationalization of the Iranian banks amounted to a taking of the 
funds it held in the accounts in question. 
Normally, then, nationalization of a bank does not establish the 
expropriation of the funds because, as Brower has pointed out, 
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"Nationalization of a bank only affects the ownership of that bank 
but not the bank's account liabilities". 
(141) 
In addition to the above mentioned awards, another group of awards 
involving banks arose out of Iran's blocking of foreigners' funds on 
the authority of its foreign exchange control regulations and must 
now be considered. 
3.8.1.3 FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
From the view point of the foreign investor, the ultimate objective 
of its undertaking is to realiz e profits in the currency of its home 
state or some other currency that has a stable value in the 
international market place. Thus most contracts with foreign state 
parties contains provisions for the payment in some hard 
currency. 
(142) Yet the risk of currency exchange blockage in 
developing countries grew to such proportions in the 1950s that 
insurance against this risk was made available by the U. S. government 
in its foreign investment guarantee programme and is generally 
available today from a wide assortment of national and international 
insurance programs. 
(143) 
As in most countries of the world, the use of foreign exchange in 
Iran was and is regulated by the government by means of foreign 
exchange contrpl regulations operated by its Central bank known as 
Bank Markazi. Before the revolution in February 1979, many foreign 
companies and individuals opened foreign exchange accounts in Iranian 
banks and relied on the routine transfer abroad of the foreign 
exchange funds in these accounts, as well as the conversion of the 
Iranian rial funds into foreign exchange for the payment abroad of 
foreign currency obligations pursuant to these regulations. Af ter 
138 
Taking of Foreign-owned Property 
the revolution, all account holders, including Iranians and 
Americans, who required foreign currencies found that what had 
formerly been routine was now stopped. Some of the Americans 
concluded after several attempts to gain access to their funds proved 
unsuccessful, that such access had been permanently blocked. 
(144) 
Claims for compensation were therefore brought before the Tribunal 
relying on a variety of legal theories including contract breach and 
expropriation. 
In these cases, Iran generally defended itself on the ground that 
whatever actions had been taken were legal and proper, in accordance 
with its foreign exchange control regulations, and in keeping with 
its international obligation. 
Since July 1944 Iran has been a member of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) agreement. 
(145) The Agreement contains provisions inter 
alia that foreign exchange contracts are unenforceable if they are 
entered contrary to the valid exchange control regulations of the 
member state involved. 
(146) Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF 
Agreement declares that: 
"Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member 
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations 
of that member maintained or imposed co N4ý' ý tent with this 
(Fund) Agreement shall be unenforceable". 
However, Article VI Section 3 of the Agreement limits the extent to 
which exchange controls may be exercised under the IMF Agreement. It 
provides for: 
"Exercise [of] such controls as are necessary to regulate 
international capital movements ... [but not] in a manner 
which will restrict payment for current transactions or 
which will unduLy delay transfer to funds in settlement or 
commitments". 
(149) 
139 
Taking of Foreign-owned Property 
Accordingly, it would appear that only controls applied to capital 
transfers, as distinguished from current exchange transactions, could 
be f ound to be consistent with Iran's obligations under the IMF 
Agreement and only then when it was clear that controls would not 
unduly delay the payment of foreign commitments. 
In many cases before the Tribunal American Claimants argued that 
foreign exchange control violated the Articles of IMF Agreement. 
Further they argued that the government of Iran was liable for 
unlawfully taking the funds or, alternatively, that the Iranian banks 
were liable for unlawfully withholding them. 
In Mark Dallal, (149) the claimant was the holder of two U. S. dollar 
cheques drawn by an Iranian bank on Chase Manhattan in New York. 
When the claimant had presented the cheque in New York for payment, 
they were dishonoured by Chase Manhattan because of insufficient 
funds. Iran's defence was that cheques were null and void because 
they had been issued by the Iranian bank in violation of a foreign 
control regulation. Dallal argued that a bank that issued a cheque 
could not subsequently deny liability on the grounds it had violated 
internal regulations in issuing a cheque in the first place. Noting 
that both Iran and the U. S. were parties to the IMF Agreement, the 
award of the Tribunal supported the right of Iran and its banks to 
refuse payment on U. S. dollar cheques where this would involve a 
violation of Iýan's foreign exchange control regulations. The award 
referred to the IMF Agreement and a provision on the Monetary and 
Banking Law of Iran which provided that the Central Bank shall 
control and formulate regulations regarding foreign exchange 
transactions. The award looked to Article VI, Section 3 of the IMF 
Agreement applying to capital transfers and concluded: 
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"These regulations at least in so far as they apply to mere 
capital transfers under Article VI, Section 3 of the IMF 
Agreement are valid currency regulations within Article 
VIII, Section 2(b)". (150) 
Thus it seems that the Tribunal was persuaded that it was dealing 
with a capital transfer transaction which Iran could validly regulate 
under the IMF Agreement. 
In contrast to the above case, in the Nasser-Esphahanian(151) case, 
which involved similar facts, the Tribunal reached a different 
result. In this. case the claimant had purchased a U. S. dollar cheque 
from an Iranian bank drawn on the Iranian bank's account with 
Citibank in New York city. When the cheque was presented in 
Citibank, it was dishonoured for insufficient funds. Iran maintained 
that the Iranian bank could not be responsible for the dishonour by 
Citibank, but no argument or evidence as to who was responsible was 
presented. The Tribunal upheld the claimant's right and declared 
that a bank that draws a cheque is responsible to ensure that 
sufficient funds are available in the bank on which the cheque is 
written to cover the cheque, also noting that this was text book law 
in New York where payment was to have been made. Judge Shafeiei 
filed a dissenting opinion(152) in the case, pointing out that the 
award had ignored the question of the legality of Iran's foreign 
exchange control regulations. The dissent discussed the IMF 
Agreement provisions and concluded that the Tribunal was duty bound 
to refuse enforcement of foreign exchange controls which violated 
Iran's currency regulations, (153) as had been the case in Mark 
Dallal. 
However, in the Hood Corpora clon (154) award which was issued by the 
Tribunal a year later, it upheld Iran's position. In that case the 
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claimant had, made a thirty-one day time deposit with an Iranian bank 
on 14 October 1979. By telex on 30 November, Hood had requested that 
the funds in the time deposit which had expired be transferred to a 
bank account which it maintained in West Germany, to be converted 
there into Deutchmarks. The Iranian bank had telexed back on I 
December that permission of the Central Bank would have to be 
obtained for the requested transfer. Subsequently, the claimants 
received information from the Iranian bank that the Central Bank 
would not authorize such a transfer. Before the Tribunal, Hood 
argued that Iran was liable because the Central Bank refused to 
permit the repatriation of its fund and this act was a violation by 
Iran in respect of its obligations under both Iranian law and 
international law. 
Hood specifically argued that the exchange controls imposed by Iran 
constituted a violation of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement. Iran 
responded that it had never joined Article VIII and was therefore not 
bound by that provision and that, in any event, it had informed the 
IMF of its regulations in accordance with Article XIV. The award 
agreed with Iran that the restrictions imposed were within Section 3 
of Article VI, pertaining to capital movements, and were therefore 
not in violation. 
Judge Mosk filed a dissenting opinion, 
(155) 
arguing that Iran had 
violated international law in several ways, by failing to make 
provision for the repatriation of the claimant's fund, by failing to 
fix time limits on the exchange controls it had imposed, and by 
failing to articulate any reasons for the restrictions. Further, 
Judge Mosk argued that in order for foreign exchange control 
regulations to be found valid by the Tribunal they must be based on 
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plausible reasons, and must be subject to reasonable time 
limits. (156) 
The above mentioned awards of the Tribunal involving foreign exchange 
controls reveal an inconsistency in the approach to the issues 
involved and in the results for the parties. However some general 
observations regarding the approach of future international tribunals 
to such issues may be made. The awards in favour of Iran in Mark 
Dellal and Hood Corporation suggests that international tribunals may 
support a strong presumption in favour of the validity of foreign 
exchange controls exercised by a state, while the awards in favour of 
the claimant in the Nasser Esphahlanian case indicate that this 
presumption may be overcome where the relevant facts and legal 
arguments are carefully identified and presented. 
3.8.1.4 BUSINESS 
In this part we examine how the Tribunal has applied the standard of 
%unreasonable interference' to interests such as the loss of a 
business entity or commercial operation. 
(157) In doing so, the 
Tribunal has used a broad approach. It has focused on the entire 
panaply of ownership rights: the right to appoint directors and 
participate in management; the receipt in the ordinary course of 
business of financial and commercial information from the business; 
receipt of income or other distributions; and other aspects of 
ownership. 
In determining the occurrence of an expropriation of business 
enterprises, the Tribunal has never used any f ixed and mechanical 
standard. However, in a few cases (in which an expropriation has 
been found) it has concluded that the total ousting of the foreign 
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owner from control and management of the property, has amounted to a 
taking of the property in question. This conclusion can be seen in 
the decisions of the Tribunal in the Sedco, (158) Starret, (159) Phelps 
(160) C(161) Dodge, and Tippet cases. In these cases, the Tribunal 
held that the replacement of the owner's management or directors with 
representatives appointed by the Government in a company or 
enterprise has been a negative factor, and has resulted in 
expropriation of that property, since the former managers or 
directors are no longer able to participate in the management. Also, 
the Tribunal found the appointment of temporary managers by the 
Government to be a taking, as long as the facts show the managers 
have assumed a functionally permanent role. 
(162) For instance, in 
the Tippects case, although the appointed managers for the Iranian 
subsidiary were temporary, the owner had been cut off from ordinary 
dissemination of financial information and so the Tribunal considered 
the expropriation confirmed. (163) After considering the facts, the 
Tribunal concluded that the claimant ýad been deprived of its 
property interests in its Iranian subsidiary and that the government 
of Iran was liable in the sense of its acts and omissions, for that 
deprivation. 
In the Starret case, however, other facts confirmed the permanency of 
supposedly temporary managers. In this case the Tribunal held that 
for a number of reasons, that the appointment of government managers 
to take over a massive housing construction project previously 
managed by the Claimant was the point at which an expropriation 
effectively occurred, despite the Covernment's subsequent invitations 
to the Claimant to return and finish the project. (164) 
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The appointment of temporary managers in this case was, made pursuant 
to the decree of the Revolutionary Council, adopted on 14 July 1979, 
called the Bill for Appointing Temporary Manager or Managers for the 
Supervision of Manufacturing, Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural 
and Service Companies, either private or public. 
(165) Considering 
this act, the Tribunal pointed out that the appointment of temporary 
managers in accordance with the provision of the act, had deprived 
the shareholders of their right to manage the Company. 
(166) As a 
result of these measures, the claimants could no longer exercise 
their rights to manage the Company, and 'were deprived of their 
possibilities of effect, use and control of it,. 
(167) The government 
of Iran argued that Scarret had been requested to resume the 
project. 
(168) Since, however, there was no evidence that the 
claimant, if it had returned to the project, would have been offered 
compensation for any reduction in the value of its ownership rights 
and contract rights caused by the temporary managers, the Tribunal 
concluded that the expropriation was complete. 
(169) 
The scope of management functions under the above Bill was another 
factor which influenced the Tribunal. Article 3 of the Bill defines 
the powers of the managers appointed by the Ministry concerned as 
follows: 
"The Manager of Board of Directors .... have every necessary 
authority for running the day-to-day business of the 
CompaAy. They do not require special permies on from the 
original managers of owners of said company'. 
Because the Government appointed managers, under the above Bill, had 
complete authority to run the business, displaced the former 
management and precluding the owner from selecting any 
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representative, the Tribunal found an expropriation of the 
Company. (171) 
The Iranian government had argued that the temporary managers were 
appointed to look after the best interests of the Corporation. 
(172) 
They were appointed to prevent a shut-down of economic and industrial 
units and any laying off of workers. It further contended that under 
Article 4 of the Bill a temporary manager has the status and 
obligations of an attorney to his client with regard to the company 
and is considered as a trustee and that accordingly his acts should 
not be considered to have any expropriatory effect. 
(173) However, 
the Tribunal has been of the view that the governmental purpose in 
appointing such managers has little or no bearing on whether the 
substitution of managers amounts to an expropriation. As we saw 
earlier, the Tribunal in Tippects case pointed out that: 
"The intent of the Government is less important than the 
effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the 
measures of' control or intertefeýce is less important than 
the reality of their impact .14 
Consequently, in Scarrec, notwithstanding the argument that the 
managers were appointed to look after the interests of the Company, 
the Tribunal did not hold this to be a mitigating factor. 
(175) 
The irrelevance of the Government's intention was given particular 
attention in fhelps Dodge Corp. v Iran. In this case, the claimant 
company owned 19.36 percent of an Iranian company (SICAB) which had 
been established for the purpose of manufacturing and selling various 
wire and cable products. 
(176) After the revolution, on 27 October 
1980, the Iranian Council for the Protection of Industries a 
governmental body, transferred the SICABs management to two 
designated organizations: The Bank of Industry and Mines and The 
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Organization of National Industries, both of which were agencies of 
the Government. As a result of the transfer, no meetings of SICABs 
Board of Directors or shareholders were held; and the claimant 
received no information on its business activities. Similarly, the 
claimant received no information as to the financial affairs of 
SICAB. (177) 
The Tribunal recognized that the legal authorization pursuant to 
which the Government Council had appointed new managers, a 'Law of 
Protection of Industries and Prevention of Stoppage of Factories in 
the Country', described the managers as. '4trustees' and the 
administration of the factory as 'provisional'. However, the law 
nowhere declared that the managers were trustees for the 
shareholders. The Tribunal pointed out that "it fully understood the 
reasons why the respondent felt compelled to protect its interests 
through this transfer of management and also understood the economic, 
financial and social concerns that inspired the law pursuant to which 
it acted". 
(178) Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that "those reasons 
and concerns cannot relive the Respondent of the obligation to 
compensate Phelps Dodge for its lossn. 
(179) Since the Respondent had 
taken control of SICABs factory; was running it for its own benefit; 
and seemed likely to continue to do so indefinitely, the Government 
was liable to the claimant for the value of that property. 
(180) 
The Tribunal has thus been consistent in finding an expropriation has 
taken place in cases where the appointment of a "temporary" or 
"provisional Manager" by the government was accompanied by facts or 
circumstances indicating that the essential rights of share 
ownership, including particularly the right to participate in the 
management of the company, had been permanently interfered with. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DATE OF THE TAKING 
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The Date of the Taking 
In the first part of this study we examined the liability of the 
State for the conduct said to constitute expropriation. This second 
part of the study addresses mainly, the issues of the standard of 
compensation which is to be applied in determining any compensable 
damages resulting from an expropriation and the methods of valuation 
of the expropriated property. However, applying any standard of 
compensation to a taking requires first and foremost, determination 
of the date of that taking. As we will see shortly the date of the 
taking has had a great impact on determining the compensation, as 
well as on the valuation of the dispossessed property. 
4.1 DATE OF THE TAKING 
Under normal conditions when an expropriation occurs, i. e. the exact 
date of taking, may not be critical, because political and economic 
conditions which usually affect the value of the expropriated 
property are constant throughout. In a revolutionary situation 
however, the property value may fluctuate with the volatile 
political, social and economic milieu. 
(') So, in a revolutionary 
condition, the fixing of the exact date of expropriation is an 
important issue. 
Whether an expropriation of property occurs by virtue of a formal 
decree or in a type of de facto(2) taking, in either case the 
determination of the date of taking is a delicate task. Moreover, 
for the purposes of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the date of the 
taking can be crucial as well. First, we shall examine the effect of 
the date of taking on'the Tribunal's jurisdiction, then we will 
discuss separately the date of taking in cases which are affected by 
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a formal decree and in cases in which there is no formal 
expropriatory decree. 
4.1.1 THE DATE OF THE TAKING AND THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION 
As we explained in the second chapter the Tribunal has no 
jurisdiction over disputes not outstanding on 19 January 1981(3). 
Article II(l) of the Claims Settlement Agreement excludes from the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction "claims described in Paragraph 11 of the 
Declaration of the Government of Algeria on 19 January 1981, and 
claims arising out of actions of the United States in response to the 
conduct described in such paragraphs. . ." 
(4), Paragraph II of the 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of Algeria (General Declaration) removes from the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction "any depending or future claims of the United States or 
a United States national arising out of events occurring before the 
date of this Declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United 
States nationals on 14 November 1979, or (B) their subsequent 
detention ...... 
(5 ) Accordingly, the Tribunal cannot consider a claim 
for an expropriation or compensation occurring after the date 19 
January 1981. 
Considering the above date, the Tribunal dismissed the case 
(6) International Technical Products Corp. v Iran 
0 
In this case, the claimants among other claims, alleged that their 
real property had been expropriated. The claimants purported to have 
been either the beneficial owners or legal owners, at all relevant 
times, of a building containing eight apartments located in 
Tehran. (7) The claimants initially based their claim on the alleged 
failure of the previous Covernment of Iran and its successors, the 
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present Iranian Government, to protect the building, thereby 
depriving claimants of the use and benefit of the building even prior 
to claimants' departure from Iran in December 1978. (8) Later, 
claimants contended that the building was expropriated through 
actions of Bank Tejarat (an Iranian Commercial Bank) with "the formal 
approval and active participation of the Government of Iran in the 
form of both its Revolutionary prosecutor and the State Deeds and 
Property Registration Organization". (9) 
Bank Tejarat, appearing as mortgagee of the property, and for the 
purposes of this claim, apparently as the representative or Iran as 
well, challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the claim. 
It accepted that the control of the building had been passed to it 
after claimants' departure from Iran in December 1978. Nevertheless, 
it asserted that it had taken the title to the building by 
foreclosing for non-payment by claimants of their mortgage 
obligations. 
(10) It alleged that it had obtained legal title on 
September 1983 in compliance with the foreclosure procedures set 
forth in Article 34 of the Law for Registration of Deeds and 
Property. (") Examining the facts, the Tribunal was not convinced 
that acts or omissions on the part of the Iranian government arguably 
engaging its international responsibility occurred within the period 
necessary to its jurisdiction and for this reason dismissed the 
claim. 
The time of an alleged taking has also been relevant in some other 
cases in which the Tribunal's jurisdiction has been contested. 
(12) 
However, these decisions, like that in the International Technical 
Products case, they turned entirely on the facts and so do not 
require further discussion here. 
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4.2 THE DATE OF THE TAKING AND THE EXISTENCE OF A FORMAL DECREE 
4.2.1 THE INSURANCE COMPANY NATIONALIZATION CASES 
When an expropriation is affected by a formal decree, the inquiry 
about the date of that expropriation is relatively simple. 
(13) 
Normally the date of the decree itself will be considered as the date 
of the expropriation. Accordingly, in the insurance company 
nationalization cases before the Tribunal, the date of expropriation 
was found to be the date on which the pertinent legislation 
proclaimed all insurance companies operating in Iran to be 
nationalized which was 23 June 1979. However, adjustments may need 
to be made because of changes in value that may have been caused by 
an earlier announcement of the nationalization. 
(14) Such adjustments 
were made, for example, in valuation of the assets of American 
International Group, (AIG) when the case was brought before the 
Tribunal. (15) 
On 23 June 1979, all insurance companies operating in Iran, including 
American International Group, were proclaimed nationalized by the Law 
of Nationalization of Insurance Companies. 
(16) On 21 October 1981, 
claimants filed a claim against respondent (the Islamic Republic of 
Iran) before the Tribunal, seeking compensation for the taking of 
their assets. Despite the objections were raised which by the 
respondent in connection with the case, 
(17) the claimants argued that 
under the Treaty of Amity and customary international law they were 
"entitled to the payment of just compensation equal to the full value 
of their interest as of the date of nationalization. 
(18 ) AIG argued 
that for purposes of determining the just amount of compensation, the 
company's value must be measured as a going concern, including such 
elements as future business prospects and goodwill. 
(19) 
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The claimant also contended that the valuation of their own interest 
in the company "must disregard any action of the Government of Iran 
prior to nationalization which may have had the effect of 
artificially depressing the value of the company" and "any event 
which followed the nationalization which may have negatively affected 
the company's future business prospects". 
(20) 
The Tribunal never clearly stated what standard of valuation was 
applicable. 
(21) It focussed mainly on the amount of compensation. 
It held that no Iranian actions prior to the nationalization should 
be considered in determining' AIG's value. However, the Tribunal went 
on to state that the effect of both the nationalization and 
subsequent events on the company's value should not be taken into 
account either. Thus the valuation was made on the basis of the fair 
market value of the company at the date of nationalization. 
(22) 
The valuation decision was complicated by the fact that there was no 
active market for AIG's shares, therefore both parties relied on 
expert testimony. Both parties experts relying on different 
financial facts, presented their own testimonies. 
(23) However, the 
Tribunal rejected both sets of valuations, adopting neither AIG's or 
Iran's estimate. It is interesting to note that AIG's valuations 
which were based on 1978 data, were rejected on the general principle 
that: 
"In ascertaining the going concern value of an enterprise at 
a previous point in time for purposes of establishing the 
appropriate quantum of compensation for nationalization, it 
is ... necessary to exclude the effects of actions 
taken by 
the nationalizing state in relation to the enterprise which 
actions may have depressed its value. Moreover, there is 
not sufficient evidence in this case that Iran had taken any 
such actions. 
On the other hand, prior changes in the general political, 
social and economic conditions which might have affected the 
enterprise's business prospects as of the date the 
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enterprise was taken should be considered.... Thus, 
financial data for the &%ýiod 21 March 1978 - 25 June 1979 
should not be ignored". 
While the Tribunal found that the method of analysis which had been 
employed by the claimant's two experts was consistent with modern 
techniques of valuation of insurance companies, nevertheless it 
disagreed with their final valuation. It found that: "The 
appraisals do not sufficiently consider the changes in general social 
and economic conditions in Iran which had taken place between the 
autumn of 1978 and June 1979, or their likely duration. In this 
connection, it should be noted that during that period many Iranian 
nationals belonging to the wealthier part of the population left 
their country. Second, the appraisal does not account for the 
effects of certain Iranian taxes upon net profitability. Thirdly, 
changes in the company's financial position between 21 March 1979 and 
the date of nationalization are not reflected in claimant's expert 
valuation". 
(25) Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal considered that 
fair market value of AIG at the date of nationalization was 
significantly less than even the lowest figure arrived at by the 
experts of the claimants. As we illustrated above, although the date 
of nationalization of AIG was fixed, 23 June 1979 i. e. the date of 
the nationalization act, the valuation of its assets and shares 
became subject to some adjustments. 
0 
4.2.2 THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY CASES 
While with respect to the insurance company nationalization cases the 
date of expropriation was found to be the date of pertinent 
legislation, (26) in petroleum industry cases in which the takings 
were carried out pursuant to the Single Article Act, the date of 
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taking was found to be different. In Mobil 011(27) the sequence of 
governmental acts and relevant events commenced on 10 March 1979, the 
date of an NIOC letter to the oil companies declaring the agreements 
had become "inoperative". (28) Meetings followed at which attempts 
were made to reach agreement on the termination of the agreements. 
The Single Article Act was issued 10 months later on 8 January 1980 
authorizing nullification of certain contracts in the oil industry, 
and on 5 September 1981, claimants were sent a letter informing them 
that their agreements had been nullified. The oil companies 
contended that the date of expropriation was 10 March 1979, the date 
of the NIOC letter that had first informed them of the Iranian 
position that the agreements were inoperative. 
(29) Iran argued for 
the later date of 5 September 1981, the date of the formal 
nullification letters. The award avoided a finding on the issue by 
ruling no expropriation had occurred because the parties had agreed 
to termination of the agreements. 
However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Brower agreed with the 
claimants on the date issue. He reasoned that 10 March 1979 should 
be taken as the effective date of expropriation even if the NIOC's 
letter of that date was ambiguous. This was because the date of the 
initial act "presumptively" should be regarded as the date of the 
taking when subsequent events confirm an expropriation has taken 
place. 
(30) 0 
In Amoco International Finance, (31) the parties agreed that 
expropriation had taken place but disagreed on the date. Amoco 
argued for the early date of 1 August 1979 on the reasoning that the 
various communications and meetings between the parties prior to that 
date had made it clear that Amoco's right had been nationalized, 
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pointing particularly to the unilateral takeover in June and July 
1979 of Khemco's marketing activities, against it objections. (32) As 
it had in Mobil 011, Iran argued for a much later date at the end of 
December 1980 when Amoco had been notified that the Special 
Commission established pursuant to the Single Article Act had 
declared the contract null and void. (33) The award by Chamber Three 
agreed with Iran, fixing the date at 24 December 1980 on the 
reasoning that this was the date on which "the process which led to 
expropriation of Amoco's rights and interests in Khemco was 
complete ...... 
(34) 
From the foregoing observations it could be concluded that in those 
expropriations affected by a formal decree (i) as regards 
nationalization of the insurance companies the date of the pertinent 
legislation was found to be the date of the expropriation, although 
with regard to the valuation of the properties some adjustments 
seemed to be necessary; (ii) in nationalization of the petroleum 
industries, however, the above formula was acceptable neither to the 
parties of the cases nor to the Tribunal. Accordingly, while the 
Tribunal in the Mobil Oil case did not fix any date, in the Amoco 
case the Tribunal fixed a date which was different to the date of the 
decree, i. e. the Single Article Act. 
4,3 THE DATE OF THE TAKING IN DE FACTO EXPROPRIATION CASES 
In the previous chapter we examined different types of de facto 
expropriation cases. It will be recalled that in these cases there 
is no formal expropriationary decree, but expropriation instead takes 
place by successive encroachments upon management and ownership 
rights. Accordingly, in these cases fixing the date of expropriation 
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is a difficult task. Differences of character among cases also cause 
the determination of the date of the expropriation to vary. Due to 
these differences the Tribunal in each individual case has adopted 
criteria consistent with the character of that case. For instance, 
as we shall now explain, in cases of expropriation of office 
equipment or a bank account, the method which has been used by the 
Tribunal differs from the method which has been used in cases of 
expropriation of a business entity. 
4.3.1 THE DATE OF THE TAKING IN AN EXPROPRIATION OF A BANK ACCOUNT 
In the case of expropriation of assets such as bank accounts or 
office equipment the Tribunal "generally has selected the date as of 
which the owner's access to the goods has been blocked". 
(35) 
The decisions of the Tribunal in American Bell International Inc 
(ABII) v Iz-an(36), (part of which is concerned with the expropriation 
of a bank account); and in Dames & Moore v Iran(37). illustrate the 
above statement. In the former case, the claimant (ABII) along with 
other claims, alleged its funds held in a bank account in Iran were 
expropriated by the Iranian Covernment. 
(38) The ABII funds in 
question were held in a joint ABII and Telecommunication Company of 
Iran (TCI) account established at Bank Melli by virtue of an 
agreement of 19 March to which ABII was party. 
(39) The funds in this 
account were used to satisfy ABII's outstanding affairs with 
creditors subsequent to its departure. Transactions on the account 
were to be made subject to the joint signature of TCI and ABII 
representatives at Price Waterhouse. 
(40) The claimant contended that 
although a substantial amount of his outstanding obligations had been 
settled, the ministry of Post, Telephone and Telegraph had delayed 
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the release of its funds which was about 20,000,000 Rials. 
(41) it 
further stated that it had many times requested the release, when 
almost all of the obligations had been satisfied. 
(42 ) These requests 
were not complied with. Instead on 10 August 1980 the Ministry in a 
letter personally forwarded by a TCI representative to ABII's Iranian 
representative at Price Waterhouse with the authority to sign on 
behalf of ABII, had requested that Price Waterhouse transfer the 
funds to a TCI account at Bank Melli. 
(43) In a letter dated 19 
August 1980 to ABII the representative reported that he was informed 
that "non compliance with the payment request would have serious 
personal consequences for [him] and would in any case not stop TCI 
obtaining access to ABIIs funds". 
(44 ) The representative then had 
authorized the transfer of the funds which was effected on 11 August 
1980. (45) Since then ABII had not had any access to the funds. 
The Tribunal concluded in the light of these facts that claimant had 
been wrongfully deprived of its bank account of 19,976,850 Rials and 
therefore it was entitled to an award of U. S. $283,964, i. e. the 
value of the property as of the date of the taking which was 11 
August 1980. (46) 
4.3.2 THE DATE OF THE TAKING IN AN EXPROPRIATION OF OFFICE EQUIPMENT 
An example of this type of case before the Tribunal is Dames & Moore 
v Iran (1983) 
(47) In this case claimants along with other claims, 
alleged that in the course of his work in Iran his property, which 
included vehicles and office equipment kept at a rented privately 
owned warehouse near Tehran, had been expropriated. 
(48) The 
claimant, relying on sworn statements of the Managing Director and 
General Manager of his company in Iran during the relevant period, 
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stated that in the autumn of 1980, representatives of the Government 
of Iran had occupied the warehouse and informed representatives of 
claimants that the warehouse was to be used to house refugees of the 
war and that any useful equipment stored therein would be turned over 
to the Iranian army. 
(49) The claimant further stated from that date 
his representatives were denied access to the equipment. Although 
Iran's liability was disputed, (50) the Tribunal, was of the opinion 
that unreasonable interference of the respondent with the use of the 
stored equipment had occurred. (51) 
As far as the date of the expropriation of the equipment is concerned 
different dates might be considered as the date of the 
expropriation. 
(52 ) However, as we noted in Chapter 3, in the view of 
the Tribunal the date at which the owners' access to the goods has 
been blocked is the day of expropriation. Accordingly in the present 
case the Tribunal concluded that "a taking of the property occurred 
no later than 1 January 1981". 
(53) 
In the awards involving the taking of tangible properties such as 
vehicles, furnishings and equipments, the date issue has seldom been 
raised, perhaps because in this type of cases the answer did not 
affect the valuation of the properties taken. On the other hand, in 
expropriation cases involving ongoing business the date question has 
often been contested. 
0 
4.4 THE DATE OF THE TAKING IN EXPROPRIATION OF AN ONGOING BUSINESS 
In expropriation cases involving ongoing businesses, a multiplicity 
of dates for the taking is conceivable. Consequently, in such cases 
the task of fixing a date is more complex. The taking of an ongoing 
business might occur through a chain of events. For example, it 
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might begin with minor management interferences and culminate in the 
transfer of title. The taking however, will not necessarily be found 
to have occurred at the time of either the first or the last such 
event. The Tribunal has been of the view that expropriation of an 
ongoing business occurs when the interference becomes an 
"irreversible deprivation". (54) 
Thus, in International Technical Products Corp. v Iran the Tribunal 
stated: 
A claim for a taking is outstanding on the day of the taking 
of property. Where the alleged expropriation is carried out 
by way of a series of interferences in the enjoyment of the 
property, the breach forming the cause of action is deemed 
to take place on the day when the interference has ripened 
into more or less irreversible deprivation of the property 
rather than on the beginning date of the events. The point 
at which interference ripens into a taking depends on the 
circumstances of the case and does not require that legal 
title has been transferred". (55) 
The question of "the date of taking' was further addressed in the 
context of the appointment of provisional managers in Sediran 
Drilling Compan7 (Sedco) v National Iranian Oil Compan7. 
(56) In that 
case the Tribunal was faced with two possible expropriation dates: 
1-2 August 1980, when an order was issued by the National 
Industries Organization of Iran causing the formal transfer of 
claimant's shares; 
2- 22 November 1979 when claimant was stripped of its management 
rights by the hppointment of three Iranians as provisional directors 
of the company. 
(57) 
The appointment of conservators or managers has often been regarded 
as a significant indication of expropriation because of the attendant 
denial of the owner's right to manager the enterprise. 
(58 ) Accepting 
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the appointment of the Government managers as an indication of 
expropriation of Sediran, the Tribunal however, laid out a two part 
standard holding that: (i) a taking is presumptively found to occur 
upon the appointment of managers and (ii) such presumption becomes 
conclusive if at the time of the appointment there was no reasonable 
prospect of the return of control to the owner. In this regard the 
Tribunal said: 
When, as in the instant case, the seizure of control by 
appointment of "temporary" managers clearly ripens into an 
outright taking of title, the date of appointment 
presumptively should be regarded as the date of taking.... 
When... it is also found that on the date of the Government 
appointment of "temporary" managers there is no reasonable 
prospect of return of control, a taking shoýld conclusively 
be found to have occurred as if that date. 
(5 ) 
Finally, the Tribunal accepted that the earlier date was the 
appropriate date of the expropriation. The Tribunal reasoned that 
the earlier date was more "equitable" because (i) the company's value 
to the claimants should not be affected by the Government's in fact 
operating the Company and having sole control over the generation of 
income; (ii) valuation of an expropriated entity 'must discount the 
effect of expropriatory acts. 
(60) 
However, in most cases of this type, it was not clear at the time of 
the appointment of the temporary managers whether the company would 
ultimately be liquidated, permanently taken over by the government, 
or returned to its shareholders. Therefore in contrast to Sedco, in 
the Starrett case(61), the Tribunal expressly declared that the 
appointment of a temporary manager in mid January 1980 could not by 
itself be considered an expropriation because the control of the 
government through such an appointment was temporary and 
incomplete. (62) 
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However, the award went on to f ind that the taking had occurred "at 
least by the end of January 1980, '(63) which was only two weeks after 
the appointment of the temporary manager in the case. In this regard 
the Tribunal stated: 
"There can be little doubt that at least at the end of 
January 1980 the Claimant had been deprived of the effective 
use, control and benefits of their property rights in Shah 
Goli. 
It has therefore been proven that at least by the end of 
January 1980 the government of Iran had interfered with the 
Claimant's property rights in the Project to an extent that 
rendered these rifW so useless that they must be deemed to 
have been taken". 64 
Starrett had argued for a much earlier date on the grounds that the 
anti-American policies of the Iranian government amounted to an 
unlawful expropriation, presumably at the time of the revolution in 
late 1978 and early 1979. The Tribunal rejecting that argument 
stated that investors assume the risk of revolutions which do not by 
themselves constitute a taking giving rise to a claim for 
compensation under international law. 
(65) While the award did not 
articulate the criteria which it followed in fixing the date of 
expropriation, the Tribunal's rejection of the earlier date as it was 
claimed by Starrett and the date on which the temporary manager was 
appointed, denotes that it settled on the date by which it considered 
the expropriation process to have become irreversible. 
In Tippects, Abbect, McCarth7, Stracton(66) the claimant alleged 
expropriation of its interest in a partnership for which a temporary 
manager had been appointed by Iran on 24 July 1979. In determining 
the date of expropriation at a later date, the Tribunal stated that: 
11 ... assumption of control over property does not automatically and 
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by 
the government,.... such a conclusion is warranted whenever events 
173 
The Date of the Taking 
demonstrate that the owner has been deprived of fundamental rights of 
ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely 
ephemeral". 
(67) 
Thus according to the Tribunal, in that case such taking does occur 
when it appears that the deprivation involved is not merely short 
lived. However, in Thomas Earl Pa7ne(68) the Tribunal found that the 
date of the taking was the date that the provisional or temporary 
manager was appointed. Examining the facts in that case, the 
Tribunal was persuaded of the governments intention to expropriate 
the claimants- interest at the time of appointment of the provisional 
manager by evidence that the business involved was high technical and 
critical to Iran's defence operations thus making it a particular 
target for takeover. 
(69) 
To sum up it could be concluded that in addressing the date issue the 
Tribunal has produced different results and articulated different 
criteria for fixing the date of expropriation in different fact 
situations. In Sedco and Thomas Ear17 Pa7ne, the date of the first 
formal government act was accepted as the date of expropriation. 
However, the approach in Starrett and International Technical Product 
Corporation was to find the point at which the process had become 
Ormore or less irreversible", while in Tippects, Abbect, McCarth7, 
Stratton, the course followed was to find the date on which it 
0 
appeared the deprivation was not merely ephemeral. 
Taking all cases together, the Tribunal's awards on the date issue 
have clearly declined to accept automatically the date of the first 
act; instead it has examined the facts of each case to determine the 
point in time when the interference or deprivation or taking became 
permanent or "irreversible". 
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In the last two chapters we examined the controversial issues of 'the 
taking' as well as 'the date of the taking'. Determining how a 
claimant should be compensated for his lost property interest is, of 
course, also an area of controversy in expropriation cases. These 
determinations necessarily involve an inquiry into what type of 
remedy should be employed. as well as the scope of that remedy. 
5.1 RANGE OF REMEDIES 
In international law, as the decisions of the International Courts 
and international arbitrations show, there is a broad range of 
remedies available to investors whose property interests have been 
expropriated(') These include restitution or specific performance, 
substitution of the value of the property taken, award of punitive 
damages, or other measures intended to indemnify the claimant for the 
wrong done, or the property lost. (2) However, it should be pointed 
out that reparation is still the primary and most frequently sought 
form of relief. (3) After almost sixty years, the definition of its 
legal nature remains to be found in the often quoted statement issued 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow 
Factory case (1928). (4) The case was related to the expropriation by 
Poland of a factory at Chorzow, contrary, as the Court had held, to 
the Geneva Cor; vention of 1922 between Germany and Poland on Upper 
Silesia. (5) In this judgement the Court ruled upon a claim by 
Germany for reparation for the damage caused by an illegal 
expropriation. In this case the Court stated: 
The essential principle contained in the notion of an 
illegal act -a principle which seems to be established by 
international practice and in particular by the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act 
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and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed. Restitution in kind or, if to the value which a 
restitution in kind would bear the award, if need be, of 
damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by 
restitution in kind or payment in place of it - such are the 
principles which should serve to determine the amount of 
comp ation due for an act contrary to international 
law75 
Accordingly, reparation may take two different forms, restitution in 
kind or the payment of damages. 
5.2 RES ITUTION IN KIND 
While restitution in kind is the primary remedy, as the Court said 
elsewhere in the same judgement, monetary compensation 'is even the 
most usual form of reparation' and was in fact selected by Germany in 
that case. 
(7) However, it seems fairly clear that as a rule 
international law has for long recognised restitution in kind as a 
right, against the wrong-doing state. 
(8) An example of legal 
restitution in kind could be the decision which was made with regard 
to the MartInI case. 
(9) In that case, the Tribunal held that 
proceedings in a case in the Venezuelan courts that was lost by the 
claimant company had been wmanifestly unjust* and decided that "the 
Venezuelan Government is bound to recognize, by way of reparation, 
the annulment of the financial obligation imposed" by the Venezuelan 
courts on the claimant company. 
(10) In the Temple case also, it was 
ordered that Thailand should return to Cambodia the artefacts which 
had been taken unlawfully from a temple by Thai authorities. 
(") 
Brownlie points out that "it would seem that territorial disputes may 
be settled by specific restitution, although the declaratory forms of 
the Judgements of the International Court masks the element of 
restitutionm. (12) However as Schwarzenberger has stated 
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"international judicial institutions have slowly groped their way 
towards the articulate formulation of the rule that the Commission of 
an international tort entails the duty to make reparation. For a 
considerable period, they tended to limit redress for breaches of 
international law to monetary compensation for actual injury, or 
damage suffered". (13) 
It is obvious that neither 'restitution in kind' or 'monetary 
compensation' is an exclusive principle. one author has subdivided 
the wrongdoer's duty into a duty to restore where a situation has 
been illegally created and a duty to pay compensation where the 
wrongdoer has wrongfully failed to create a situation. 
(14) The 
Harvard Draft Convention recognizes the principle by providing in 
Article 27 that the reparation which a state is required to make for 
a wrongful act or omission may take the form of 'measures designed to 
re-establish the situation which would have existed if the wrongful 
act or omission... had not occurred', damages or a combination 
thereof. (15) In our opinion, determining the reparation primarily 
depends on the circumstances of the case and on the claimant state's 
choice whether the wrongdoer state can or should make restitution in 
kind or pay damages. For example, in a nationalization case, if the 
nationalized assets have already passed into the hands of bonafide 
third party purchasers, restitution is indeed impossible. National 
Courts may have jurisdiction over such persons, but international 
tribunals have no jurisdiction to require them to return to the 
nationalized party the assets which they now hold. Again, the 
nationalized property may no longer exist in the same form to be 
restituted. 
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Sometimes restitution is impossible, depending on the circumstances 
of the case. Such circumstances are what the Permanent Court had'in 
mind in its obIter dictum in the Chorzow case, when it spoke of 
restitution being required, unless Othis is not possible'. 
(16) 
Certain writers interpret impossibility of restitution as meaning 
that if a state is unwilling to return what it has taken by 
nationalization, and cannot be compelled to do so, then restitution 
is impossible* and should not be ordered against a state. 
(17) This 
seems to be accepted, particularly, in situations where the taking is 
of the business of exploitation of natural resources, within a 
state's territory, or indeed any other commercial enterprise which 
has to operate within the state's territory. 
(18) Accordingly, in 
recent arbitral awards the application of restitution rarely can be 
seen. 
5.2.1 RESTITUTION IN RECENT ARBITRAL AWARDS 
In recent arbitral awards, as we shall see below, the arbitrators 
have hesitated to apply "restitution in kind" in making their 
decisions. While they have recognised the principle as a principle 
of international law, nevertheless, they have tended to treat it as a 
purely theoretical possibility. 
In the recent arbitration between the Libyan American oil Company 
(Llamco) and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, the Sole 
Arbitrator, Dr. Mahmassani spoke of restitution as being a general 
principle of the Islamic Sharia and of international law, but said 
that it was **hindered' by the impossibility of performance. 
(19) 
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Although in the Texaco v LIbya case, 
(20) a different arbitrator, 
Dupuy, relied on the principle of restitution and equated specific 
performance with restitution, this course was rejected by Judge 
Lagergren in B. P. v Llbya. 
(21) As it is well known, specific 
performance did not take place in Texaco v Libya. Instead 
compensation was eventually agreed between the parties. Similar 
hesitation about the application of restitution can be seen in the 
award in Amco Asia Corp. v Indonesla. 
(22) The Tribunal was concerned 
with the claim that the Indonesian government had unlawfully revoked 
an investment licence, granted to the alien corporation. It said: 
It is obvious that this Tribunal cannot substitute itself 
for the Indonesian Government. in order to cancel the 
revocation and restore the licence. Such actions are not 
claimed. and it is more than doubtful that this kind of 
restituilyn integrum could be ordered against a sovereign 
state. ( 
For restitution to be carried out, it is necessary for the 
Arbitration tribunal to order a specific performance against a state. 
However, these tribunals feel that once states have given their 
consent (whether ad hoc, or in an arbitration clause) they can 
pronounce upon the law as it affects a dispute before them; but they 
cannot order specific performance. 
(24) 
It is also a reality that within a state's territory specific 
performance usually is impractical. 
(25) Impracticability and virtual 
impossibility of restitution have led to the emergence of a request 
from private parties seeking redress for nationalization, that the 
award be in the form of a declaration of the invalidity of the act in 
question. In B. P. v Llbya case the claimants argued in favour of 
restitution, but requested a declaration rather than an order that it 
should be restored to the full enjoyment of its rights under the B. P. 
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concession. 
(26) The Tribunal found this to be a purely theoretical 
distinction. It stated: 
It may be argued that the claimant does not in fact ask for 
an order of restitutio integrum, but merely for a 
declaratory statement as to its legal position under the 
B. P. concession and with respect to certain property and 
that issue of whether restitution in kind is an available 
remedy therefore is not presented... The Tribunal holds, 
however, that no such distinction should be made. If it is 
found that the claimant is entitled to be restored to the 
full enjoyment of its rights under the B. F. concession, and 
is the owner of the Oil and assets referred to, then the 
claimant is entitled to an order for specific performance 
or, alternatively, a (55ýlaratory award of entitlement 
to 
specific performance". 
In the Liamco-Libya case also, Mahmassani, like Judge Lagergren, 
answered the request for a Declaratory Award negatively but on rather 
different grounds. (28) In that case, the claimant requested the 
issue of a declaratory award that Libya's acts were unlawful and not 
entitled to international recognition and that Libya did not have 
title to oil extracted from Liamco's concessions. Dr. Mahmassani, 
referring to and relying on the sovereignty of states and the act of 
state doctrine and the inability to enforce a Declaration, rejected 
the request in question. 
(29) 
Bowett also is of the opinion that in cases where the nationalization 
is of the business of exploitation of natural resources, within a 
state's territory wrestitution is remote, and specific performance 
will usually be impractical, so that a claim to compensation will 
become, realistically, the primary remedy. Similar arguments would 
tend to relegate the remedy of a declaratory judgement to a secondary 
role in such cases". 
(30) 
Considering the above arguments, a fundamental question must 
be 
whether international law does indeed recognize in principle the 
remedy of restitution. In the B. P. -Llbya case, Arbitrator Lagergren 
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suggested that the dictum in the Chorzow Factory case was obiter, 
because in that case the German government did not claim 
restitution. (31) He further explained that Nsuch comments as the 
court made were in reality to identify the principles by which to 
determine the amount due in compensation for an unlawful taking". 
(32) 
However, Dupuy, Sole Arbitrator in Texaco-Libya case stated: Wthe 
principle was expressed in such general terms that it is difficult 
not to view it as a principle of reasoning having the value of a 
precedentm. (33) Higgins points out that for Professor Dupuy "the 
very numerous quotations of this part of the opinion in doctoral 
writings conf irm ...... that all authors see in it a declaration of 
principle. (34) Nonetheless, Judge Lagergren was of the belief the 
writers merely repeat the quotation of the Chorzow case and fail "to 
appreciate its limited significance". 
(35) 
It is a reality that in none of nationalization of concessionaries 
has restitution alone been claimed. The U. K., for example, in its 
protest note to Libya relating to the B. P. v Llbya nationalization 
spoke of restitution and compensation as alternatives, either of 
which would serve to make an otherwise unlawful act lawful. 
So far as the practice of th U. S. were concerned, the Hikenlooper 
Amendment to the SabbatIno judgement of the U. S. Supreme Court 
referred to compensation but not restitution. 
(36) Thus it could be 
concluded that' although restitution is in general terms a recognized 
remedy, it has not in practice been an established remedy. Lack of 
such status, in our opinion, is because of the impracticability of 
restitution as a means of settlement of cases, particularly in cases 
of nationalization of businesses based on state contracts. There may 
be a role for restitution of the actual property expropriated, in 
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cases where there has been an unlawful detention of a ship or 
aircraft, or where there has been an unlawful occupation of a 
territory. Yet in situations where the taking is of a business 
exploiting natural resources, within the state's territory, the 
likelihood of restitution seems remote. 
(37) As we will see, 
restitution or specific performance has not been seriously 
contemplated in the awards of the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal which are 
the most recent case law in respect of expropriation. 
5.2.2 RESTITUTION IN THE IRAN-U. S. TRIBUNAL 
Judge Brower (the U. S. Member of the Tribunal) has pointed out that 
%virtually all of the Tribunal's decisions focus solely on the return 
of the claimant of the value of the property interest lost. 
Restitution or specific performance has not been discussed... in any 
(38) 
of the Tribunal's awards'. The primary reason for this has 
been 
the nature of the cases that makes restitution almost impossible. 
Claims which have been brought before the Tribunal, 
characteristically have either been because of *breach of a contract 
or an expropriation of a business entity or commercial operation". 
The nationalized property may no longer exist or may have been passed 
into the hands of a third party. Thus as a practical matter 
restitution is impossible. Furthermore, the Tribunal does not 
have 
adequate enforcement mechanisms for such restitution, although 
it 
does have available to it the Security Account established in the 
Algiers Accords out of which monetary awards can be satisfied. 
(39) 
Moreover, claimants have seldom, if ever, requested punitive damages. 
In the Sedco case, the Claimant argued that the expropriation of its 
interest was unlawful and that the remedy for an unlawful taking 
is 
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restitution, or where restitution is not practical, full 
compensation. The Tribunal held that the "Claimant must receive 
compensation for the full value of its expropriated interest in 
Sediran ...... regardless of whether or not the expropriation was 
otherwise lawful". 
(40) 
It is notable that in the Starrett case(41) Iran formally offered 
restitution as the appropriate remedy. for settling the case, 
nevertheless the Tribunal refused this. This attitude of the 
Tribunal has resulted in that Khan to conclude that: 
". . the Tribunal has never considered restitution in Integrum as the appropriate remedy in expropriation cases, 
even in a case whw it was formally offered by that 
expropriating state". '42) 
5.3 DETERMINING OF THE SCOPE OF COMPENSATION 
The question of the scope of compensation concerns whether the 
expropriating state must pay the genuine economic value of the 
property, full, or only partial compensation. However, in the 
context of the Tribunal the issue has related to only two standards: 
full and partial compensation. Iran as the respondent in the cases 
before the Tribunal has not denied the very principle of compensation 
although it has in almost all cases contended the scope of it. 
5.3.1 THE OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE 
0 
As it was discussed in Chapter 1, customary international law has 
long recognized such elementary principles as respect for lawfully 
acquired property rights and respect for lawfully concluded 
agreements between states and foreign investors. As Clagett points 
out: 
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"... state liability for breach of these obligations has 
never been seriously questioned by any twentieth century 
arbitral T ib nal or other international adjudicatory ý4]3 u 
authority". 
To the contrary, international Tribunals have repeatedly held that 
under customary international law a state must compensate an alien 
investor if the state expropriates the investor's interest. (44) As 
was also pointed out earlier, Iran itself recognized this rule by 
admitting in legal opinions, filed in the Tribunal that its 
unilateral termination of a state contract "is subject to the payment 
of appropriate compensation". (45) 
In the Chorzow Factory case, which is the leading decision in public 
international law concerning the obligation to pay compensation for 
expropriation, the Permanent Court described compensation as a 
necessary element of any lawful expropriation. (46) 
Recent international arbitrations have also uniformly held that when 
states expropriate property, whether by repudiating contractual 
obligations to foreign investors or otherwise, an obligation to pay 
compensation arises. As we saw in the first Chapter, in the recent 
oil expropriation arbitrations arising out of Libya's expropriation 
of foreign petroleum interests, three different international 
arbitrators each held Libya to be liable for payment of compensation. 
In a more recent international arbitration concerning the Benvenutl 
et Bonfont v People's Republic of the Congo (1980)(47) the state 
party defendant was held liable to a foreign company for breach of 
its contractual undertakings. In summary, customary international 
law, as interpreted by international courts and tribunals, has 
consistently recognized that the expropriation of foreign investors' 
property, including contract rights, must be accompanied by 
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compensation. However, the scope of compensation and its 
determination have remained controversial. 
As we mentioned earlier, debate as to the scope of compensation 
before the Tribunal has centred on two standards of compensation, 
viz. full and partial compensation. The two parties in the cases 
have naturally continued to insist on their own principles. While 
, 
the American side, relying on the traditional standard of the Hull 
formula, insists on the principle of full compensation, the Iranian 
side, relying on the U. N. Resolutions, have been insisting on a 
partial compensation standard. 
(48) This issue has been at the centre 
of a vortex of scholarly articles and speculation; and the Tribunal's 
decisions and awards on this point have received very close 
attention. We shall examine these awards to determine which one of 
the above mentioned principles has been employed by the Tribunal. 
In determination of the scope of compensation, the principal issue is 
determination of the applicable law, as by application of that law, 
the scope of compensation can be determined. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal in expropriation cases had had to deal with 
two issues: first the question of which law is applicable, Iran's 
domestic law, the Treaty of Amity, between the United States and 
Iran, or customary international law; and secondly the question of 
the precise context of that law. The Tribunal has, however, 
hesitated to discuss these issues comprehensively and in depth, but 
on the contrary has tended to discuss them sparingly. 
It has confronted these questions only when it was unavoidable. The 
reason perhaps, has been the great number of expropriation cases, and 
"possible impact as a precedent of a case relying on - or rejecting - 
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a particular standard of compensation". 
(49) Because of this 
reluctance, the Tribunal's treatment of the issues has depended on 
the importance of the individual case. In cases in which the amount 
of property in dispute was relatively small or the expropriation 
dispute was incidental to the main claims, the controversy over the 
applicable law and legal standard has taken second place to the 
disposition of the case. Consequently, in many of the cases 
involving seizure of tangible business assets, such as office 
equipment, the Tribunal has simply awarded the value of the property 
at the time of seizure, without discussion of any of the issues. 
(50) 
In cases in which the expropriated property formed the principle 
aspect of the claim, on the other hand, the issues of applicable law 
and compensation standards have been discussed more directly. We may 
now examine these awards of the Tribunal to explore just how the 
Tribunal has determined this applicable law, then its treatment of 
the standard of compensation. 
5.4 THE APPLICATION OF IRANIAN DOMESTIC LAW 
As we mentioned in the second Chapter. the Charter of the Tribunal. 
(51) 
the 'Claims Settlement Declaration', permits the Tribunal to look 
at a wide range of sources to determine the law it will apply. 
(52) 
Accordingly, claims under contracts for the purchase of goods or 
services have been decided entirely, or at least substantially, on 
the basis of the parties' contracts. Where there is no contract, or 
where it does not provide significant rules, the Tribunal regularly 
has identified and applied general principles of law. 
(53) In cases 
which are relevant to public international law, such as 
expropriation, treaty interpretation and expulsion, the Tribunal has 
applied that body of law. The Tribunal has rarely applied national 
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rules, "even in cases where the parties might arguably have agreed on 
them as the rule of decision". 
(54) 
As far as the applicability of the Iranian domestic law in 
determination of compensation in expropriation cases is concerned, 
the Tribunal decisions to date have not upheld Iran's contentions 
that its own domestic law governs the standard of compensation 
payable for nationalized or expropriated property. In the two cases 
dealing with expropriations made under formal government decree (the 
law of Nationalization of Insurance Corporations), the Tribunal 
applied principles of Customary international law or treaty law to 
determine the standard of compensation, without relying on or 
applying Iranian Law. These cases are as follows. 
American International Group (AIG) v Iran (1983) 
In this case, the claimant (AIG) claimed against respondents, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Central Insurance of Iran ('Bimeh 
Markazi') seeking compensation for the alleged nationalization of an 
Iranian Insurance Company in which AIG had an equity interest. 
(55) 
AIG's claim arose out of nationalization of the Iran America 
International Insurance Company (ýIran America') by the Government of 
Iran in June 1979. 
Iran America, which began its activities in 1974, was organized as an 
Iranian public, joint stock company with 10% of the shares issued each 
in the names of American Life Insurance Company (IALICO'), a 
corporation organized under the laws of the state of Delaware, 
American International Reinsurance Company, Limited (AIRCO), a 
corporation organized under the laws of Bermuda; and American 
International Underwriters Overseas Limited (AIUO), a corporation 
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also organized under the laws of Bermuda; and with 5% of the shares 
issued in the name of the Underwriters Bank Incorporated (UBANK), a 
corporation organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut. 
Each of these corporations was a wholly owned subsidiary of AIG. The 
Respondents, along with other objections, (57) objected to subject 
matter jurisdiction over the claim on various grounds. 
As regards the issue we are presently concerned with, they argued 
that the claim was barred for the reasons that "the Commercial Code 
of Iran gives its Iranian Courts exclusive jurisdiction over Iranian 
corporations, that the claimant had failed to exhaust local remedies 
provided in the Iranian law and that nationalization of insurance 
companies is an Act of State which is not subject to review by an 
international Tribunal". (58) 
However, the Tribunal found that the commercial code of Iran, 
although giving jurisdiction to Iranian courts over Iranian 
corporations such as Iran America, could not exclude the claims from 
its jurisdiction. (59) Relying on Article II, Paragraph 1 of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal further stated "the two 
Government delimited the grounds for excluding claims from the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction and a general reservation for cases within 
the domestic jurisdiction of one of the countries was not among those 
grounds". 
(60) 
Furthermore, the Algiers Declaration has granted jurisdiction to the 
Tribunal notwithstanding that exhaustion of local remedies or Acts of 
S*tate doctrines might otherwise be applicable. 
(61) In conclusion, 
the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over both claims i. e. a 
claim by AIG with regard to 25 percent of the Iran America shares and 
a claim by ALICO with regard to 10 percent of those shares. 
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INA Corporation v Iran (1985) 
In this case, the claimant (INA Corporation), a United States 
corporation incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, filed a 
statement of claim with the Tribunal for compensation for alleged 
expropriation of its 20 percent shareholding in Bimeh Sharagh (an 
Iranian Public Joint Stock Insurance Company(62)). INA claimed U. S. 
$285,000 representing what it alleged was the value of its shares, 
together with interest and legal costs. As far as the determination 
of the level of compensation is concerned, the claimant argued that 
compensation should be 'prompt, adequate and effective on the basis 
both of general principles of international law and the Treaty of 
Amity,. (63) 
The respondents conceded that, "in principle, the wording of Article 
1 of the nationalization law does, in appropriate cases, envisage the 
payment of compensation to private shareholders of nationalized 
insurance companies". (64) The Respondent explained that a mechanism 
for the assessment and payment of compensation exists pursuant to 
which Central Iranian Insurance (CII) commissioned an official 
evaluation to be carried out by an independent firm of accountants to 
assess the value of each of the twelve nationalized companies at the 
date of nationalization. 
(65) The Respondent further explained that 
"a composite report was to be made by CII to the Joint General 
Assembly consisting of five Government ministers, established 
pursuant to the nationalization law, who would in due course make 
their recommendation to the Government as to the appropriate level of 
compensation, if any, to be paid". 
(66) 
However, the Tribunal, ignoring the pertinent Iranian laws and 
regulations, found the fair market value principle as the proper 
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international law rule in determination of the value of the 
shares. 
(67) We will have more discussion about this decisions of the 
Tribunal later in this chapter, as this decision concerning the 
valuation standard of compensation is rather different from other 
decisions which have been made in this area. 
American Bell International Inc. (ABII) v Iran(68) 
This case also is another in which the Respondents relied on the 
Iranian Law. In this case the claimant, along with other claims, 
argued that the funds held in his bank account in Iran had allegedly 
been expropriated by the Government of Iran. 
(69) The claimant's 
funds in question were held in an account jointly with 
Telecommunication of Iran. The funds in this account were used to 
satisfy ABII's outstanding affairs with creditors subsequent to its 
departure. The claimant, relying on international law, sought 
compensation for his funds. Respondent did not dispute the 
appropriation of the funds, but contended that the acts in question 
did "not amount to 'expropriation or ursurpation' under Iranian Law, 
(70) 
the law governing the contracts". However, the Tribunal noted 
that in the circumstances of this case there was "no need to discus 
the applicable law at length". 
(71) The Tribunal further stated: 
Where, as here, both the purpose and effect of the acts are 
totally to deprive one of funds without one's voluntarily 
given consent, the finding of a compensable taking or 
appropriation under any applicable law (International or 
domestic), is inev table unless there is clear justification 
for the seizure. 
(41) 
Since there was no outstanding obligation of ABII, to justify the 
taking of its funds, the Tribunal found that the claimant was 
wrongfully deprived of its bank account funds and without reliance on 
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any Iranian or international law, simply awarded the value of the 
funds as of the date of the taking. 
(73) 
To sum up, in the three above cases, the Tribunal did not rely on the 
Iranian law. On the contrary, in the first and second cases, it 
applied the principles of customary international law and in the 
third case simply awarded the value of the property without reliance 
of any of the above mentioned laws. 
Although the Tribunal did not discuss its reasons for disregarding 
Iranian law in its decisions concerning the determination of 
compensation, its decisions in this regard are consistent with the 
opinion of some commentators, as well as the decisions of 
international tribunals. Among commentators, Carlston, for example, 
states: 
'While confiscatory legislation must be given application by 
the Courts of a state in which judicial review on the bases 
of opposition to international law is impossible, both 
international courts and courts of other states, may refuse 
to give application to such legislative action as it 
impinges upon inter ational society and if it is violate of V34) 
international law#. 
In the settlement of Shufeldt's claim more than fifty years ago, this 
principle was also applied. In that case the Guatemalan legislature 
had enacted a decree depriving Shufeldt of all his rights under a ten 
year economic development agreement. 
(75) The Guatemalan government 
contended that this decree rendered the contract null and void ab 
Initio. The Arbitrator held: 
"It is perfectly competent for the Government of Guatemala 
to enact any decree they like and for any reason they see 
fit... But this Tribunal is only concerned where such a 
decree passed even on the best of grounds works injustice to 
an alien subject, in which case the Government ought to make 
compensation for the injury inflicted and cannot *k any 
municipal law to justify their refusal to do so". 
(ý ) 
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In response to the argument of the Guatemalan government, that the 
legislative decree was the constitutional act of a sovereign state 
that was not subject to review by any judicial authority, the 
arbitrator declared: 
"This may be quite true from a national point of view but 
not from an international point of view for 'it is a settled 
principle of international law that a sovereign cannot be 
permitted to set up one of his own municipal laws as a bar 
to a clai Pý a sovereign for a wrong done to the latter's 
t 
T57 
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Subsequently, in the TOPCO arbitration the arbitrator noted the 
irrelevance to an international claim of the legal character of 
'nationalization measures under municipal law. Dupuy in this regard 
-summarised the relevant principle with his observation that: 
"It is, indeed, a well known principle that, with regard to 
international law, municipal law is a mere fact and that the 
act of a state which is irregular internationally cannot be 
affected by its legal racter under municipal law within 
which the state acted"Jýg) 
' 5.5 THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the previous section we examined the question of the applicability 
of domestic law as a source for determination of compensation. We 
saw that these laws have not been employed in settling international 
claims. Also we saw that the Tribunal has hesitated to apply the 
national rules of either of the participating states in any case 
before it "even in cases where the parties might arguably have agreed 
on them as the rule of decision". 
(79) As a result, the Tribunal, 
when determining the standards of compensation in expropriation 
cases, has mainly relied on customary international law. While in 
some cases it has relied exclusively on customary international law, 
in others it has relied on both customary international law and the 
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Treaty of Amity, and in a few cases exclusively on the Treaty of 
Amity, which will be examined in the next Chapter. 
However, the content of customary international law with respect to 
the compensation standard is not clear cut. As we discussed in the 
first Chapter, the customary rules in the area of nationalization of 
foreign property, particularly with respect to compensation, have 
always been controversial and remain as a point of controversy in the 
relationship between foreign investors and host states, especially 
Third World ones. 
(80) 
While Western developed states, mainly the U. S. , along with many 
legal writers, claim that the traditional rule of customary 
international law (i. e. the standard of full compensation), still 
exists, the Third World states, along with some jurists in these 
countries, argue that the customary law in this regard has changed at 
least to a principle of less than full compensation. 
(81) Since in 
this study we are dealing primarily with the decisions of the Iran- 
U. S. Claims Tribunal we must examine changes supposedly affecting 
customary international law in the light of the arguments of the 
parties before the Tribunal. First the position of Iran before the 
Tribunal with respect to the customary international law standard of 
compensation will be examined. Then the position of th U. S. in this 
regard will be discussed. 
Since Iran in its arguments against the principle of full 
c ompensation as a rule of customary international law has tried to 
rely decisively on U. N. Resolutions and settlement practice, the 
Tribunal has been faced with the necessity of deciding the basis on 
which to draw conclusions concerning the contents of such law. This 
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question along with the question of the position of both parties will 
be discussed as preliminary matters. 
Finally, in the decisions of the Tribunal in application of 
compensation standard issued from different chambers, certain 
differences can be discerned. Therefore the fourth part of the 
Chapter will assess the Tribunal's contribution to the question of 
the standard of compensation. 
5.5.1 THE POSITION OF IRANIAN PARTIES 
Iranian parties have repeatedly challenged the traditional 
requirement of full compensation. While in some cases they have 
implicitly denied this standard, in other cases they have explicitly 
challenged this standard. For instance, in the Thomas Earl Payne 
case Iran used the implied argument: 
'Present day international law lays down a standard of 
partial compensation, the amount determined "With view to 
the laws and regulations of the states concerned"'. 
8) 
In the American International Group case, on the other hand, Iran 
straightforwardly stated: 
'The suggestion of full compensation derives from the 
traditionally asserted standard of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation which has been repudiated by modern 
developments, in international law; instead, a standard of 
Oppartial compensation" should be applied based on references 
contained in Resolutions of Unýjgd Nations organs and from 
post-war settlement practices". " 
) 
Iranian parties, when relying on the partial compensation standard, 
maintain that lump sum agreements between States have affected 
traditional customary international law. (84) Also they argue that 
the various resolutions adopted by the U. N. General Assembly in the 
1970s: the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" and the 
**Declaration on the "Establishment of a New Economic Order' both 
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adopted in 1974, and "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources", 
adopted in 1962, (86) have changed the content of the international 
law. 
-It is well known that in lump sum and other settlements the 
compensation has usually amounted to less than the full value of the 
property in the sense of the traditional international law 
standard. 
(87) A study of the wording of consecutive U. N. Resolutions 
from the 1960s and 1970s also shows a trend of departing from the 
requirement of full compensation as the standard of international 
law. (88) Since World-War II, the U. S., th U. K., France and some 
other countries have attempted to settle the international claims of 
their nationals by negotiating lump sum settlement agreements. 
(89) 
Under these agreements, the respondent state pays a fixed sum to the 
claimant state and the latter distributes it, generally through a 
national claims commission established pursuant to domestic 
legislation. Examples of such commissions are the U. S. Foreign 
Claims Settlement Commission, the British Foreign' Compensation 
Commission and the French Commission which, adjudicate the separate 
claims and allocate a share of the fund to each successful 
claimant. 
(90) Lillich, in examining lump sum agreements in the last 
40 years, has concluded "this procedural device has become, without 
doubt, the paramount vehicle for settling international claims". 
(91) 
Between the end of World-War II and 1975,139 lump sum agreements 
were concluded. 
(92) Moreover, an additional 29 lump sum agreements 
were concluded in the period from 1975 to 1982. 
(93) However, their 
jurisprudential significance has been the subject of intense 
controversy. In 1970, the I. C. J. in the Barcelona Traction case(94) 
declared lump sum agreements as sul generis, describing them as no 
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more than a lex specialls; having no legal effect beyond the unique 
circumstances giving rise to them, and consequently not to be 
regarded as sources of general international law. (95) Nevertheless, 
Lillich and Weston argues that the I. C. J. was incorrect in its 
approach to these agreements. They state: 
First, that lump sum agreements fall squarely within the 
ambit of sub-paragraphs I(a) and (b) of Article 38 of the 
statute of the I. C. J.; second, that as "sources" of 
international custom "they can and must be treated in the 
same manner as any other international prescription; third, 
that this treatment should be both contextual and policy- 
oriented in character; and finally, that as a result of such 
treatment (but only after such treatment) they can be 
accorded binding, analogical, or no effect whatsoever. 
Continued adherence to a theory that would deny the validity 
of these conclusions by relegating the whole phenomenon of 
lump sum agreement -making to an inferior status within the 
panthenon of international [legal] prescription' is ... to 
deny a growing edge of international law. Worse, it is to 
misconceive the nature of law and legal process. 
(96) 
Returning to the position held by Iranian parties, they not only 
relied on the lump sum agreements and argued for a partial 
compensation standard, but in some cases also argued in favour of 
Frappropriate compensation". For instance, in the Sedco case(97) the 
Iranian parties argued that: 'customary international law requires 
appropriate compensation to be measured in the light of all 
circumstances of the case, and assessed with "unjust enrichment" as 
the guiding principle'. (98) They further argued, should any 
enrichment or their part entitling the claimant compensation such 
compensation should be calculated according to the net book value as 
the appropriate valuation method". 
(99) 
Since the Sedco case related partly to an oil nationalization 
agreement, the Iranians employed unjust enrichment as a basis for the 
appropriate compensation principle which has been recognized as part 
of the issue of the permanent sovereignty of states over their 
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natural resources'. While the concept of unjust enrichment in 
international law has been used uniformly in favour of full 
compensation standard, 
(100) 
relating this issue to that of permanent 
sovereignty indicates a claim to pay less than full compensation. 
The principle of unjust enrichment works in two ways: while the 
plaintiff in a case may claim his own rights on the basis of unjust 
enrichment, the respondent, on the other hand, may argue this 
principle in his own favour, as the Iranian parties in the Sedco case 
did. Thus, the Iranians argued that undue enrichment acquired by 
Sedco during a period of monopoly, or of a highly privileged economic 
position, should be taken into account. 
The Iranian position is supported by some writers who contend that 
the principle of unjust enrichment favours less than full 
compensation. For instance Sornarajah points out that: 
"If in fact, the principle of unjust enrichment forms a part 
of international law, it cannot support the blanket 
proposition that full compensation must be paid upon the 
expropriation of foreign property. Since it is an equitable 
principle, it requires that account must be taken of the 
entire past relationship between the parties, the profits 
0 made 
by the investor and the harm, if any, (ju host economy as a result of the investment". 
Oi5ered 
by the 
Friedman also made this point in the following terms: 
"A decision whether a state enriches itself at the expense 
of another state or of private foreign interests is often a 
highly complex question involving an examination of not only 
the formal legal titles but of the history of economic- 
polit; Lcal relations between the parties ... If, for example, 
a concession for growing and merchandising tobacco for the 
exploitation of mineral resources has been granted under 
conditions of political... domination and under financial 
conditions starkly different from this prevailing in an open 
market, it would be neither realistic nor equitable not to 
take into account the unjust enrichment that has accrued to 
the foreign erest as a result of their privileged 
position.... -M) 
He further explained that: 
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"when a foreign company has acquired a long lease over 
agricultural territories or mines, at a rent that by 
comparison with prevailing commercial rates is purely 
nominal and when it has for a number of years made profits 
considerably in excess of those that would have been 
possible under normal commercial arrangements, it is 
entirely proper to bring these factors into account against 
the benefits that will accrue to the country as a result of 
the nationalization of the assets developed by the skill of 
the jb5lign enterprise and by the capital invested in 
it". ( 
Similar to the position held by the Iranian Government in the Sedco 
case, was the position adopted by the Chilean goverment with regard 
to the expropriation of th properties of the Copper Mining 
Corporations, Kennecott and Anaconda in 1972. 
(104) In this case, the 
Chilean Government had put forward the view that excess profit which 
had accrued to the investor must be taken into account in assessing 
the compensation. With regard to this case further explanation will 
be given in Chapter 7 of this study. 
Arguing against the principle of full compensation, Iranian parties 
in many cases, have also disputed this principle on the basis of the 
concept of "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources" enshrined 
in Resolution 1803 and 3281 of the United Nations General Assembly. 
The concept of permanent sovereignty has been vigourously asserted by 
developing countries as a sine qua non of national independence and 
economic self-sufficiency. It has been invoked as a fundamental 
premise of the right of states to nationalize foreign property or 
regulate the operations of foreign investors, particularly in the 
national resource sector. 
(105) As far as the compensation standard 
in cases of nationalization is concerned, Resolution 1803 in its 
Paragraph 4 states that in cases of: 
"Nationalization expropriation or requisitioning the owner 
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with 
the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the 
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exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with 
international law". (106) 
Approval for this resolution was overwhelming; only France and South 
Africa voted against the resolution, with most communist countries, 
including Cuba, abstaining. 
(107) Paradoxically, the compromise 
resolution purported to state a new requirement of "appropriate" 
compensation for expropriating property, while simultaneously 
reaffirming adherence to international law. This ambiguity allowed 
some western diplomats to argue that the reference to international 
law reaffirmed the orthodox position and that appropriate 
compensation meant %prompt, adequate and effective, 
compensation. 
(108) Schwebel has argued that the absence of 
opposition to the American Ambassador's statement during the debate 
on the Resolution that "appropriate compensation" referred to in the 
Article meant "prompt, adequate and effective compensation", together 
with the rejection of the Soviet amendment that compensation must be 
assessed in accordance with standards specified in the national laws 
only, and the acceptance in the Resolution that international 
standards are relevant, indicate that the traditional norm that full 
compensation must be paid remained unaffected by the Resolution. 
(109) 
But this has not been the understanding of other lawyers. Writing a 
year after the Resolution, Professor Friedman observed that the 
requirement of, "appropriate compensation" in the Resolution, "while 
capable of the most diverse interpretations and probably deliberately 
imprecise, may indicate an evolution from the formerly predominant 
Western sponsored principle of "full, prompt and adequate 
compensation to a more flexible principle that takes into account the 
circumstances under which the interests in question were acquired and 
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is more likely to achieve a balance of equities in the various 
situations". 
("O) 
Asante, the Director of the U. N. Centre on the Transnational 
Corporations, after a close examination of the arguments of the 
Western European and the U. S. governments in favour of the 
traditional rule of full compensation in a case of nationalization, 
points out that: 
"Notwithstanding the formal affirmation of the traditional 
rules by the governments of Western European states in 
international forums and bilateral investment agreements, a 
realistic assessment of the evidence and sources within the 
past forty years, namely state practice in all regions, 
diplomatic exchangqs, multilateral and regional endeavours 
towards in international regime for investments, opinlo 
jurls on a global basis, the relevant resolution of the 
United States and other declarations of the preponderant 
majority of the members of the international community, 
cannot sustain the Hull formulfl)a valid principle of 
contemporary international law". ( 
Schachter maintains that the "prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation" formula was never a rule of traditional international 
law and certainly has no validity in contemporary international law 
in all cases of nationalization. (112) He further maintains that a 
study of state practice in cases of post-war nationalization shows 
that compensation fell short of the full value and that payments were 
often made in non-convertible currency. 
(113) Bring argues that no 
generally recognized international standard can be inferred from 
state practice with regard to the quantum of compensation; what can 
be inferred is a duty to pay compensation which is to be discharged 
bona fide considering all the relevant circumstances. 
(114) 
From a philosophical understanding, some western writers such as 
Wieghel and Weston have argued that a more equitable re-distribution 
of the world's resources would be precluded by the requirement of 
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fair market value as a basis of compensation. 
(115) Such a concept is 
equally subversive of the legitimate attempts of the poorer countries 
to achieve fundamental economic and social reforms. In such cases, 
the traditional compensation standard must yield to a formula that 
considers the country's political instability, or its capacity to 
pay. 
In the view of third-world developing countries the imposition of the 
traditional formula of 'prompt, adequate and effective compensation' 
in a case of nationalization is "unduly onerous and tantamount to the 
imposition of a virtual *O-mbargo on. their abilities to take 
appropriate measures to restructure their economies". 
(116) As far as 
the computation of compensation is concerned, in the view of these 
countries, the concept of fair market value implicit in the 
requirement of adequate or full compensation is particularly 
inappropriate in major economic restructuring involving large-scale 
land reform or nationalization of strategic sectors such as natural 
resources. The concept is inadmissible because "it purports to apply 
traditional commercial and property concepts in a situation which is 
not a normal commercial purchase but more properly characterised as 
the intervention of state power to restructure the capital and 
economic system". 
(117) Insisting on this attitude, Iran in the Amoco 
case(118) put forward the principle of the net book value as a 
measure of compensation. The Iranian parties contended that this 
principle "accords with state practice and case authorities and is 
supported by the theory of unjust enrichment". 
(119) In addition the 
Iranians argued that recovery of future profits in the case of a 
lawful expropriation (since the Amoco expropriation was considered to 
(120) be lawful) should be excluded. 
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Arguing against the idea of compensation for lost profits as it was 
put forward by the claimant, the Iranian parties argued against 
application of any other standard instead of net book value, because 
"the result of the award of lost profits would be absurd, since the 
claimant would be able to invest the amounts including lost profit, 
received as compensation, and therefore obtain a real return for such 
an investment, which would be tantamount to double recovery and such 
an award would also produce an unreasonable rate of return". 
(121) 
Amoco made an investment of $6 million (in 1968), for a half share of 
the capital. By the end of 1978 the net book value of the joint 
venture project had increased to $29.3 million, of which $14.65 
million was Amoco's share. Moreover, the joint venture had earned 
after taxes $82.5 million by the end of 1978, that is $41.25 million 
in profit for Amoco. 
(122) This means a return in excess of $50 
million on an investment of $6 million. The Iranian parties argued 
that compensation "on top of that for loss of future profits would be 
the opposite of fairness and equity". 
(123) 
However, the Iranian arguments, though deriving some support from 
practice and scholarly writing, contrasts sharply with the position 
of the U. S. government and the American claimants before the Tribunal 
which must now be considered. 
5.2.2 THE POSITION OF U. S. PARTIES 
The U. S. Government and the American claimants generally have been 
claiming "compensation equal to the "full" value of their interest ... 
as the date of nationalization (or other taking) meaning the fair 
market value of expropriated property, a value which includes lost 
profits". 
(124) 
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Accordingly, to them partial compensation for the expropriated 
property does not suffice under international law. Alternatively, in 
some cases they have claimed full ("prompt, adequate and effective") 
compensation by virtue of customary international law. (125) 
Furthermore they contend that in the case of an ongoing business 
enterprise, full market value means going concern value, including 
not only net assets, but also goodwill and anticipated future 
earnings. However, it should be noted that the claimants in the 
American International Group case contended that "the valuation of 
their own interest... must disregard any action of the government of 
Iran prior to nationalization which may have had the effect of 
artificially depressing the value" of their own interest, and any 
event which followed the nationalization which may have negatively 
affected their future prospects of their interest in the 
business. (125) 
For expropriation involving a state contract, i. e. an agreement 
between a state and a foreign investor, they claim that the foreign 
investor is entitled to receive just compensation, that is the full 
equivalent of the property or rights expropriated or repudiated. 
This means compensation that will place the foreign investor in as 
good an economic position as he was in before the expropriation or 
repudiation occurred. 
(127) In addition, they claim, "the foreign 
investor's rights must be valued without regard to any reduction in 
value that would have resulted from apprehension that the rights must 
be expropriated without full compensation or that the state party 
might otherwise breach this agreementm. 
(128) 
In the Amoco International Finance Corporation case, the Iranian 
Respondents when discussing the compensation issue emphasised a 
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distinction between a lawful and unlawful expropriation. They argued 
that when the nationalization is lawful "the measure of compensation 
must be substantially less than the measure of damages for breach and 
in any event, no compensation should be paid for loss of future 
profits". 
(129) They further contended that in such cases "the duty 
to compensate would be limited to the unjust enrichment of the 
nationalizing state". This means that the compensation should be 
equivalent to the net book value of the residual nationalized assets 
of the foreign company. The claimant however, insisted that 
"international law requires compensation for expropriation whether 
the expropriation is lawful or unlawful, but asserted that an illegal 
seizure of property requires a standard of compensation higher than 
the standard of lawful expropriation". 
As we can see, there is a big difference between the attitude of the 
Iranian and American parties towards the compensation standard in 
expropriation or nationalization cases. As PellonpAl and Fitzmaurice 
have pointed out: "Even where the difference between the Iranian and 
American parties might not be so manifest as regards the general 
formulation of the standard of compensation, the gap is apparent at 
least when it comes to the valuation methods suggested". 
(130) 
However, in cases concerning expropriation of tangible assets, the 
American parties, while arguing in favour of full compensation 
standard in calculation of the value of the expropriating assets have 
exceptionally been satisfied with the application of the net book 
value standard. For instance in the Computer Sciences Corporacion 
case where Iran was liable for the expropriation of furniture and 
office equipment which had been in the Tehran offices of a subsidiary 
of the claimant, the claimant had calculated the compensation due on 
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the basis of the net book value which, not surprisingly, was accepted 
by the Respondent. (131) The claimant did not mention why he only 
sought the net book value of the equipment. It seems that this was 
because the relevant portion of the claim was only a tiny fraction of 
the whole case, and therefore in the claimant's view perhaps did not 
deserve the effort of more complicated calculations. Apart from 
these exceptional cases, the American position as presented before 
the Tribunal reflects the standard of full compensation (i. e. the 
Hull standard of 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation) as 
the customary rules of international law. Below, we shall first 
examine the standpoint of the Tribunal regarding the customary 
international law of compensation and then we shall analyse the work 
of the Tribunal in applying the compensation standard. 
5.6 THE POSTTION OF THE TRIBUNAL CONCERNING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF COMPENSATION 
As we said earlier, the Tribunal in small claims involving tangible 
business assets such as office equipment or furnishings has not 
discussed any applicable rule and simply has awarded the value of the 
taken property, upholding sub silenclo the principle of full 
compensation. 
(132) In big claims of expropriations or in large scale 
nationalizations, however, both parties have discussed the applicable 
source of law and the Tribunal inevitably has been forced to examine 
0 
these sources. Thus the standpoint of the Tribunal concerning 
customary law can only be found in the latter cases. In these cases 
the Tribunal in its search for customary international law has 
examined settlement practice, and the relevance of the U. N. 
Resolutions, as well as international and arbitral awards. However, 
as will be seen, it has rejected the former two, and has mainly 
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emphasized the international and arbitral awards. We will examine 
these below: 
5.6.1 CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
Regarding the settlement principle in the post-1945 in the Amoco 
International Finance Corp(133) the Tribunal said that: 
"As a rule, state practice as reflected in settlement 
agreements cannot be considered as giving birth to customary 
rules of international law, unless it presents specific 
features which demonstrate the conviction of the state 
parties that they were acting in application of what they 
considered to be settled law, the provisions of such 
agreement, indeed are the outcome of negotiations in which 
motivations other than legal ones may have prevailed. This 
is specially true here, where certain commercial advantages 
given to companies (even if they were not expressly detailed 
in the agreements) produced the concessions that they 
accepted on the standard of compensation". - 
While the discussion in the above case was limited to settlements 
between states and foreign companies, the Tribunal's discussion in 
the Sedco(134) case was extended to both settlement agreements and 
lump sum agreements between states. The Tribunal in the Sedco case 
stated that: 
"both types of agreements can be so greatly inspired by non- 
judicial considerations - e. g. resumption of diplomatic or 
trading relations - that it is extremely difficult to draw 
from them conclusions as to opInio jurls, i. e. the 
determination that the content of such settlements was 
thought by the tes involved to be required by 
international lawo 
In the Sedco case it added that: 
"The International Court of Justice and international 
arbitral tribunals have cast serious doub s on the value of 
such settlements as evidence of custom". 
(lS6) 
In another context it stated that "considerations underlying 
settlements often include factors other than elements of law". 
(137) 
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This means, of course, that the bulk of relevant state practice is 
dismissed. (138) While it is true that many treaties or other 
examples of state practice, are in fact based on factors other than 
%elements of law' there are many agreed settlements in the oil 
industry in which states increased their participation in concessions 
licenses, joint ventures and so on, enjoyed by foreign companies 
operating in their territory. 
(139) As Bowett points out: "if all 
state practice had to be isolated from factors other than elements of 
law, there would be little evidence of state practice - in this or in 
any other field - which could be used as evidence of custom". 
(140) 
In effect therefore, the Tribunal was rejecting virtually all 
evidence save judicial or arbitral discussions. 
(141) For this 
reason, Lillich and Weston, two American writers, have recently 
argued for more status to be given to lump sum agreements as evidence 
of the standards of compensation commonly adopted in state 
practice. 
(142) They have criticized the attitude of the U. S. members 
of the Tribunal who have been instrumental in persuading the Tribunal 
to reject the evidence of 'a new consensus' on compensation provided 
by these agreements. 
(143) 
The Tribunal in the Sedco, case applied the same reasoning (as it did 
to settlement agreements) to bilateral investment practices. it 
stated that: 
"The bilateral investment Treaty practice of states which 
more 'often than not reflects the traditional international 
law standard of compensation for expropriation, more nearly 
constitutes an accurate measure of the High Contracting 
Parties' views as to customary international law, but also 
it carries with it some of the same evidentiary limitation 
as lump sum agreements. Both kinds of agreements involve in 
some degree bargaijý%, in a context to which opinlo jurls 
seems a stranger". 
( 5 
212 
Remedies 
Discussions in the Sedco, case also extended to the next question to 
be considered: whether in the light of the U. N. Resolution there has 
been an erosion of the traditional standard of full compensation. 
5.6.2 THE LEGAL IMPACT OF U. N. RESOLUTIONS 
As we mentioned earlier, Iranian parties relying on U. N'. Resolutions, 
argued in the Sedco case and elsewhere that there has been an erosion 
of the traditional international law standard of full compensation. 
The Tribunal in this case declared that: 
'United Nations General Assembly Resolutions are not 
directly binding upon states and generally are not evidence 
of customary law. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted 
that such resolutio 
- 
ns in certain specified circumstances may 
be regarded as evidence of customary international law or 
can contribute - among other factors - to the creation of 
such laws'. 
(145) 
In examining the Resolutions 1803,3201 and 3281, the Tribunal 
concluded that among these three Resolutions, only Resolution 1803 
has obtained considerable unanimity in international arbitral 
practice and scholarly opinion and reflects, if it does not evidence, 
current international law. 
(146) 
In the Amoco case also the Tribunal recognized this Resolution as a 
better reflection of legal standards than the 1974 'Economic 
(147) Charter'. When discussing whether "Just" compensation (meaning 
full compensation) is a condition of lawfulness of an expropriation 
in internatiorýal law, the Tribunal noted that the Charter had cast 
some doubt on this. Other less controversial resolutions such as 
Resolution 1803 confirm the existence of the rule. However, in the 
Sedco case the Tribunal admitted that the Resolution (with its 
requirement of "appropriate compensation... in accordance with 
international law") is itself ambiguous and does not give an answer 
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to any of the existing questions concerning the amount of 
compensation. (148) The Resolution, as the Tribunal pointed out, "has 
been argued, on the one hand, to express the traditional standard 
with different words and on the other hand to signify an erosion of 
this standard". (149) Accordingly, the formula of appropriate 
compensation as used in the Resolution 1803 is of an elusive nature. 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal admitted that the reference to 
"international law" suggested that the delegates who had adopted the 
Resolution intended no break with prevailing customary international 
law. (150) Moreover, to the Tribunal the travaux preparatories were a 
confirmation that the drafters had used the word 'appropriate' in the 
sense of adequate. 
(151) 
A recent application of the term 'appropriate' emanates from the 
International Law Association. On 30 August 1986, it adopted the 
Seoul Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of 
Public International Law Relating to a New International Economic 
Order. Article 5.5 of this Declaration states: 
'4A state may nationalize, expropriate, exercise eminent 
domain or otherwise transfer property within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction, subject to the principle of 
international law requiring a public purpose and non- 
discrimination, and subject to appropriate compensation as 
required by international law... and without prejudice to 
legal effects fj? wing from any contractual undertaking 
(emphasis added, 
2) 
According to the Tribunal the Seoul Declaration recognizes that the 
term "appropriate" finds its content in international law. 
(153) In 
other words, the "appropriate compensation standard", as inserted in 
the Declaration, is equivalent to the traditional standard of full 
compensation. In supporting this statement the Tribunal in the 
SolaMes case stated: 
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While recent arbitral and judicial tribunals have employed 
the standard of 'appropriate' compensation, they have at the 
same time regularly awarded compensation equa ng the full 
value of the property in the circumstances". 
(11ýi 
Nonetheless, for the Tribunal the relevance of U. N. Resolutions to 
customary law is regarded as rather limited. For this reason, the 
awards of the Tribunal need to be backed up by other authorities. 
Thus in reaching decisions of compensation, the Tribunal has relied 
on legal writings; and judicial and arbitral precedents, as well as 
its own earlier awards. 
5.6.3 RELIANCE ON INTERNATIONAL AND ARBITRAL AWARDS 
References in the awards of the Tribunal can be found to classical 
cases, and newer arbitral awards, as well as to some ICSID and ICC 
arbitration awards. 
(155) 
The Judgement of the P. C. I. J. concerning the Factory at Chorzow 
(156) (Chorzow Factory case Germany v Poland (1928) in spite of the 
fact that it is sixty years old, has been the most authoritative for 
the Tribunal in making decisions about the compensation due in 
expropriation and nationalization cases. In the Amoco case, both 
parties before the Tribunal referred to this Judgement when 
discussing the effects of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of 
expropriation on the standard of compensation, but each of them gave 
contrary interpretations of it. 
(158) 
Undoubtedly, the first principle which was established by the Court 
was that a clear distinction must be made between lawful and unlawful 
expropriations, since the rules applicable to the compensation to be 
paid by the expropriating state differ according to the legal 
characterization of the taking. 
(159) 
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In examining the judgement of the Court the Tribunal found that in an 
unlawful expropriation there is an obligation of reparation of all 
the damages sustained by the owner of the expropriated property. (160) 
It further explained that in a case of unlawful expropriation the 
rules of international law relating to international responsibility 
of states will be applied. (161) To the Tribunal these rules provide 
for restitutio in integrum, i. e. restitution in kind, or if 
impossible, its monetary equivalent. It continued by stating that "a 
lawful expropriation must give rise to the payment of fair 
compensation (162) or of the just price of what was expropriated. 
Such an obligation is imposed by a specific. rule of international law 
of expropriation". (163) 
A similar view was taken by the Tribunal when examining the decision 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Norwegian Shipowners Claims 
(Nor v U. S. 1922). (164) 
In this case the Norwegian owners of ships expropriated by the U. S. 
during World War I were found to be entitled to just compensation 
under international law. The Tribunal held that "such compensation 
equalled the 'fair actual value of the property.... at the time and 
place it was taken". 
(165) 
The Tribunal further stated that numerous other arbitral decisions 
confirm these statements as the customary international law. 
(166) 
0 
As a result, generally speaking, in expropriation and nationalization 
cases, the Tribunal has concluded that under customary international 
law the claimant must receive full compensation for its expropriated 
or nationalized interest. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that 
while in respect of expropriation cases (unlawful and single 
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expropriation ones) the Tribunal has required full compensation, with 
regard to lawful nationalizations it has indicated that less than 
full compensation in some circumstances might be appropriate. In the 
following sections we shall examine the Tribunal's view in both 
expropriations and nationalizations. 
5.6.4 CUSTOMARY LAW IN EXPROPRIATION CASES 
In the cases of involving simple individual expropriation the 
Tribunal has held consistently that full compensation is payable. It 
should be pointed out that the takings of property in these cases has 
not been referred to as 'nationalizations' and they do not seem to 
have been regarded as such. They seem to have been treated as simple 
expropriations of an individual nature which were justified because 
they were for a public purpose. Full compensation in these cases was 
generally understood to mean the full value of the property taken, 
which could include in appropriate circumstances an elements for 
profitability. 
Similarly, in regard to the expropriation of land (which was also not 
apparently treated as nationalization proper), including tangible 
assets, in the one relevant case the Tribunal has held that full 
compensation was payable in the sense that it regarded the issue as 
one of establishing the fair market value of the property. In those 
cases in which claims were related to tangible assets only, the 
Tribunal awarded full compensation. 
In the Sedco case, in relation to the taking of the claimants' share 
in an Iranian drilling company called "Sedirann, the Tribunal was of 
the opinion that international tribunals and legal writers 
overwhelmingly support the conclusion that under customary 
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international law full compensation should be awarded for the 
property taken. It added that "this is true whether or not the 
expropriation itself was otherwise lawful". 
(167) 
Supporting its decision, the Tribunal examined recent arbitral 
decisions and made references to its own earlier awards. It declared 
that the standard of full compensation as the customary rule in 
lawful or unlawful expropriation cases, is illustrated by the award 
rendered in Libyan American Oil Compan7 v Llb7an Arab Republic 
(LIAMCO). 
The arbitrator in Liam_cp found that the concessionaire had been 
lawfully deprived of its property and went on to state that "there is 
no difficulty in concluding that the indemnity shall include as a 
minimum the damnum emergens, e. g. the value of the nationalized 
corporal property, including all assets, installations and various 
expenses incurred". 
(169) The Tribunal concluded that "compensation 
at full value - for damnum emergens thus was held as an undisputed 
minimum standard even in what the arbitrator regarded as a lawful 
nationalization". 
(170) 
Emphasising that international law requires full compensation, the 
Tribunal also took into account its own past practice. 
(171) it 
stated that in Tippets, Abbett, McCarth7, Stratton v Iran 
(1984), (172) which concerned expropriation of the claimant's 50 per 
cent share in an Iranian entity created for the purpose of performing 
certain engineering and architectural services, the Tribunal had 
stated that the claimant was entitled under international law and 
general principles of law to compensation for the full value of the 
property of which it had been deprived. 
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Finally, in supporting full compensation as the standard of 
international law, it relied on the view of some scholars, especially 
those who otherwise appear to view with sympathy the desire of 
developing nations for a standard requiring less than full 
compensation. It stated that Brownlie had concluded that 
%expropriation of particular items of property (as distinct from 
nationalization) is unlawful unless there is provision for the 
(173) payment of prompt adequate, and effective compensation'. 
Another reference was to Amerasinghe who had held that "the argument 
that the law has changed has been made, not in regard to what may be 
called an 'individual expropriation'... but in regard to the case of 
nationalization. (174) 
Thus as far as the awards of the Tribunal in respect of the above 
cases indicate, international law requires full compensation in 
single cases of expropriation. Although the Tribunal's pronouncement 
in the above cases are the most unequivocal statements of principle, 
other awards rendered by the Tribunal can also be cited as support 
for this conclusion. Examples of the latter awards are the awards of 
the Tribunal in the Dames & Moore case. 
(175) Where one of the claims 
concerned expropriation of "vehicles, office equipment, instruments 
and other equipment". The Tribunal held that the claimant was 
entitled to compensation for the value of the equipment as of the 
date of the taking, quite clearly meaning full (rather than just 
partial) value of the property. 
The conclusion of the Tribunal is also consistent with the practice 
of other tribunals. For instance, a reference can be made to the 
above mentioned ICSID award in Amco v Indonesia. 
(176) The damages 
were eventually awarded on the basis of a breach of a kind of 
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contract which was found to have existed between the parties, rather 
than on the basis of expropriation (an alternative theory put forward 
i 
by the claimant), but it was made clear that in case of a taking the 
II result "would have been the same as that of the unjustified breach of 
contract alleged by the claimants". (177) As damages for such a 
breach the Tribunal in turn felt bound to "grant the investor full ... 
compensation of th prejudice it suffered, as international law 
requires.... (178) In principle such compensation was considered to 
comprise both damnum emergens, i. e. the immediate loss suffered, and 
the lost profits (lucrum cessans). 
Therefore, not only the jurisprudence of the Iran-U. S. Tribunals, but 
also arbitral practice generally supports the conclusion that at 
least in cases of single, individual expropriation, as distinct from 
nationalization, customary international law requires the payment of 
full compensation. This means the full value of the property taken, 
which can include in appropriate circumstances an element for 
profitability. 
5.6.4 CUSTOMARY LAW IN NATIONALIZATION CASES 
Nationalization cases, as we mentioned earlier, were cases in which 
the takings resulted from, or were part of, the take over by Iran of 
entire industries in the course of implementing state control over 
areas of the economy. With regard to such cases the Tribunal made a 
distinction in the Phillips Petroleum Company of Iran case 
(1989)(179) between the standard of compensation inserted in the 
Treaty of Amity and that of customary international law, holding in 
effect that the former was strict, whatever the latter was, and 
required "Just compensation representing the full equivalent of the 
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property taken". The Treaty standard was also held to be applicable 
in the case. 
In the INA case the Tribunal assumed that the Treaty of Amity, as the 
lex specialls, was similar to customary international law, the lex 
generalls, on the subject of nationalization. 
(180) Under either of 
the laws, in the case in hand what was payable was "compensation 
equal to the fair market value of the investment" which, by 
implication, in the opinion of the Tribunal was full compensation. 
However, considering that the taking of the INA was one case among 
others of systematic takings in Iran, the Tribunal pointed out that: 
"This case presents, in addition, a classic example of a 
formal and systematic nationalization by decree of an entire 
category of commercial enterprises considered of fundamental 
importance to the nation's economy... 
In the event of such large-scale nationalizations of a 
lawful character, international law has undergone a gradual 
re-appraisal, the effect of which may be to undermine the 
doctrinal value of any 'full' or 'adequate' (when used as 
identical to % ull') compensation standard as proposed in 
this case". 
(181ý 
Nevertheless, this obiter statement does not go further than 
confirming that the traditional standard may have been undermined. 
Immediately after the above quotation the Tribunal addressing the 
instant case, stated that: 
"In a case such as the present, involving an investment of a 
rather small amount shortly before the nationalization, 
international law admits compensation in an Imount equal to 
the f4ir market value of the investment". 
(1-82 
While the INA case indicates that -less than full compensation might 
be appropriate in cases of nationalization of a more substantial 
investment with a longer profit history, the Tribunal's decision in 
American Internacional Group(183) fails to confirm this. In the 
latter case Chamber Three of the Tribunal was faced with a case 
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concerning a larger and somewhat older investment in the Iranian 
insurance business, nationalization of which was based on the very 
s ame enactment as that involved in INA. (184) Instead of indicating 
any pr ofound erosion of the full compensation standard, the Tribunal 
in this case rather put forward the main rule "that even in a case of 
lawful nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property 
is normally entitled to compensation for the value of the property 
taken". (185) That the Tribunal did not find justification to depart 
from what it thus considered the "normal" rule of full compensation 
(which is quite obviously meant by compensation for the "value" of 
the property), is shown by the fact that the compensation was based 
on the "fair market value" of the claimant's shares in the 
nationalized Iranian insurance company at the date of the 
taking. (186) This value in turn was assessed as a going concern in 
which the future profitability was included as one element. 
Thus although in the practice of the Tribunal the possibility of less 
than full compensation being appropriate in some cases of 
nationalization has not been totally excluded, at least so far no 
concrete decision can be interpreted as an application of such a 
lesser standard. 
However, it should be pointed out that in the case of a lawful 
nationalization the Tribunal has acknowledged that the elements of 
full compensation are limited to dai7mum emergens, lucrum cessans 
0 
being excluded from the calculations. The Tribunal with regard to the 
nationalization of the Amoco, s(187) interest in Khemco, found that 
damage which would fully cover lucrum cessans were property only in 
the case of an unlawful taking, and not in lawful takings to which 
category the Tribunal considered the present case to belong. Still, 
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, even in this case of a lawful taking the compensation, pursuant to 
, 
Article IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity, should reflect the full value 
of the property. Such value of the enterprise (Khemco) as a going 
concern should also encompass, in addition to its physical and 
financial assets, various immaterial rights as well as "goodwill and 
commercial prospects". These various intangible assets, including 
commercial prospects, the Tribunal distinguished from lucrum cessans 
(full lost profits) for which there was no entitlement in a lawful 
taking. Therefore the Tribunal's finding in the Amoco case may turn 
out to prove the correctness of the obiter statement in INA that 
insofar as concerns large-scale nationalizations, the value of 
"full" or "adequate"... compensation standard' may have been 
undermined by recent developments. 
To sum up, the practice of the Tribunal emerges as follows: 
(I) In so far as per se wrongful takings are concerned (both 
expropriation and nationalization) full compensation is due 
and no exceptions appear possible, and this means that 
whether the damages incurred consist of damnum emergens or 
lucrum cessans, or both, they should be fully compensated. 
(II) In the case of lawful takings, whether the taking is a 
discrete expropriation or part of a larger nationalization 
programme, there is no doubt about the applicability of the 
standard of full compensation as cases in which the loss of 
property or property rights is to be characterized as 
falling under damnum emergens. 
(III) In the case of lawful nationalization, while again 
here there is no doubt of about the applicability of the 
full compensation standard, the Tribunal's practice suggests 
that departure from the full compensation standard, if it is 
goinj to happen, should be limited and affect only 
compensation for lucrum cessans. 
However, so far, none of the cases decided by the Tribunal, suggests 
that the Tribunal has applied a standard lower than full 
compensation. Nevertheless, the Tribunal in INA did hint at the 
appropriateness of such a lesser standard in large scale 
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nationalizations of a lawful character. The partial award in Amoco, 
although it operates with the standard of full compensation, further 
suggests that there may be an adjustment of damages for lucrum 
cessans where a case can be characterized as a part of a 
nationalization programme, and concerns a lawful taking of property 
rights pertaining to Iran's natural resources. Accordingly, while 
the standard of full compensation in the Tribunal's view is clearly 
the main rule in international law, some exceptions to it do not 
appear totally excluded. 
So far we have been dealing with the standard of compensation under 
customary international law. - In addition, the Treaty of Amity 
between Iran and the U. S. is also a relevant source. Application of 
that Treaty in the practice of the Tribunal will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
0 
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6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
As we saw in the first chapter, one of the greatest concerns of 
Western investors investing abroad is the possible expropriation of 
their property by a foreign government, particularly in the less 
developed areas of the world. 
(') 
Again, while foreign investors have always tried to discourage 
expropriation, 
(2) 
several developing countries consider it as one of 
the solutions to their problems of economic independence and economic 
development. (3) However, foreign investors have always contended 
that such an exercise of sovereignty depends on the payment of 
adequate compensation. Thus they expect the expropriating state to 
discharge its obligations under international law by making 
reparations to a dispossessed alien investor. 
(4) 
International law supports an international minimum standard which 
guarantees certain rights to aliens. 
(5) However -it has not solved 
the problem of the relationship between investors and investees. 
(6) 
As we saw in Chapter 1, while foreign investors rely upon public 
international law and the decision of arbitrators and also advocate 
an international minimum standard, the investees claim that the 
conditions of expropriation are matters to be left to the taking 
states to regulate at their own discretion, under their own laws. 
(7) 
International law does not offer any device or formula acceptable to 
developed and aeveloping states; in short it provides no clear-cut 
solution to resolve obscurity, disputes and doubts. 
The instability of developing countries, and the obscurities of 
international law concerning foreign investment, have in the past 
caused insecurity for foreign investors and thus tended to discourage 
foreign investment. ") Naturally, investors have always been looking 
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for various types of guarantees to cover their risks. As a result, 
inter- governmental means have often been employed to resolve the 
differences between groups of countries and to define the intentions 
of the parties. One way of doing this is-obviously through treaties 
which may include provisions for the protection and treatment of 
nationals of both the high contracting parties 
6.1.1 THE ROLE OF TREATIES 
All writers concur that treaties have the function of legally 
recording that which has been agreed between the parties. 
(9) They 
have definite attributes which are generally recognized. 
Fitzmaurice, the rapporteur on the law of treaties for the U. N. 
International Law Commission, embodied these legal elements in 
Article 2(l) of his code definition: 
a treaty is an international agreement embodied in a single 
formal instrument (whatever its name, title or designation) 
made between entities both or all of which are subjects of 
international law possessed of international personality and 
treaty making capacity, and indeed to create rights and 
obligations, or tIO)establish relationships, governed by 
international law. - 
Article 2(l) of Vienna Convention also states: 
""treaty" means an international agreement concluded between 
states in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instru 
designation.... . 
M17S , and whatever 
its particular 
0 
Treaties are the only source of international law to receive 
universal and unconditional acceptance from all states and are thus 
of fundamental importance. 
(12) As Professor Harris points out a 
treaty is "the closest analogy to legislation that international law 
has to offer". 
(13) 
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Customary international law generates controversy regarding the 
extent to which rules may arise and bind the community of states when 
certain states remain silent, or where the rules originated before 
the emergence of newly- independent states. 
(14) The sanctity of 
treaty obligations, on the other hand, is explained by the undisputed 
rule of pacta sunt servanda. (15) 
In this regard, Baxter has pointed out: 
Psychologically, the act of acceptance of a treaty.... is 
more likely to induce compliance with the obligation than 
would subjection to customary obligations dra General uý" 
Assembly regulation of doubtful legal effect. 
He thus suggests that the effectiveness of treaty obligations stems 
from the explicit nature of consent itself, in that states are free 
to consent to a contractual obligation, or from the underlying do ut 
des concept of reciprocity. Such reciprocity of rights and duties 
under treaty is founded on the conviction of sovereign equality for 
both parties to a treaty and as such offers security for small and 
newly-independent states. (17) Every treaty is presumed to be valid 
and in force unless there is an occurrence of one of the grounds 
listed in the Vienna Convention (1969); each of these grounds is 
considered an exception to the general rule and, thus, can neither be 
presumed nor be subjected to any extensive interpretation. 
The binding nature of treaties have been sufficient to cause investor 
I 
states to conclude bilateral treaties with many developing countries 
for the reciprocal promotion, encouragement and protection of 
investment. (18) 
These agreements contribute to the reduction of political risks 
relating to investments. They accommodate the views of the 
participating states on such threshold issues as industrial policy, 
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free trade and finance, as well as issues with regard to 
expropriation or nationalization and settlement of investment 
disputes through arbitration. (19) 
Accordingly, these treaties have been employed by the I. C. J. and 
arbitral tribunals as a source of law applicable in settling 
disputes. (20) 
The most recent application of such treaties as a source of 
applicable law, took place in respect of an investment dispute 
between the U. K. and Sri Lanka in 1990. (21) The case which had been 
brought before the ICSID arbitration, involved a claim for 
compensation for the total loss of the claimant's investment in Sri 
Lanka which had resulted from a military operation by governmental 
forces against a rebellious group. 
The Tribunal addressed the following issues: (I) applicable law; (II) 
the scope and nature of a state's obligation under a bilateral 
treaty; (III) the quantum of compensation payable' and the method of 
assessing damages. 
Significantly, the Tribunal held that the rules governing the various 
aspects of the dispute had to be drawn from the Treaty that had been 
concluded between U. K. and Sri Lanka, i. e. the Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (1980). 
(22) 
There have been different types of inter- governmental agreements 
relating to investments. The agreements which are most relevant to 
our study are treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNS). 
FCNs were designed by the United States after World War II, although 
their roots lie in the commercial treaties of the 19th Century. (23) 
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The U. S. and Japan are the main countries that have used the FCN 
formula, but some individual treaties entered into by the 'United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Cermany are also of this type. 
Approximately 12 of the 43 FCNs entered into by the U. S. after World 
War II in force at present have been entered into with developing 
countries, including the Treaty of 1955 concluded with Iran. 
(24) 
6.2 THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
In 1953 the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the 
collaboration of the Secret Service of the British Government, 
organized the Coup d'etat in Iran which ousted the National 
Government of Dr. Mossadeq and replaced it by a government disposed 
to continue the special privileges accorded to the U. S. and western 
powers. 
(25) As soon as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi returned as Shah of 
Iran, the Iranian government began to develop a very good 
relationship with western countries, especially with the U. S. 
Consequently, in 1955, ý the Covernments of -Iran and the U. S., for the 
purpose of affirming their relationship, signed the Treaty of Amity 
which entered into force on 16 June 1957. 
(26) 
The Treaty of Amity includes various provisions dealing with 
jurisdiction, expropriation, compensation, arbitration and so on. As 
far as this study is concerned we shall focus on the expropriation 
provision and in particular on the standard of compensation as it was 
0 
provided for in this Treaty. 
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6.2.1 'LAWFULNESS OF EXPROPRIATION 
The Treaty establishes a number of bases for a lawful taking 
consistent with traditional standards of international law. Article 
IV(2) of the Treaty provides that: 
Property of nationals and companies of either high 
contracting party, including interests in property, shall 
receive the most constant protection and security within the 
territories of the high contracting party, in no case less 
than that required by international law. Such property 
shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it 
be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation. 
Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable form 
and shall represent the full equivalent of the property 
taken; and adequate provision shall have been made at or 
prior to the t' e) Of. taking for the determination and 
payment thereof. 
ffi( 
Reference to principles of international law is a characteristic of 
all FCNs. In substance as well as in language all signed FCNs have 
the effect of accomplishing the FCNs programme objective of 
reinforcing the continuing viability of the traditional concept of 
lawfulness in the area of expropriation. 
(28) The requirement that a 
taking must be for a public purpose may be the least controversial 
element of lawfulness, since it is to a considerable extent self- 
defining. It would characterize as impermissible purposes, for 
example, cases of conversion to personal use and motives of political 
retaliation. 
(29) 
A second requirement (and the key requirement of a lawful taking 
under this treaty) is that an expropriatory act be accompanied by the 
"prompt payment of just compensationm. 
(30) The precise wording of 
the compensation formula in FCNs can vary, whether compensation is 
described to be without delay or 'just' and actually 'realizable' or 
any other equivalent choice of words. Reliance on such formulations 
is an act whereby the parties select and incorporate by reference a 
243 
The Relevance of the'TreaC7 of AmIt7 
standard of international law elaborated by precedents and practice 
external to the Treaty. 
(31) If these expropriation standards are not 
met then expropriation is per se unlawful under the terms of the 
treaty. Such a breach of the treaty could be argued to be a ground 
either for restitution or specific performance in addition to 
compensation for the value of the property taken. 
(32) 
6.2.2 COMPENSATION AND VALUATION 
The Treaty of Amity in its Article IV(2) provides "that compensation 
shall be in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the 
full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision shall 
have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the 
determination and payment thereof.,, 
(33) 
This explicit language of the Treaty denotes that under the Treaty 
Iran must pay effective compensation for the expropriation of U. S. 
property. 
The negotiating history of the Treaty clearly confirms this 
conclusion. Immediately following World War II, the U. S. negotiated 
a series of some 21 FCN treaties with other nations. 
(34) One 
important purpose of these treaties, including the Treaty of Amity, 
was to protect investment abroad, and thus each of the treaties 
contained a section which required prompt payment of just 
compensation for the expropriation of foreign investment. 
(35) 
As far as the determination of compensation is concerned the treaty 
declares that, for the purposes of determining the amount of 
compensation, expropriated property be appraised at its fair market 
value. However this Treaty, like other treaties of this type, does 
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not attempt to provide a more detailed methodology of computation, 
inevitably leaving much to the discretion of the arbitrator under the 
treaty arbitration mechanism. 
International accounting practice also does not provide fixed rules, 
and the science (or it might be more appropriate to say 'art') of 
valuation has not yet been standardized. While there are various 
measures of fair market value, there may be cases where replacement, 
or even net book value, might be an appropriate device for 
approximation of the total value. 
(36) 
Accordingly, the agreed Minutes in the U. S. -Panama Treaty (1982) 
which also is a friendship treaty, include, in paragraph 4, the 
understanding that "the estimate of the full value of expropriated 
investment can be made using several methods of calculation depending 
on the circumstances thereof". 
(37) Similarly, Article III(l) of the 
Haiti-U. S. Treaty (1983), which is another friendship treaty, 
provides that fair market value will be determined "according to 
different methods of calculation as appropriate in each specific 
case". 
(38) 
This language reflects the fact that in the absence of a relevant and 
ascertainable market price of the investment affected, an 
approximation will have to be arrived at by indirect means. The 
indirect method, however must be one that is the most reasonably 
calculated in the circumstances to provide the investor with fair 
compensation for the economic value to him of his investment as an 
on-going enterprise, and not merely for the historical costs of the 
investment. 
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6.2.3 DATE OF VALUATION 
The Treaty of Amity in its Article IV further requires that, for 
purposes of determining compensation, expropriated property must be 
valued as of the date of expropriation, disregarding the effects of 
any actions attributable to the expropriating government (1) that 
were unlawful or (2) that were taken in anticipation of the 
expropriation. These requirements concerning valuation are inherent 
in the principle of 'Just compensation' which is embodied in Article 
IV(2) of the Treaty. These requirements are also well established in 
customary international law and were similarly incorporated into the 
Treaty of Amity by the further provision of Article IV(2), which 
states that compensation for expropriation must be in "no case less 
than that required for international law". 
(39) 
The requirement of valuation from the date of taking has consistently 
been inserted ip the early post-World War II FCN treaties concluded 
between the-U. S. and different countries, -as well as in the most 
recent bilateral investment treaties (BITs). BITs which were 
concluded with Panama (1982); Senegal (1983); Zaire (1984); and Haiti 
(1984), lay down exactly the same requirements as were stipulated in 
FCNs concluded with Korea (1936); Nicaragua (1956); and Pakistan 
(1959). (40) 
6.2.4 TERMINATION OF THE TREATY 
The Treaty of Amity provides that it shall continue in effect until 
terminated by a party. Specifically, Article XXIII(2) states that 
the Treaty "shall remain in force for ten years and shall continue in 
force thereafter until terminated as provided herein". 
(41) The sole 
method of termination under the treaty is described in Article XXIII, 
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which provides that the treaty may be terminated only upon one year's 
written notice by one party to the other. As the Treaty has 
established the method of its termination, the parties are obliged to 
adhere to that method. 
(42) 
The question of termination of the Treaty has been a controversial 
issue in the context of the Tribunal. The Treaty, however, was never 
terminated in accordance with its term. Thus the Tribunal has been 
confronted with the question whether the Treaty still is in force or 
not. 
6.3 THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OF THE TREATY 
The parties of the Treaty of Amity have made and are, in their pleas 
before the Tribunal, still making extensive reference(43) to the 
Treaty because, as we saw earlier, it lays down the standards which 
apply to the taking of the property of each other's nationals. 
American claimants constantly have contended that Iranian 
expropriations do not comply with obligations set forth in the Treaty 
of Amity, and Iranians, on the other part, have argued that the 
Treaty is no longer in force. In some cases Iranians have argued 
that the Treaty has been terminated by 'implication' as a result of 
economic and military sanctions imposed on Iran by the U. S. in late 
1979 and 1980 and in other cases they have denied the applicability 
of the Treaty as a result of the changes in U. S. -Iranian relations 
since the Iranian Revolution, and the signing of 'the Claims 
Settlement Declaration' (CSD). (44) 
Having outlined the position of the both parties before the Tribunal 
in respect of the validity issue, now we should examine the 
Tribunal's position in this respect. 
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6.4 THE TRIBUNAL AND THE VALIDITY OF THE TREATY 
The Tribunal in its early decisions in expropriation cases, avoided 
discussing the status of the Treaty as this issue carried some 
significant political overtones. As we saw earlier, American 
claimants, as well as the U. S. government, have been arguing in 
favour of the application of the Treaty, and the Iranian parties have 
been protesting that implementation of a treaty of "Amity" was an 
insult and affront given the polarized "enmity" between the two 
states. Thus, the Tribunal's early decisions avoided what was seen 
as a controversial issue. (45) 
As a result, in the American International Group case, 
(46) 
which was 
one of those early decisions, the Tribunal, after finding full 
compensation as the applicable standard prescribed by customary 
international law, concluded that it "need not here deal with the 
issues concerning the Treaty of Amity and its relevance with regard 
to the present dispute". 
(47) 
The Tribunal's refusal to rule on the validity and the relevance of 
the Treaty of Amity provoked strong reaction. The American 
arbitrator, Mosk, in a concurring opinion criticized the Tribunal in 
that regard. Judge Mosk argued that the Tribunal "should have held 
explicitly that the terms of the Treaty of Amity are controlling as 
to the requirements for compensation" in the case. 
(48) He continued 
by mentioning that the Treaty was never terminated by either 
party(49); that both Iran and the United States claimants had relied 
on the Treaty in the United States courts, 
(50) 
and that the denial of 
the benefits of the Treaty's protection to U. S. nationals would 
amount to a deprivation of "substantive rights" of U. S. claimants on 
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account of a change in the venue of litigation from the U. S. courts 
to the Tribunal. (51) 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal's reluctance to deal with the validity of 
the Treaty persisted for some time. 
Six months later (10 June 1984), Chamber One of the Tribunal, under 
the Chairmanship of Judge Lagergren, showed a mixed reaction towards 
the problem of the validity of the Treaty. With regard to the issue 
in Sea-Land Services it stated that: 
"'Aside from any conclusion as to the continued validity or 
effect of the Treaty, the Tribunal has one fundamental 
observation to make as to its interpretation in such a 
context as the present. There is nothing in either Article 
II or Article IV of the Treaty, which extends the scope of 
either state's international responsibility beyond those 
categories of acts already recognized by international law 
as giving rise to liability for a taking. The concept of 
taking is the same in the Treaty as in international law, 
and though the Treaty might, arguably, affect the level of 
compensation payable it does not relieve a claimant of the 
burden of establishing the breach of an international 
obligation. Accordingly, on the basis of its conclusions, 
with regard to Sea-Land's assertion of expropriation, the 
Tribunal does not consider that any benefit can be derived 
in this (5 2ýse 
from reliance on the provisions of the 
Treaty". 
However, about one year later (on 12 August 1985) in the INA(53) 
case, Chamber One was confronted with the task of defining of the 
obligations assumed by the parties to the Treaty of Amity. In that 
case, as the Tribunal noted, the Iranian government had not addressed 
the question of the continued validity and effect of the Treaty in 
its written pleadings. Iranian agent, Mohammad Eshragh, during a 
pre-hearing conference held on 18 January 1983, had indicated that 
"his government was not at that stage prepared to presents its 
definitive views as to the validity of the Treaty". 
(54) In the 
absence of arguments on the issue, the Tribunal "assume[d] that for 
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the purpose of the present case the Treaty remains binding as it is 
drafted". (55) 
Moreover, it added that: 
".... for the purpose of this case we are in the presence of 
a lex specialls, in the form of the Treaty Amity, which 
in principle prevails over general rules"J563f 
This clearly means that whatever the general rules might be on the 
law of nationalization, and whatever be the developments regarding 
the standard of compensation, the Tribunal was obliged to apply the 
Treaty of Amity. 
The conclusion of the Tribunal in the INA case provoked the Iranian 
judge's dissent. Judge Ameli's long dissent contested the Tribunal's 
presumption in favour of the continued validity of the Treaty of 
Amity on several grounds. He challenged the Tribunal's assertion 
that the Agent of Iran had failed to present the views of the 
government of Iran on the subject, and pointed out that the 
government's views were made available less than two weeks before by 
the agent in yet another important case (i. e. Starrett) to the same 
Chamber, and in any case, "the issues involved in the question... 
[were] so notorious and compelling that the Tribunal should have 
examined them on its own initiative". 
(57) 
More seriously, he objected that concluding in favour of the treaty 
violates the 
Lic 
principle of "reciprocity". 
(58) He argued that 
the Articles of the Treaty proclaimed "enduring peace and sincere 
friendship" between the two parties on the basis of mutual assurances 
of the "most consistent protection and security" to each other's 
nationals, win no case less than that required by international law" 
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and provided for a mechanism of ensuring just compensation for 
properties taken, etc. 
(59) 
He further asserted that despite the provision of Article 1 of the 
Treaty, the course of -conduct of the U. S. before and after the 
Algerian Accords offended against the friendly relations, economic 
relations and the consular rights of Iran. Then he referred to a 
series of violations of the Treaty provisions, such as harassment of 
Iranian nationals by the "hostile and inhuman actions" of the U. S. 
authorities, blocking of Iranian assets, prohibiting exports to and 
imports from Iran, and "finally, the armed invasion of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, or what is also described by the U. S. as abortive 
rescue mission". Judge Ameli cited the overthrow of the Mossadeq 
government by the CIA - sponsored coup d'etat in 1953 and the 
allegedly continued interventionist policies of the U. S. as 
militating against the origin and applicability of the Treaty of 
Amity. (60) The bottom line was that the U. S., had breached the Treaty 
and as a result the Treaty was not in force, and the U. S. could not 
be considered entitled to its benefits. 
Despite his strong protest, the Tribunal continued to refer to the 
Treaty in its later awards. 
In the Phelps Dodge Corp. case, no party contended that the Treaty 
was ever termiýated in accordance with its terms, but Iran argued 
that the Treaty had been terminated by implication when the U. S. 
sanctioned Iran economically as well as militarily in the late 1970s. 
The Tribunal did not find it necessary in this case to determine 
whether the Treaty had remained in force between the two states. It 
stated: 
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ff ... whether or not the Treaty still is in force today, it is a relevant source of law on which the ibunal is 
justified in drawing in reaching its decisions . 
ý) 
Following this decision, the Tribunal has routinely held that the 
Treaty of Amity constituted as source of law applicable to cases 
between Iran and the U. S. As Khan points out: 
"Securing recognition by the Tribunal of the Treaty of Amity 
as a source of law between Iran and U. S. was a 
significant triumph for the United States". 
MY) 
Surprisingly, in the Sola Tiles case, while the claimant did not rely 
on the Treaty of Amity and the respondent did not address the 
applicability of that Treaty, the Tribunal stated that the Treaty: 
"cannot be ignored and must in some way form the part of the 
legal bl5kground against which the Tribunal decides the 
case". 
(6 
Yet, in the Amoco International Finance case, examining different 
contentions of the Iranian respondents, the Tribunal. reached the 
conclusion that the Treaty was valid and in force. 
In the Amoco case, Iran challenged the validity of the Treaty on 
various grounds. 
First, it argued that "the Treaty was never binding on Iran since it 
was executed by a Government installed as a result of foreign 
intervention". (64) Iran continued that, if the Treaty was held to be 
validly concluded "it ceased to be operative in November 1979 at the 
latest, by reason of United States violation of it taking measures 
against Iranian assets as well as by the general "change of 
circumstances", which was required by Article V of the CSD to be 
taken into account by the Tribunal". 
(65) Furthermore, Iran argued 
that "the decision to the contrary of the International Court of 
Justice in the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular 
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Staff in Tehran"(66) was irrelevant since that "decision only 
concerned jurisdiction and the case was not argued by Iran". (67) 
With regard to the Iranian contention that the Treaty was invalid 
because it was concluded by a government installed by the 
intervention of the U. S., which was a clear duress argument framed in 
the terms of Article 49,51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the Tribunal stated that: 
at the time the Treaty was signed and ratified the two 
governments were recognized by the whole international 
community. There is no evidence, and it has not been 
contended, that the Treaty was executed under duress, or by 
fraud.... None of the provisions of the Treaty can be 
considered as contrary to an imperative norm of 
international law (Jus Cogens),.... Nothing, therefore, 
suggests that the Treaty was null and void ab InItIo". (68) 
In respect of the Iranian contention against the Treaty based on 
"change of circumstances" 
(69) 
the Tribunal said that it did not need 
to determine whether events such as the Islamic Revolution, the 
attack on the United States Embassy in Tehran, taking of embassy 
personnel as hostages, and the subsequent presidential freeze orders 
and rescue attempt, "constituted changes of such a nature and 
magnitude as to justify the termination of the Treaty in conformity 
with customary rules of international law as declared in Article 62 
of the Vienna Convention". Then it pointed out that as "Article 62 
clarifies, change of circumstances never automatically terminates a 
treaty". 
(70) 'While 
the Tribunal mentioned that those events could 
not be without consequences upon the implementation of the Treaty and 
that such a legal and factual context has to be kept in mind, 
nevertheless, the Tribunal dismissed the Iranian contention on the 
ground of "changed circumstances" and concluded that the Treaty was 
valid. 
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Similarly the Tribunal did not agree that the negotiation of the 
Algiers Accords(71) in January 1981 constituted a termination of the 
Treaty. The Tribunal stated that: 
"the Accords, which provided for the release of the 52 
United States nationals and lifting of t freeze of the ýý2) 
Iranian assets, do not mention the Treaty". 
The Tribunal added that: 
"The general reference to "changed circumstances" in Article 
V of the CSD, which deals with the law to be applied by the 
Tribunal, cannot be construed as a notice of intention to 
terminate the Treaty, or as constitutin a finding that the 
Treaty was terminated on such a basis". 
F73) 
To hold the Treaty valid the Tribunal mainly relied on the decision 
of the I. C. J. in the Hostages case. 
0 
In the Hostages case, the U. S. filed an application which claimed, 
inter alia, that Iran's seizure of the U. S. Embassy in Tehran 
violated the Treaty. The Court in its judgement held that the 
Treaty's provisions "remain part of the corpus of law applicable 
between the U. S. and Iran". 
(74) 
In its holding the Court explained that the continued applicability 
of a treaty of this nature is especially important when the parties 
are in dispute: 
"The very purpose of a Treaty of Amity, and indeed of a 
treaty of establishment, is to promote friendly relations 
between the two countries concerned, and between their two 
peoples, more especially by mutual undertakings to ensure 
the protection and security of their nations in each others, 
territory. It is precisely when difficu es arise that the 
Treaty assumes its greatest importance". 
Iýý) 
The essential basis for this judgement seems to be the sanctity; 
effect; and importance of the Treaty in peaceful continuation of 
relationships of both parties and ultimately in settling their 
disputes. 
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Examining the Court's judgement, the Tribunal stated that "the Court 
dismissed the suggestion that the Treaty was rendered inapplicable 
because of the counter measures the United States had taken against 
Iran. ... the Court emphasized, in this context that "mutual 
undertakings [of both parties] to ensure the protection and security 
of their nationals in each other's territory" are specially related 
to the "very purpose of amity and, indeed, of a treaty of 
establishment" like the Treaty". (76) 
Following the I. C. J. judgement, the Tribunal said "Iran could easily 
have denounced the Treaty if-it thought it proper to do so"(77) which 
was what, for instance, the French Covernment did after the I. C. J. 
was invited to found its jurisdiction in the Nuclear Tests case(78) 
on the Ceneral Act which France had considered to have lost 
effectiveness and fallen into desuetude. The Tribunal added but 
"Iran took no such action". 
(79) Accepting the Iranian argument that 
no formal notification of treaty termination was necessary, and that 
it could be implied from conduct of the parties, the Tribunal held 
that "the conduct of the parties was not such as to warrant such a 
conclusion". 
00) Pointing out that the closure of the consulate and 
the rupture of diplomatic relations could be construed as suspending 
the part of the Treaty which relates to consular relations, the 
Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that "the parties considered 
the provisions. of the Treaty relating to the Treatment of nationals 
to be terminated or suspended at the time of the occurrence of the 
(81) facts to which the claim relates". The Tribunal noted the 
claimant's contention that the U. S. had "repeatedly invoked the 
Treaty... continued routinely to confer on Iranian nationals benefits 
arising from its provisions and Iran itself had invoked the Treaty 
before United States Courts, as recently as the summer of 1985". (82) 
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In this case also, (as it did in the INA case), the Tribunal pointed 
out that, as lex specialis in the relations between the two 
countries, the Treaty superseded the lex generalls, namely customary 
international law. The Tribunal, however, added that: 
"This does not mean, however that the latter is irrelevant 
in the instant case. On the contrary, the rule of customary 
law may be useful in order to fill in possible lacunae of 
the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in 
its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and 
"(83) implementation of its provisions. 
As the foregoing shows, the Tribunal has been trying in one way or 
another to hold the Treaty valid, and by doing that, of course, the 
Tribunal meant to preserve the investment protection rules contained 
in the Treaty. As we shall see below, the Tribunal in almost all of 
its awards has in fact applied the provisions contained in the 
Treaty. 
6.5 THE TREATY AND THE COMPENSATION AWARDS OF THE TRIBUNAL 
We saw earlier that with regard to the three initial cases, i. e. 
American International Group; Seland-Services; and Tipperts, the 
Tribunal referred to customary international law as the source of 
applicable standards. However, while the Tribunal in its initial 
decisions tended to rely wholly on customary international law and 
found that these principles require full compensation, in the INA 
case the Tribunal preferred to reach this same result by applying the 
Treaty of Amity. 
In its later cases, the Tribunal has consistently applied the Treaty 
of Amity and its "Just compensation" standard of compensation. In 
the Phelps Dodge case, the Tribunal held that the Treaty of Amity's 
provisions for unilateral termination had never been invoked. The 
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Tribunal therefore, held that the Treaty was applicable to the 
present case. In this case, the Tribunal ignored Iran's argument 
that net book value, as reduced by subsequent alleged losses, 
conformed to the definition of "full equivalent" value, and focussed 
on the extent to which goodwill plus long term and short term profits 
could confidently be valued. 
Several of the Tribunal's more recent awards have affirmed that the 
standard of full compensation is the same under both the Treaty and 
customary international law. Thus, while Lagergren regarded the 
Treaty as lex specialls(84), Chamber Two and Chamber Three awards 
have found the Treaty and Customary rule of full compensation to be 
the same. 
(85) Chamber Two in the Phelps Dodge case found that the 
Treaty of Amity stipulated compensation standards "similar, if not 
identical" to those found under customary international law citing, 
American International Group and Tipperts v TAMS-AFFA Consulting 
Engineers of Iran. Another Chamber Two award in Payne v Iran applied 
the provisions of the Treaty concerning compensation standards as 
similar as those developed through customary international law. 
The most extensive award to date which has discussed the compensation 
standards found in the Treaty and customary international law is 
Sedco, Inc. v National Iranian Oil Co. In this case Chamber Three 
needed to determine the compensation standard applicable to the 
expropriation 
ýf 
an oil drilling company because Iran argued that the 
Treaty of Amity, even if applicable, incorporates the reduced 
standard of compensation allegedly found in customary international 
law. The Tribunal rejected the contention that the traditional 
standard of full compensation has been eroded. The Tribunal reviewed 
the opinions of international tribunals, and legal publicists, and 
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concluded that the standard of full compensation is overwhelmingly 
supported. (87) 
In Amoco International Finance Corp. v Iran (88) Chamber Three reached 
the same conclusion. In this case the Tribunal decided that the 
claimant's interest in a joint venture chemical enterprise had been 
lawfully expropriated and that the Treaty established the standard of 
compensation. However, in this case the majority interpreted the 
Treaty standard in the light of principles of public international 
law as declared in the Permanent Court's Judgement in the Chorzow 
Factory case(89). * On the basis of these principles, the Chamber 
concluded that the Treaty and general principles of international law 
did not permit application of discounted cash flow methods of 
valuation (subsequently adopted by Chamber One in the Starrett case) 
to determine damages for a lawful expropriation. 
(90) In the Sedco 
case also the Tribunal concluded that full compensation must be 
awarded "whether or not the expropriation itself was otherwise 
lawfulm. (91) 
CONCLUSION 
From the above several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the Treaty 
of Amity has been used as a source of law applicable to expropriation 
or nationalization cases before the Tribunal. Secondly, the concepts 
of changed cirLmstances and implicit termination have not affected 
the Treaty and its enforceability. Thirdly, the provisions of the 
Treaty have been considered as a firm ground for applying the full 
compensation standard for expropriation or nationalization cases. 
However, this full compensation standard, according to the Tribunal, 
can be applied either via application of the Treaty of Amity or by 
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reference to customary international law. This conclusion is 
consistent with the desire of investors to be protected firmly and, 
as the American arbitrator Brower points out, "underscores the strong 
support manifested today for the principle of full compensation". (92) 
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OUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES 
In the previous chapter we saw that in its awards the Tribunal has 
reached the conclusion that full compensation must be paid by an 
expropriating state. This conclusion was reached via application of 
the Treaty of Amity, and by reference to customary international law. 
A crucial area of the Tribunal's awards, which has a close link to 
the standard of compensation, is the issue of how actually to 
calculate damages based on the designated compensation standard. 
From the point of view of a deprived investor the determination of 
full compensation as a designated standard may seem of limited value, 
if the valuation method applied leads to an award which the investor 
considers as falling far short of proper compensation for the loss 
suffered. Thus the issue of the valuation of expropriated or 
nationalized property is in practice one of the most important issues 
in this field. Moreover, although in some circumstances less than 
full compensation might be an appropriate standard, in such cases the 
full value would still be the starting point in the calculation of 
compensation. Therefore the Tribunal's treatment of the valuation of 
various kinds of property is of great importance. There are, of 
course, different methods of valuation, some favoured by the United 
States and some favoured by Iran, but our primary concern is with the 
methods which have been used by the Tribunal to meet the full 
compensation spandard and the justifications for its approach. 
First, however, we shall examine the interpretations of the full 
compensation standard by the two sides. 
268 
Quancificatlon of Damages 
7.1 FULL COMPENSATION IN THE VIEWPOINT OF THE U. S. 
-CLAIMANTS 
American claimants have argued before the Tribunal that full 
compensation means full value, or going-concern value, or market 
value of the property taken, plus the value of lost profits. They 
have followed the views of the Department of State in regard with the 
meaning of the term "adequate compensation" in cases of expropriation 
or nationalization. 
The viewpoint of the Department of State has been expressed as 
follows: 
"once it appears that a taking of American-owned property 
has occurred or is about to occur, it is the long-standing 
and continuing position of the U. S. government that 
international law requires payment of fair market value, 
calculated as if the expropriatory act had not occurred or 
was not threatened. Since market value is often not 
directly ascertainable, and since there usually are not 
recent sales of comparable properties to refer to, market 
value generally must be approximated by indirect methods of 
valuation. There are at least three methods. 
The going-concern approach attempts to measure earning power 
(and so encompass elements such as loss of future prof its 
which may be based on projections of past earnings or 
estimates of future earnings), and in the view of the U. S. 
Government generally best approximates market value. We 
recognise that there may be circumstances in which 
application of this method is impractical, or where it might 
operate unfairly - for example, where an investment has a 
limited history of operating result, or where expropriation 
occurs after significant costs are incurred but before a 
revenue-generating state is reached. This method of 
valuation is also vulnerable to governmental actions which 
adversely affect profitability such as increased taxes, 
threat of cancellation of contractual or concessionary 
rights, or withdrawals of privileges. We believe that such 
actioL taken for the purpose of or which have the effect 
of, unfairly influencing compensation may not properly be 
allowed. 
The replacement cost of the property at the time of 
expropriation less actual deprecation, a standard which is 
likely to yield an amount substantially greater than book 
value but which does not take into account earning capacity 
is of limited use in valuing intangibles, and in our view is 
generally less acceptable in most circumstances than the 
going-concern approach. 
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Book value or some variation of it, which (unlike the 
replacement-cost approach) values assets at acquisition cost 
less depreciation, is a figure which in most cases bears 
little relationship to their actual value. We believe this 
to be the least acceptable method for valuation of 
expropriated property. 
We recognize that no single method of valuation is valid 
under all circumstances. The method or combination of 
methods most likely to provide joint compensation for 
expropriated property varies, and depen fs upon the attendant 
circumstances of the particular case. --- 
) 
In the AIG case (1983) which involved nationalization of an insurance 
company the claimants maintained that full compensation for their 
property was the "full value of the company as a going concern", 
including future business prospects, goodwill and interest from the 
date of nationalization. (2) 
Yet in the Arnoco case (1987) 
(3) the claimant showed more sensitivity 
in applying for full compensation. As the case involved an 
international economic agreement (Khemco agreement) between Amoco and 
NPC (an Iranian Government instrumentality), the claimant in argument 
discussed the full compensation standard comprehensively. The 
claimant argued that the Khemco agreement belonged to a special 
category of international contracts. 
(4) Further, the claimant 
contended that such contracts by their nature require that "they be 
insulated from the disruptive effects of changing municipal law and 
therefore the law from which they derive their binding force (1of 
dlenracinementj is international law. n(5) In fact, by distinguishing 
international contracts from other existing contracts the claimants 
tried to make out a case for a higher full value than for other 
contracts. It is therefore worth briefly examining some 
characteristics these agreements. 
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7.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PETROLEUM AGREEMENTS 
Petroleum agreements have specific characteristics which distinguish 
them from other agreements. The following could be listed as their 
features: 
The state is always, directly or indirectly implicated in 
them. Accordingly, they are also called "state contracts". 
(ii) They comprise a mixture of contractual and statutory or 
regulatory provisions. 
(iii) They are long-term contracts. 
(iv) They are international contracts, often described as 
"international economic development" or "investment 
contracts". 
(6) 
Among these features the last has a close link to our discussion. As 
we saw in the Chapter 3, there are some writers who argue that state 
contracts are governed by international law. This is said to conform 
to the intention of the parties as reflected in the provisions 
referring to international law or the general principles. Weil, for 
example, points out that economic development contracts concluded 
between state and private parties are rooted in the international 
legal order and are, or should be, governed by international law. 
(7) 
0 
Host states. on the other hand, relying on the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, argue that their own national law 
should be applied to these contracts. 
(8) Weil adds that submission 
to international law is still valid even where the parties refer to 
the national law of the State, because here the national law has been 
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elevated to the level of international law (exhausse all niveau 
del'ordre jurdlque international). (9) 
The claimant in the Amoco case adopted the above attitude, and 
relying on the international character of the Khemco Agreement, 
contended that nationalization of Amoco was unlawful under 
international law because it violated the Khemco agreement, ý or more 
specifically the Stabilization Clause of the Agreement. (10) 
Furthermore, the claimant maintained that the international law 
applicable to these types of Agreements was the international law of 
responsibility of states. 
(") In fact it argued that the breach of 
the agreement was against the international responsibility of states 
and consequently the act of nationalization was unlawful. Bowett 
points out that "whether the taking is an overt act of expropriation 
or nationalization, ... an alleged breach of a contract with an 
alien, the alien claimant is usually at pains to show that the taking 
is unlawful.. 
(12) The advantage in showing that the taking is 
unlawful lies in the fact that the remedies for an unlawful act are 
more beneficial to the claimant than are the remedies for a lawful 
taking. (13) However, it is unnecessary to consider this issue 
further here because whether the nationalization of Amoco was lawful 
or unlawful was discussed in Chapter 5 and we are now dealing with 
the position of American claimants concerning the determination of 
full compensati-on standards. 
7.3 FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE NATIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONA 
AGREEMENTS 
On many occasions Americans have argued that compensation for 
nationalization of an international agreement should be greater than 
272 
Quantification of Damages 
full compensation, as the claimant did in the Amoco case. 
(14) 
Relying on the decision of P. C. I. J. in Chorzow Factory 
(15) 
case the 
claimant there argued that compensation in the case of unlawful 
expropriation should be more than the full compensation standard as 
full compensation applies only to lawful expropriation. 
According to the Court in the Chorzow Faccor7 case, an obligation to 
provide reparation for all the damages sustained by the owner of 
expropriated property arises from an unlawful expropriation. 
(16 ) The 
rules of the international law of responsibility of States apply in 
such a case. They provide for restirutio in inregrum, restitution in 
kind or, if impossible, its monetary equivalent. If need be "damages 
for losses sustained which would not be covered by restitution" 
should also be awarded. 
(17) On the other hand, a lawful 
expropriation must give rise to the payment of fair compensation "or 
of the just price of what was expropriated". 
(18) Such an obligation 
is imposed by a specific rule of the international law of 
expropriation. 
Restitution is well defined by the Court. It means the restitution 
in kind or, if that is impossible, the payment of the monetary 
equivalent. In both cases the principle on which it rests is the 
same: "that reparation must as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if this act had not been 
committed". 
(19) 
One essential consequence of this principle is that compensation is 
not necessarily limited to the value of the undertaking at the moment 
of dispossession (plus, of course, interest to the day of payment). 
Accordingly, the claimant in the Amoco case argued that: "Whenever 
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foreign owned property is expropriated and specifically when an 
agreement between a state and a foreign investor, such as the Khemco 
Agreement is repudiated by the state party and, the foreign investor's 
right under than agreement are expropriated, the foreign investor is 
entitled to receive just compensation, that is the full value of the 
property or rights expropriated or repudiated, compensation that will 
place the foreign investor in as good an economic position as he was 
in before the expropriation or repudiation occurred". 
(20) 
The claimant in the Amoco case further contended that "the foreign 
investor rights must be valued without regard to any reduction in 
value that would have resulted from apprehension that the rights 
might be expropriated without full compensation or that the state 
party might otherwise breach the agreement". 
(21) We shall discuss 
this contention later in this Chapter. 
In addition, the claimant argued that when the expropriated rights 
involve an ongoing business activity with demonstrable future earning 
power, the just compensation is the going concern value which, 
according to the claimant, is equivalent to the fair market 
value. 
(22) 
Similarly, in the Phillips Petroleum case, the claimants argued that 
their rights in Joint Structure Agreement (JSA) "Constituted part of 
a going concern". 
(23) 
However, the requirement that fair market -value must be paid as 
compensation is not accepted by the third world countries which in 
recent times have been largely responsible for expropriations. 
(24) 
These expropriations were motivated by economic nationalism and by 
the belief that state ownership of resources and industry is 
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necessary for economic development. As the norm of full compensation 
would have been beyond the means of third world countries to satisfy 
thus it became necessary to seek other norms, and justify them. 
7.4 THE CLAIM THAT EXCESS PROFITS MADE BY FOREIGN INVESTORS MUST BE 
DEDUCTED FROM THE COMPENSATION 
Claims to deduct excess profits have largely been influenced by the 
dependencia school of economists. Adherents to this school believe 
that investments by multinational corporations in developing 
countries perpetuate the economic dominance of the host countries by 
integrating their economies with the economies of the home countries 
of the investors. 
(25) 
The termination of such dependence is the aim of this school and 
expropriation of foreign assets would be the best mode of such 
termination. 
(26) Girvan, one of the theorists of this school, 
referring to the past exploitation of the third world by 
multinational companies, asserts that it is the third world that has 
to be paid compensation. 
(27) Such assertions, however, are not 
grounded in any legal base. Nevertheless, some Latin American 
countries have tried to provide legal bases for these assertions in 
some recent expropriations. For instance, the Chilean Governments' 
claim relating to excess profits in the expropriation of Kennecot 
Shares in the Chilean Copper Mining Industries, was couched in legal 
form. (28) A Chilean constitutional amendment of 1971 permitted the 
expropriation of the properties of the copper mining corporations, 
Kennecott and Anaconda. 
(29) These American corporations were in 
joint venture associations with CODELCO, a Chilean state owned 
corporation. Earlier, Kennecott and Anaconda, by an agreement 
275 
Quantification of Damages 
negotiated with the Frei government, had divested themselves of 51 
percent of their shares to CODELCO, thus creating the joint ventures. 
The 1971 amendment permitted the taking over of the remaining shares, 
limiting compensation for the expropriated properties to their book 
values and vested a discretion in the President to deduct from the 
book value the excess profits he determines the companies had made 
since 1955. 
(30) The valuation was to be made by the Comptroller 
General of Chile on the basis indicated, but the power to determine 
the amount to be deducted as excess profits was within the sole 
competence of the President. 
(31) 
In the case of Kennecott, the Comptroller assessed compensation due 
at $179m but he deducted $198m for write-ups of asset values made by 
the corporation, $21m for deficient installations and $46m as 
indemnification for workers. In addition, the President ordered a 
further deduction of $410m as excess profits. No indication was 
given as to how this figure was arrived at. The appeal of Kennecott 
to the Copper Tribunal which had been created by the nationalization 
decree was rejected on the ground that the Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of the Presidential 
determination of the amount of excess profits to be deducted. 
However, after the Marxist government responsible for the 
expropriations was removed from power, the military government which 
0 
replaced it agreed to pay compensation based on the book value of the 
property. 
(32) 
The valid ity of the method of assessing compensation stated in the 
Chilean decree has been subjected to academic criticism in capital 
exporting countries. 
(33) It has been pointed out that the method of 
calculation was ex post facto in that the investor had no prior 
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indication before investing that compensation would be calculated on 
the basis stated in the amendment of 1971. The only indication as to 
the permissible limits of profits was in the Andean Code, but its 
provisions too were not intended to operate retrospectively. (34) 
However, Sornarajah among others have argued that "such an objection 
admits that an investor may make excessive rewards from his 
investment and that if his assets are taken over he must be given 
their full value placing him in an even better position than he was 
when he commenced his investment. It requires the profiteer to be 
rewarded twice". (35) 
Rohwer also, by employing the principle of unjust enrichment in 
favour of the deduction of excess profits, declares that "the idea of 
excess profits contains an embryonic notion of fairness that commends 
itself to the unjust enrichment doctrine". 
(36) This is an attractive 
idea de lege ferenda. 
The claim relating to deduction of excess profits must be considered 
with favour in situations where the investment has had an 
exploitation character. However, difficulties will inevitably be 
encountered in defining what amounts to excess profits. Foreign 
investment is made with the object of making more profit than would 
be made had the capital been kept at home. Thus allowance must be 
made for the fact that the investment yielded more profits than it 
0 
would have had the capital stayed at home. The risks involved in 
making the investment in an incipient business must also be 
considered. Ultimately, the assessment of excessive profits must be 
left to the good sense of nationalizing state. The sanction against 
an improper assessment would be that future foreign investment would 
shy away from the state. 
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7.5 CLAIMS THAT ONLY A LIMITED COMPENSATION SHOULD BE PAID 
Asian countries, following Resolution 1803, have argued that only 
limited compensation is payable. Thus Ceylon which nationalized oil 
installations almost immediately after Resolution 1803, made 
statutory provision for the payment of compensation. 
(37) 
Arrangements for payment of compensation were also made when tea 
estates were taken over in 1976. When India took over the oil 
installations of Burma Shell in 1976, provision was made in the 
Statute(38) for the payment of compensation. However, the manner of 
payment provided for indicates that full compensation was not 
contemplated. 
African expropriations have also involved the payment of some 
compensation. Rood, in a survey of compensation practices in Africa 
concluded that: "the compensation promised or paid for a take over of 
foreign industry in British Africa falls far short of what the former 
owner thinks is due. Fair market value valuation based on 
capitalized earnings and effective compensation are distant ideals; 
reality is likely to be partial payment, a value promise of something 
in the future or a statement of good intentions by the 
government". 
(39) 
The Zambian takeover of 51 percent of the shares of copper mines 
resulted in payment of compensation but, according to some, the 
replacement value of the property taken was two to five times as much 
as the compensation paid. 
(40) 
The present practice of developing countries thus indicates that they 
are conscious of the need to pay some compensation but they are not 
willing to pay the fair market value of the taken property. 
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7.6 IRAN'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE MARKET VALUE 
In nationalization cases before the Iran-U. S. Tribunal Iran has 
challenged the requirement of fair market value. In the AIG case 
(1983), they argued that modern international law has prescribed 
"merely the payment of the actual worth of assets owned at the date 
of nationalization", or "... the net book value defined as assets 
(41) 
minus liability without consequential damages". 
In the Amoco case, Iran argued that the most relevant issue in the 
valuation of compensation was whethýr the nationalization was lawful 
or not. In the case of lawful nationalization, the measure of 
compensation was to be substantially less than the measure of damages 
for a breach and in any event, no compensation was to be paid for 
loss of future profits. 
(42) In such a case the compensation should 
be the equivalent of net book value of the residual nationalized 
assets. Also in Phillips Petroleum Co. case, Iran asserted that 
compensation should be based on the net book value of the property 
taken and pointed in support of that assertion to "a series of 
settlements in the global petroleum industry in recent decades which 
they assert, demonstrate that both nations with petroleum reserves 
and companies engaged in finding and extracting those reserves accept 
net book value as an appropriate basis for compensation". 
(43) 
Furthermore, in this case as it did in Amoco, Iran argued that "the 
taking of property in the present case was a lawful taking and that 
for such a taking a lesser standard of compensation is required". 
(44) 
In short, Iran so far has argued that the fair market value of the 
nationalized assets is best represented by the net book value. Yet 
in the Amoco case, Iran argued that the net book value standard was 
in conformity with the doctrine of unjust enrichment, state practice 
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in the oil industry and legitimate expectation of the parties. These 
arguments must now be examined. 
7.6.1 UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Unjust enrichment is a domestic law principle. 
(45 ) However some 
writers have recommended application of this principle in the field 
of international expropriation law. Judge *Ar6chaga is among these 
writers. He did so for two main reasons. First, in assessing 
compensation, the focus was to be put on the beneficial gain obtained 
by the expropriating state, rather than on the loss of the former 
owner. Secondly, the equitable foundation of the principle was 
supposed to allow discarding undue advantages the former owner may 
have possessed before the expropriation. 
(46) 
Iran's reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment originates from 
its political attitude towards American investors operating in Iran 
before the Revolution. Iran argues that before the Revolution, 
American investors were given undue privileges and accordingly it 
believes that investors were enriched unjustly. Iran adds that in 
any case of dispute between it and Americans, the past relationship 
of America with the Iranian authorities before the Revolution must be 
taken into account. As we saw in Chapter 5, some writers also pursue 
this attitude. 
As we also saw in Chapter 5, in 1972 Chile put forward the view that 
excess profits which accrued to the investor must be taken into 
account in assessing compensation. 
(48) Sornarajah states that "when 
the principle of unjust enrichment is coupled with the economic 
theory of the dependencla school that the developing countries have 
been subjected to permanent economic dominance through the 
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instrumentality of multinational investment, the principle could 
achieve results quite unintended or unforeseen by its modern 
adherents". (49) 
Other writers suggest applying the general principle of unjust 
enrichment in order to bridge the gap between the concepts of the 
economically developed and the under developed nations. (50) 
Ar&chaga, Chowdhury and other members of the International Law 
Association's International Committee on the New International 
Economic Order plan to use unjust enrichment as the legal foundation 
of the concept of appropriate compensation in a forthcoming 
resolution to be adopted by that Committee and the International Law 
Association itself. The Members of the Committee have argued that 
this principle constitutes the legal foundation of current state 
practice. 
(51) However, as Dolzer has pointed out "various difficult 
questions are raised by recourse to the principle of unjust 
enrichment... the relevance of general principles to customary law 
must be carefully analyzed before their application on the 
international law level is considered. A survey of national legal 
orders indicates that the concept of unjust enrichment operates in a 
manner that nullifies certain transactions without proper legal 
grounds". 
(52) 
Acknowledging that the unjust enrichment concept constitutes ,a 
mechanism thaý corrects transactions, Dolzer maintains that it 
provides no independent legal perspective on any situation. 
(53) 
Therefore this principle is fundamentally ambiguous at the 
international law. (54) Yet, unjust enrichment could in principle 
operate in favour of foreign investors, as well as in favour of the 
host country. For it would appear to be at least arguable that any 
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expropriation transaction without full compensation could be viewed 
as an unjust enrichment of the host country. If the principle is to 
be used in favour of the host country as a corrective mechanism (as 
*Ar6chaga implies), a principle of justifying the duty to compensate 
is logically required as ap earlier step. 
(55) 
International courts and tribunals have been reluctant to recognise 
unjust enrichment as a well established international principle. In 
a dispute which arose out of the confiscation of the Austrian 
property in Yugoslavia, the tribunal said that in assessing 
compensation: 
"only true compensation will be payable and no account will 
be taken of any unjustified enrichment that may have 
occurred". 
According to this rule, unjust enrichment has limited the 
boundaries of compensation, not widened the jurisdiction of 
the forum and relates to the mgrits of the case and not to 
the jurisdiction of the case"(5 
) 
As we shall see later, the Iran-U. S. Tribunal has also been reluctant 
to implement the unjust enrichment principle, notwithstanding that 
Iranian respondents have argued repeatedly that this principle should 
be employed as the guiding principle in assessing compensation. They 
have argued that should any enrichment on their part entitling 
claimants to compensation be found, such compensation should be 
calculated according to the net book value of the assets, a valuation 
basis allegedýy widely used in compensation settlement in oil 
industry. 
7.7 STATE PRACTICE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY SINCE 1972 
In Amoco, as well as in Phillips Petroleum case, the Iranian parties, 
when supporting net book value principle and denying any loss of 
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future profits as a part of full compensation, relied on state 
practice in the oil industry. 
Since 1972 there have been a series of takeovers by various OPEC 
countries of concession interests in whole or in part, in which the 
(57) compensation (following OPEC guidelines) was generally based on 
net book value without apparent regard for loss of profits. 
Examples are the 1972 General Agreement on participation in which the 
Gulf states acquired participation rights rising to 51 percent, the 
1972 Iraqui nationalization of IPC; the 1973 Sales and Purchase 
Agreement between Iran and the consortium members; the 1972-3 Libyan 
acquisition of 50 percent of the KOC; and the 1975 Venezualan oil 
nationalization. 
(58) In virtually all of these the price of the 
shares acquired, or in other words the compensation due, was 
generally based on net book value, or asset value without any 
consideration for loss of profits. 
Moreover, in the Aminoll case the government of Kuwait disputed the 
market value which had been put forward by Aminoil and supported the 
net book value standard based on state practice in the oil 
industry. (59) It contended that net book value should be the primary 
measure of any compensation. In its contentions it relied mainly on 
the OPEC guidelines to that effect, and also on the various takeover 
agreements whigh had been negotiated on that basis. 
(60) However, it 
did not adduce any judicial or arbitral authority in support of its 
position, but offered the testimony of a certified public accountant 
to confirm that this method had been adopted in the takeover of the 
Kuwait Oil Company in other unspecified instances. 
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In the above case the Tribunal noted that this contention was based 
on ýa series of negotiations and agreements in the oil industry 
between 1971 and 1977 and found that these were of a special 
character insufficient to constitute either an expression of opinlo 
jurls or a customary rule -a lex pecrolea - valid generally for 
government takeovers in the industry. It added that such settlements 
often provided for valuable benefits in addition to the book value 
compensation, including service contracts, long term supply 
arrangements and preferential treatment - none of which were 
available to Aminoil. Purther, they were negotiated under heavy 
economic pressure; and even if this pressure did not amount to duress 
legally, the circumstances surrounding the negotiations were not such 
as to make the agreements "apposite for generating general rules of 
I, aw applicable in other cases too". 
(61) Accordingly, the Tribunal 
concluded that it was "Just and reasonable to take some measure of 
account of all the elements of an undertaking. This leads to a 
separate appraisal of the value on the one hand of the undertaking 
itself, as a source of profit, and on the other of the totality of 
t- he assets, and adding together the results obtainedm. 
(62) With 
respect to valuing the physical assets, it observed that there was no 
absolute rule, but that in a case such as the present one, where high 
inflation rates and a general depreciation in the value of money were 
factors, the use of net book value was not appropriate. 
(63 As we 
shall see, the Iran-U. S. Tribunal has taken a similar position. 
7.8 ARGUMENTS WITH REGARD TO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF THE PARTIES 
The third argument which was put forward by Iran to challenge the 
market value in the Amoco case was the legitimate expectations of the 
parties. They argued that the initial investment was too small to 
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give rise to legitimate expectations of a compensation of such a 
magnitude as was claimed by the claimant. 
(64) 
The concept of legitimate expectations was central to the AMINOIL 
award. In the AmInoll case we saw earlier that the Kuwait Government 
argued that compensation should be based only on net book value of 
the assets. Aminoil, 'on the other hand, argued that it was entitled 
to compensation and damages representing, as far as possible, the 
monetary equivalent of restiruclo In integrum. This equivalent, 
whether stated in terms of lucrum cessans and damnum emergence, or of 
full value or going-concern value or market value, corresponded in 
Aminoil's view to the full value of the property, plus the value of 
lost profits. The Tribunal found the arguments of the both parties 
unacceptable. It proceeded to elaborate on two principle elements 
entering into its concept of legitimate expectations. The first was 
the presence of the stabilization clauses. Even through these did 
not forbid a nationalization of Aminoil assets, the Tribunal said 
they nevertheless protected against confiscation and created an 
expectation on the part of concessionaire which had to be taken into 
account. 
(65) 
The second element was that, in the Tribunal's view since 1973 
Aminoil had implicitly accepted that its profit should be restricted 
to a reasonable rate of return, that this concept figured largely in 
the post 1973 
ýegotiations. While conceding that attitudes taken in 
an unsuccessful negotiation "cannot be made the basis of an arbitral 
or judicial decision", the Tribunal asserted nevertheless that this 
record indicated what in fact Aminoil had come to accept and that 
this "moderate estimate of profitsm constituted its legitimate 
expectation. 
(66) 
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7.9 POSITION HELD BY THE IRAN-U. S. TRIBUNAL WITH REGARD TO UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. STATE PRACTICE IN OIL INDUSTRY. AND LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION OF PARTIES, 
In the Amoco and in the PhIllIps Petroleum case the Iran-U. S. Claims 
Tribunal rejected all three arguments which we have been considering 
and which were put forward by the Iranian respondents. 
With regard to the principle of unjust enrichment in the Amoco case, 
the Tribunal dismissed this theory on the ground that the concept was 
used "as a ratio legIs of the applicable rule rather than as the rule 
itself". (67) It argued that in any event, the theory did not support 
the net book value criteria proposed by the respondents. 
(68) The 
Tribunal added that nationalization Ndoes not take place in order to 
disperse, by auction, the assets of the expropriated undertaking, or 
to use them for other purposes". On the contrary, the undertaking is 
nationalized as a going concern to be placed as such under state 
control, with a view to developing its activity and allowing the 
community to benefit fully from its returns". 
(69) Therefore, "the 
value of the expropriated assets as a going concern will be the 
measure of the enrichment of the nationalizing state", and not merely 
the net book value of the assets. 
(70) 
Concerning state practice in the oil industry, the Tribunal in the 
PhIllIps Petroleum case noted that: 0 ... such settlements are usually 
confidential and appear frequently to involve additional 
consideration, such as continued access to petroleum resources, so 
that the true compensation may be difficult to identify". 
(71) 
Examining the AmInoll award, the Tribunal concluded that "such 
settlements do not constitute an opinlo jurls" . Further 
it stated 
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that "in any event, such settlements are irrelevant to the applicable 
Aaw in the present case, that is the standard of compensation set 
forth in the Treaty of Amity". (72) 
In addition, in the Amoco case, endorsing the view expressed by the 
I. C. J. in Barcelona Traction case, 
(73) the Tribunal found that the 
provisions of settlement agreements in the oil industry are the 
outcome of negotiations in which many motivations other than legal 
ones may have prevailed and therefore concluded that these agreements 
cannot be considered as evidence of customary rules of international 
law. (74) 
With regard to the concept of the legitimate expectation of the 
parties, while the Tribunal recognized that legitimate expectations 
was a concept that was central to the Aminoll award, it rejected its 
application to the Amoco case on the ground that "the high level of 
returns obtained on the investment in the first years of the Khemco 
Agreement would normally have given birth to expectations of 
substantial revenues for the following years and, accordingly, of a 
higher level of compensation in cases of expropriation". 
(75) The 
Tribunal found no proof, in any event, that these expectations were 
limited to the net book value of the undertaking. 
The Tribunal ruled that the correct method of valuing the 
expropriated updertaking was "the full value of the asset taken" or 
"the full equivalent of the property". The expropriated undertaking 
should be considered as "a going concern" and the going concern value 
encompassed "not only the physical and financial assets of the 
undertaking, but also the intangible values which contribute to its 
earning power, such as contractual rights ... as well as goodwill and 
commercial prospects". 
(76) The intangible assets, explained the 
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Tribunal, are closely linked to the profitability of the concern; 
they cannot and must not be confused with the financial 
capitalization of the revenues which might be generated by such a 
concern after the transfer of property resulting from the 
(77) expropriation (lucrum cessans) 
Having described the principles on which the Tribunal proceeds in 
determining the issue of compensation, and the considerations which 
it regards as irrelevant, we are now in a position to consider 
precisely how it handles the issue of the valuation. 
288 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
See Department of State, Application of the Treaty of Amity to 
Expropriation in Iran, reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. S16055 
(daily ed. No. 14,1983). See also R. Smith, 'The United 
States Government Perspective on Expropriation and Investment 
in Developing Countries', 9 Vand. J. Transn'l Law. 1976, 
pp. 517,519-20. 
2. See American International Group v The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 4 Iran-U. S. C. Trib. Reports, 1983, p. 96. See also INA 
Case, INA Corp. v The Government of Islamic Republic of Iran, 
1985,8 Iran-U. S. C. Trib. Reports, p. 373, and Thomas Earl 
Payne v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 
Iran-U. S. C. Trib. Reports, 1986, p. 3. 
3. See Amoco International Finance Corp. v The Covernment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 1987,15 Iran-U. S. C. Trib. Reports, 
P. 189. 
4.: Ibid, p. 234. 
5-, Ibid. 
6 See C. F. Charles Leben, "Les investissements miniers 
internationaux dans les pays en development: Reflexions sur la 
decennie ecoulee", (1976-1986), 1986, pp. 895-957. Hussain 
Abdallah, The economics of Petroleum, 2nd ed., Cairo, 1979, (in 
Arabic). M. Yousef Elwan, The Legal Regirne for the 
Exploitation of Petroleum in the Arab Countries, Kuwait, 1982; 
Zuhair Mikdashi, Transnational Oil: Issues, Policies and 
Perspectives, London, 1986, and A. Z. El Chiati, "Protection of 
Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreements", Recuieil 
Des Cours, 1987, IV, p. 26. 
7. See P. Weil, "Les clauses de stabilisation ou d' intangibilite 
inserees dans les accords de developpment economique", in 
Mellanges offerts a Charles Rousseau, 1974, p. 319. 
8. See P. J. O'Keefe, "United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources", 8 J. W. T. Law, 1974; and Gamble and 
Frankowska, 'International Law's Response to the New 
International Economic Order: An Overview', 9 B. C. Int'l & 
Comp. L. Journal, 1986, p. 257,265-68. 
9. ' P. Weil,, op cit. 
10. Amoco case, op cit, p. 234. 
11. Ibid. 
12. See D. W. Bowett, 'State Contracts With Aliens: Contemporary 
Developments on Compensation For Termination or Breach". B. Y. 
Int'l Law, 1989, p. 49. 
13. Ibid. 
289 
. 
14. See e. g. 74, Department State Bulletin 138,1976. See also 
Department State, Application of the Treaty of Amity to 
Expropriation in Iran op cit; and B. M. Clagett, D. B. Poneman, 
'The Treatment of Economic Injury to Aliens in the Revised 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law' , The Int'l Lawyer, Vol. 22, No., 1988, p. 63. 
15. Chorzow Factory case, (Cermany v Poland), 1928, P. C. I. J., 
Series A No. 17. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid, at 46. 
18. Ibid, at 47. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Amoco case, op cit, p. 244. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. See Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v Iran, in Vol. 21, Iran-U. S. 
C. Trib. Reports, 1989, p. 121. 
24. See G. Roy, "Is the Law of State Responsibility a part of 
Universal International Law', 55, A. J. Int'l Law, 1961, p. 863; 
and R. P. Anand, Asian States and International Law (New Delhi), 
1973. 
25. See N. Girvan, "The Question of Compensation: A Third World 
Perspective", Van. J. Transn'l Law, 1976, p. 340. 
26. M. Sornarajah, "Compensation For Expropriation: The Emergence 
of New Standards', J. World T. Law, 1979, p. 113. 
27. Girvan, op cit. 
28. R. B. Lillich, "The Valuation of Copper Companies in the Chilean 
Nationalization", 66, A. S. Int'l Law, 1972, at 213. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. See also F. Orego-Vicuna, "Some International Law 
Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by 
Chile", 67, A. J. Int'l Law, 1973, p-711. 
31. Ibid. 
32. See 13, I. L. M., 1974,1190; and 14 I. L. M., 1975, p. 136. 
33. See cases reported in 12, I. L. M. 1973, p. 270 and 278 and 13. 
I. L. M. op cit, p. 1115. 
34. Ibid. 
290 
35. Sornarajah, op cit, p. 125. 
36. J. Rohwer, 'Nationalization Chilean Excess Profits 
Deduction", H. Harvard. J. Int'l Law, 1973, p. 378. 
37. See C. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to 
Aliens (London), 1968, p. 158. 
38. Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976. 
39. L. Rood, 'Compensation for Takeovers in Africa', 11 J. Int'l L 
& Economics, 1977. p. 521 & 525. 
40. F. G. Dawson and I. G. Head, International Law, National 
- Tribunals and the Rights of Aliens, (Syracuse), 1971, p. 232. 
41. American International Group v The Islamic Republic of Iran, op 
cit, pp. 103-104. 
42. Amoco case, op cit. 
43. See Phillips Petroleum Co. case, op cit, p. 121. 
44. Ibid. 
45. See D. Chr. Dicke, "Unjust Enrichment and Compensation' in 
Foreign Investment in the Present and a New International 
Economic Order, (Ed. by D. Chr. Dicke), 1987, p. 268. 
46. See J. de -Ar6chaga, International Law in the past third of a Century, RCADI, 1978, Vol. 1, p. 299. 
47. See W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, 
(London), 1964, p. 207. 
48. See R. B. Lillich, 'The Valuation of Copper Companies', op cit. 
49. See Sornarajah, op cit, p. 120. 
50. See R. G. J. de Arechaga, "State Responsibility for the 
Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property', 11 N. Y. U. J. Int'l 
Law & Pol. , 1978, p. 179. See also S. Chowdhury, Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources In International Law, 1,13 
(K. Hossain & S. Chowdhury eds. ), 1984. 
51. Ibid. 
52. See R. Dolzer, "New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of 
Alien Propertym, A. J. Int'l Law, 1981, p. 580. 
53. Ibid. See also in Friedmann, op cit. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
56. See H. Lauterpacht, I. L. R., Vol. 40, p. 175. See also A. 
Shirazi, ', Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal: An Unfair International 
291 
Award on the Basis of Unjust Enrichment', 5 J. Intl Arb., 
1988, p. 124. 
57. OPEC Guidelines were linked with Abu Dhabi terms. At a meeting 
in Abu Dhabi in November 1974, certain OPEC countries imposed 
on their major producers increases: a royalty rate of 20 
percent and a tax rate of 85 percent, both on posted prices 
(the postings since October 1973 having been fixed unilaterally 
by the OPEC governments). These increases together with other 
related adjustments were substantially adopted by OPEC as a 
whole and became known as the ', Abu Dhabi Formula". See Ahmed 
Abdel Hamid Achouch, The Legal Regime of Concession Agreements, 
(in Arabic), Cairo, 1975, op cit. 
58. See Brower, 'Recent Developments in the International Law of 
Expropriation and Compensation", The Southwestern Legal 
Foundation, 1975, p. 153. 
59. See 21 I. L. M. 976-1053,1982. See also R. Young and W. L. Owen, 
'Valuation of the Aminoil Award' in R. B. Lillich, Valuation of 
Nationalized Properr7 in International Law, (ed. ), 1987, pp. 8- 
9. 
60. Ibid, p. 11. 
61. See paras 152-153 of the Award in 21 I. L. M., op cit. 
62. Award, para 164. 
63. Ibid, paras 165-166. 
64. See Amoco case, op cit, p. 267. 
65. See the AmInoll case, op cit, paras 152-153 of the Award in 21 
I. L. M., op cit. 
66. Ibid, para 154. 
67. See Amoco case, op cit, p. 268. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid, p. 267. 
70. Ibid, p. 269. 
71. See Phililps Petroleum case, op cit, p. 121. 
72. Ibid. 
73. See I. C. J. Report, 1970, p. 3. 
74. Amoco case, op cit, p. 266. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. p. 269, the Tribunal noted that its formulation of the 
measure of compensation corresponded with the Aminoil ruling, 
292 
according to which the going concern value is "made up of the 
values of the various components of the undertaking separately 
considered, and of the undertaking itself considered as an 
organic totality, for going concerns, therefore as a unified 
whole, the value of which is greater than that of its component 
parts". 
77. Ibid. 
293 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE TRIBUNAL AND THE CALCULATION 
OF 'FULL' COMPENSATION 
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In Chapter 6 of this study we saw that the Tribunal has concluded 
that 'full compensation' must be paid by an expropriating state. In 
Chapter 7, which analysed the view point of the parties regarding 
this standard, we saw inter alla that American claimants have argued 
that the full value of the property taken means the fair market value 
of the nationalized or expropriated property plus the value of lost 
profits. In the present chapter, we shall examine how the Tribunal 
itself has interpreted the concept of 'full compensation' in its 
awards. 
8.1 THE TRIBUNAL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 'FULL COMPENSATION' 
STANDARD 
In several cases concerning expropriation or nationalization the 
Tribunal has applied the principle that under the standard of full 
compensation the deprived owner is entitled to the fair market value 
of his property as of the date of taking. Thus in the INA case('), 
for instance, the Tribunal held that: "The full equivalent of the 
property taken" to which the claimant was entitled meant, "the fair 
market value of its shares in Bimeh Shargh, assessed as of the date 
of Ithe nationalization". 
(2) Similarly in the American International 
Group case, the Tribunal stated that: 
'the valuation should be made on the basis of the fair 
market value of the shares in Iran America (i *e (3) the 
natiorlalized company) at the date of nationalization'. 
In the Starrett case, 
(4) 
as well as in the INA case, the Tribunal has 
defined the principle of fair market value as "the price that a 
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller in circumstances in which 
each had good information, each desired to maximise his financial 
gain and neither was, under duress or threat". 
(5) 
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Determining the market value of property where there is an effective 
market such as a stock exchange valuation for the property, seems 
straightforward. However, very often in practice due to lack of such 
active market for the property, ascertaining the exact market value 
of the property will be problematic. Thus the Tribunal in the 
American International Group case stated "there has not been an 
active market for Iran-America's shares" 
(6) 
and went on to determine 
the equivalent of the market value through indirect methods which 
will be discussed later. However, even if hypothetical market value 
can somehow be approximated, other questions demand consideration. 
Circumstances such as changing economic and political factors will 
often complicate the task of determining what is the fair market 
value of the property taken. As we will see, the Tribunal has paid 
considerable attention to such factors and as a result the 
compensation awarded has often been substantially less than the 
amount claimed. 
8.2 VALUATION METHODS 
When the nationalized or expropriated property is an on-going 
commercial enterprise, and there is no existing market, the full 
compensation (in the sense of the closest equivalent to the actual 
market value) has to be computed on the basis of the going-concern 
approach which must now be explained. 
8.2.1 GOING-CONCERN VALUE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Going concern value has been defined as "the full value of the 
property, business or rights in question as an income producing 
asset". 
(7) Therefore this method of valuation not only considers the 
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value of the physical assets of the enterprise, but also "takes into 
account the loss of future profits and, often, such intangible assets 
as goodwill as well". 
(8) Clagett states: 
"Value is a forward-looking concept. At any given time, the 
value of an income -producing asset will depend primarily 
upon the net cash flow it is expected to generate in the 
future, "discounted" (reduced) to a 'present value' (value 
as of the valuation date) at a percentage rate that fully 
accounts both fo, 5 the time value of money and for all 
relevant risks". (9 
Implicit in the notion of going-concern value is the goal of making 
the owner whole after his loss. It is believed an investor in an on- 
going business cannot be placed in the same financial position he was 
in before the expropriation unless he is paid the going concern value 
of the expropriated investment as of the date of expropriation, 
calculated as if the expropriatory act had not occurred and business 
had-not been threatened. In other words, as was pointed out in the 
Sapphire award, the deprived person should be placed "in the same 
pecuniary position that they [sic] would have been in if the contract 
had been performed in the manner provided for by the parties at the 
time of its conclusion". 
(10) This attitude has been expressed by 
both the International Court of Justice and international arbitral 
tribunals. 
8.2.2 INTERNATIONAL COURT 
The principle of going-concern value was concisely expressed by the 
F. C. I. J. in the Chorzow Factor7 case. 
(") The Court held that the 
monetary compensation due, for a foreign investor as reparation for a 
taking, must be determined from the full economic value of the 
interests taken based on the valuation of the enterprise as an on- 
going prof it- generating business. The Court held that, if the 
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investor seeks damages rather than restitution in kind, the damages 
should equal "a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in 
kind would bear", plus "damages for loss sustained which would not be 
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it. . ... 
(12) In 
fact, the Court recognised that the amount of damages due in place of 
restitution depends directly upon the ability of the expropriated 
enterprise to generate future profits. 
. International arbitral decisions rendered after the Chorzow Factor7 
case also have declared that an investor cannot be fully compensated 
for the going concern value of his- expropriated interests unless he 
is awarded both the damage that has been sustained as a result of the 
taking and the reasonably ascertainable profit that has been missed. 
In the Lena Goldfields(13) arbitration, for example, the Tribunal 
held that the proper measure of damages was "the present value, if 
paid, in cash now, of future profits which the Company would have 
made and which the Government now can make on the assumption of good 
commercial management and the best technical skill and up-to-date 
development". (14) 
As we saw in Chapter 1, future profitability also was considered in 
the LightHouses arbitration. 
(15) In this arbitration, the 
arbitrators refused to consider Greece's arguments that the 
subsequent upheaval of World War II would have reduced the 
profitability of the lighthouses in the hands of the French 
owner. 
(16) Accordingly, in calculation of compensation the 
disregarding of subsequent events became an element in determining 
the international law standard. 
liowever, as we shall now explain, decisions made by later tribunals 
seem to provide no support for taking into account lost profits in 
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such cases, although it can be argued that in general they have 
supported the application of the full compensation standard. First 
we must analyse decisions of various tribunals and then we shall 
examine the Iran-U. S. Tribunal's decisions specifically. 
8.2.3 DECISIONS IN VARIOUS OIL EXPROPRIATIONS 
Three significant arbitration decisions resulted from the Libyan 
nationalizations in the 1970s of the interest and properties of 
various international oil companies. 
(17) In the BP arbitration(18) 
the sole arbitrator determined that the appropriate remedy for the 
expropriation was the award of damages rather than restirutio In 
integrum, but no award on the amount of damages was reached because 
the dispute was finally settled by the parties for an agreed 
amount. 
(19) 
In the TopcoICALASIATIC arbitration(20) the sole arbitrator held that 
rescItutio in Integrum was the appropriate remedy. Therefore it was 
not necessary for the arbitrator to address in detail the proper 
compensation standard or methods of valuation when damages are 
awarded. 
In the Liamco case(21) the award, which was published in 1981, 
recited and then rejected the arguments for a full compensation 
standard that included lost profits: 
"These arguments cannot be taken as relevant in this 
connection, because they are mostly vague and difficult to 
apply in practice. Moreover, they are not conclusive on the 
matter at issue, because international legal theory and 
practice are not yet in agreement on one general uniform 
rule in this respect. 
The classical doctrine required the payment of 'adequate' 
compensation for the nationalized property of an alien. 
Adequate compensation... had to include "lucrum cessans", 
namely the loss of future profits from property which as 
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invested capital or a concessionary right granted for a 
specific number of years". 
This classical doctrine was not always accepted, neither in 
the inter-war period nor after World War II. Adequate 
compensation as including loss of 
_profits, 
such as was 
awarded in the old above mentioned arbitral decisions (e. g. 
in Delagoa and Shufeldt cases], was not more acceptable as 
an imperative general rule. It retains only the value of a 
technical rule for the assessment of compensation, and a 
useful guide in reaching settlement agreement, as was well 
and justly asserted. It stands only as a maximum rarely 
attained in practice. 
In conclusion, it may be safely laid down that it is lawful 
to nationalize concession rights before the expiry of the 
concession term, provided that the measure be not 
discriminatory nor in breach of treaty, and provided that 
compensation be duly paid. 
But the question whether or not the concessionaire may claim 
compensation for all the loss of future profits for the 
unexpired term is still ac ntroversial point which has not 
been definitely settled". 
( 5 
The arbitrator awarded Liamco an amount he deemed to constitute 
"equitable" compensation and the claim was then finally settled by 
confidential agreement. 
(23) 
A fourth international arbitration decision involved the 
determination of full compensation by Kuwait for the expropriation of 
(24) Aminoil This is the most recent award involving the 
nationalization of rights under oil concession agreements. It was 
rendered in 1982 just as the Iran-U. S. Tribunal was just getting 
under way. While the award in this case refers to the going concern 
value of the concession including the 'legitimate expectations of the 
owners' , 
it was found, on the facts of this case, that only a 
"moderate estimate of profits" was justified. 
(25 This appears to 
have produced a set of compromise awards based on differing reports 
by accountants for the opposing parties. In that case the Tribunal 
said: 
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"In order to calculate the amount of indemnification due, 
the Tribunal has available to it numerous elements furnished 
by the parties and by the experts they have commissioned for 
that purpose. In particular, the Tribunal has had available 
to it the Joint Report dated 30 October 1981, referred to in 
paragraph 120 above. This Report had been the subject of 
Head X of the Order of the Tribunal of 1 July 1981, which 
stated: 
'The takes note of the mutual intention of the parties to 
direct their respective accountants to produce, if possible, 
a joint report on questions of quantum or, if this is not 
possible, to produce separate reports for the Tribunal 
before 1 November'. 
Having given careful consideration to this Report and to the 
analyses, statements and counter statements to be found in 
the written proceedings and furnished by counsel and experts 
during the oral hearing, the Tribunal is pursuaded that it 
is not indispensable for the final adjustment of the present 
case to hear the parties again on matters of quantum, and 
the parties were so informed in a communication from the 
Secretary of the Tribunal. Where there are differences 
between the accounting firms above mentioned, tht Tribunal 
has taken the mean of the two totals indicated". 
(2 ) 
However, practice is not at all consistent. Although in the AmInoll 
case a moderate estimate of profits was awarded, as we saw in Chapter 
1 of this study, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, deciding the 
Banco Naclonal de Cuba, (27) rejected lost profit in its decision. 
The Court- pointed out that the revolution and its economic 
consequences .... made it unlikely that the Chase Manhattan Bank 
could operate profitably after the Revolution. 
(28) Thus this 
11 decision appeared to contradict the Lighthouses arbitration principle 
that events and circumstances subsequent to taking should not be 
taken into account in fixing the compensation due for expropriation. 
It is also notable that the ICSID Arbitration in its recent decision 
with regard to the case of Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) 
(1990), (29 ) rejected compensating for future profits. As we saw in 
Chapter 6, that case involved a claim for compensation for the total 
loss of claimants' investment in Sri Lanka. Claimant sought 
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compensation for physical and financial assets, and $5,703,677 for 
other claimed damages, including loss of tangible assets and future 
profits. 
(30) The respondent argued that international tribunals are 
bound to project future profits on the basis of the past and that 
Serendib (the Company in which AAPL held shares) offered no basis for 
making any such projections. 
(31) Furthermore, the respondent argued 
that the assessment of the value of lost crops was too speculative 
and indefinite to be included in a proper evaluation of damage under 
international law. The Tribunal examined the relevant circumstances 
and rejected all the claims regarding intangible assets and future 
profits. 
(32) 
Therefore, as the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal was getting underway in 
1981, the extent to which going-concern value should involve lost 
profits as part of the compensation due in cases of compensation or 
nationalization, remained a controversial issue. With this as 
background we can now examine the interpretation of going-concern 
value in the awards of the Iran-U. S. Tribunal. 
8.3 GOING CONCERN VALUATION IN THE TRIBUNAL AWARDS 
In -takings which involve ongoing business enterprises the Tribunal 
has ruled that in principle to satisfy the standard of full 
compensation the expropriated enterprise must be valued as a going 
concern. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal in the American International Group 
case(33) stated: 
"The appropriate method is to value the company as a going 
concern, taking into account not only the net book value of 
its assets but also such elements as goodwill and likely 
profitability, had the company been al owed to continue its 
business under its former management". 
(ý4) 
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This in a going-concern valuation a crucial question is how to 
forecast future profitability, i. e. what should and should not be 
taken into account in such calculation. 
8.3.1 GENERAL VALUATION MAXIM 
According to the traditional western approach illustrated in the 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property Adopted by 
OECD in 1967, (35) "the value must remain unaffected by .... the very 
seizure which ultimately occurs, similar seizures by the Party 
concerned or the general conduct of the Party towards the property of 
Aliens which makes seizures likely". (36) Thus (1) changes in the 
host country, either political or economic, and (2) the act of 
expropriation, should not be taken into account for the purpose of 
valuation. 
In line with this approach, the Tribunal in several cases has 
confirmed that in the calculation of the market value "or any 
diminution of the value to the taking itself or the anticipation 
thereof"(37) should be disregarded, as should any specific "actions 
taken by the nationalizing state in relation to the enterprise which 
actions may have depressed its value". 
(38) 
Moreover, the Tribunal in the American International Group 
disregarded the effects of events that occurred subsequent to the 
nationalization, declaring: 
"Neither the effects of the very act of nationalization 
should be taken into account nor the effect o events that 
occurred subsequent to the nationalization". 
(3 
J 
Although in the above cases the Tribunal disregarded political or 
economic changes prior to and after the taking, in other cases it has 
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taken account of such changes. 
(40) Surprisingly, while the Tribunal 
in the American International Group without any hesitation held that 
such changes should be disregarded, at the same time it held that: 
"Prior changes in the general political, social and economic 
conditions which might have affected the enterprise's 
business prospects as oi the date the enterprise was taken 
should be considered". 
(4 ) 
However, the Tribunal was clear that it should not take account of 
the very impact of the nationalization, for it stated that "it is 
necessary to exclude the effects of actions taken by the 
nationalizing state in relation to the enterprise which actions may 
have depressed its value". 
(42) Nevertheless, it considered such 
political and economic changes prior to the nationalization stating 
"whether such changes are ephemeral or long-term will determine their 
impact upon the value of the enterprise's future prospects". 
(43) It 
was in part due to this conclusion that the Tribunal reduced the 
amount of $39,100,100 claimed by the claimant and ended up with 
$10,000,000 as the approximate value of the property in question. 
This holding of the Tribunal has been criticized by the agent of the 
U. S. to the Tribunal. He alleged "there is no legal justification 
for diminishing the going-concern value of claimant's property on the 
basis of events surrounding the revolution for which the present 
government of Iran is largely responsible". 
(44) 
However, the Tribunal's decision was not unprecedented. As we saw 
earlier, in 1981 the American Second Circuit Court of Appeals, also 
considered, and changed in its decision. Moreover, the impact of 
these changes has been repeated in other awards of the Tribunal. 
(45) 
Furthermore, in some awards of the Tribunal the nature of the 
expropriated property has been considered as well. 
(46) Each of these 
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cases held that the value of the Corporations, which were 
expropriated after the culmination of the Revolution, had to be 
reduced by the business outlook then prevailing. 
(47) As a result, as 
we shall now see, the Tribunal has approximated the value of the 
property. 
8.3.2 APPROXIMATION AS THE METHOD OF GOING-CONCERN VALUATION 
Just as the Tribunal in the American International Group case 
resorted to approximation of the value of the property, it applied 
the same method in Thomas Earl Payne case. 
(48) The claimant in this 
case sought the fair market value of its shares in two expropriated 
electronics and cinematographic parts and servicing companies (Berkeh 
and Irantronics), at $3,000,180 based on the alleged going-concern 
value of the companies. 
(49 ) The claimant calculated his claim on the 
basis of a multiple of 10 times net average earnings for the three 
years preceding the taking. As the business activity principally 
consisted of electronic spare parts sales and distribution of 
Hollywood movies, it seemed evident that such a business activity had 
no future in Islamic Iran. *As Khan points out, "one does not have to 
be greatly knowledgeable to see that business activity of that kind 
had no future in revolutionary Iran based on Islamic ideology and 
fervour". (50) 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran caused drastic decrease in the 
claimant's business because of, as the Iranian Judge Hamid Bahrami 
pointed out, "the disappearance of demand for sales of U. S. 
films". (51) The claimant consequently cut back its business 
activities and left Iran in 1978 and turned over the management of 
the business to the other Iranian shareholders. After the Revolution 
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however it was managed by an appointed temporary manager. The 
Tribunal awarded compensation on the basis of a taking grounded on 
the appointment of a temporary manager. 
(52) 
a point which was 
discussed in Chapter 5. The question related to the present context 
is: should business activity of this kind be considered as a going- 
concern? 
The Tribunal held that companies were to be valued as going- 
concerns. (53) The respondent's contentions to the effect that the 
claimant had abandoned the business because of losses resulting from 
reduced imports, recession, etc. were ignored. The Tribunal all 
found that "the business of the [claimant] ran relatively smoothly, 
although at a much reduced pace, - throughout the Revolution and 
afterwards until the summer of 1980", (when the manager was appointed 
by the Government), and, taking note of the claimant's assertion that 
it had "properly financed (the activity and] salaries and bonuses of 
the employees were regularly paid at the time of the alleged 
expropriation", declared the business a going-concern. However, 
considering that the prospects of the companies had deteriorated due 
to the policies of the new Government, the Tribunal concluded that: 
"that the effects of the Revolution seriously discounted the 
reliability of past performance as an indicator of likely 
future profitability for the two companies and the value of 
their goodwi 1, particularly since they are service 
compa-=ý . 
iý 
Apparently finding confirmation for this conclusion from evidence of 
the claimant's efforts to transfer some of its business out of Iran 
prior to the expropriation, the Tribunal in this case, too, rejected 
the going-concern calculations presented by the claimant. 
(56) 
Instead it again resorted to an approximation of the value of the 
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claimant's interest, and awarded him $900,000 which was less than 
one-third of the amount that had been claimed. 
In the recent award by Chamber Two (filed 28 June 1990), in the CBS 
case, the Tribunal again referred to the impact of the Iranian 
Revolution. The claim in this case involved facts similar to those 
in the Thomas Earl Payne case. Here the claim was for expropriation 
of a servicing and distribution business in Iran that had been formed 
in 1976 to market records and tapes, primarily of Western music, in 
Iran. In concluding the business had a negative net worth on the 
date it was alleged to have been taken, the Tribunal took account of 
the impact of the Iranian Revolution and stated: 
The claimant's valuations also underestimate the adverse 
effects of the Islamic Revolution on the music market, and 
thus on the CBS Iranian companies future business. In 
par 
- 
ticular, in view of the policy of the new Iranian 
government against music, especially Western music, which 
constituted a substantial part of the CBS Iranian Companies' 
field operation, the expectation for these Companies were 
greatly diminished". 
(58) 
In two other cases involving the expropriation of on-going business 
enterprises the Tribunal followed the same attitude as it did in the 
CBS and Thomas Earl Payne cases. Accordingly, in the Phelps Dodge 
case(59) considering the "obvious and significant negative effects of 
the Iranian Revolution" the Tribunal awarded the amount of the 
original investment as the full value of the property in the SolaTile 
case(60) had operated for only a brief period of time, it awarded the 
actual value of physical assets as the market value of the property 
taken. In both cases elements such as going concern value and lost 
future profits were ignored. 
Because these decisions show the Tribunal's approach very clearly, 
they are worth considering in a little more detail. 
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8.3.3 THE AMOUNT OF THE ORIGINAL INVESTMENT AS THE FULL VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY 
In the Phelps Dodge case, the claimant's investment of some $2.5 
million made in mid-1970s in the Iranian cable industry was 
expropriated on 15 November 1980. (61) Phelps Dodge submitted a 
consultant's study which "assumed that the Iranian Revolution would 
have no long-term impact", and estimated the going concern value of 
the claimant's share (19.36 percent) in the Company taken at 
$7,500,000. (62) The Tribunal found that the business had not reached 
the point of a going concern on the date it was expropriated and that 
the business was likely to be diminished as a result of the Iranian 
Revolution. It said: 
"The Tribunal cannot agree that SICAB had become a going 
concern prior to November 1980 so that such elements of 
value as future profits and goodwill could confidently be 
value. In the case of SICAB any conclusion on these matters 
would be highly speculative. While no dimution in value 
should be made because of the anticipation of a taking, the 
Tribunal could not properly ignore the obvious and 
significant negative effects of the Iranian Revolution on 
SICAB's business prospects, at least in the short and medium 
term. There was no market for Phelps Dodge's shares in 
November 1980'. (63) 
Having rejected going concern value as the appropriate measure in 
this case, the Tribunal, without further explanation, awarded the 
amount of Phelps Dodge's original investment: 
"taking into account all relevant evidence, the Tribunal 
concludes that the value of Phelps Dodge's ownership in 
SICAB on 15 November 1980 was equal to its investment, that 
is $2,437,860 the claimants are entitled to compensation in 
that amount. 
(64) 
The U. S. $2,437,860 awarded was less than one third of the U. S. 
$7,500,000 claimed. 
t 
4 
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8.3.4 ACTUAL VALUE OF PHYSICAL ASSETS AS THE FAIR MARKET VALUE 
In the Sola Tiles case, 
(65) in which the business involved the import 
and sale of tiles for luxury housing, going-concern value was 
likewise rejected. In this case, however, the Tribunal rejected the 
going-concern value on the dual grounds that (1) the business had 
operated for only two years during which a loss had been incurred in 
the first year and only a small profit realized during the second 
year, and (2) the impact of the Iranian Revolution was likely to have 
diminished substantially the claimant's prospects for the marketing 
in Iran of luxury'tiles. 
In determining whether the Company qualified as a going concern the 
Tribunal stated: 
"the consideration on which the "goodwill" of Simat rests 
are at best speculative. Goodwill can best be defined, at 
least for the purposes of the present case, as that part of 
a Company's value attributable to its business reputation 
and the relationship it has established with its suppliers 
and customers .... 
Different elements had come into play by the time of the 
expropriation, however. Simat's trade consisted largely of 
the selling of specialized luxury tiles, the market for 
which depended in large measure on the continued 
construction of luxury houses and apartments. The question 
presents itself - though neither party offered evidence on 
this point - whether Simat could have expected to continue 
importing large quantities of tiles without experiencing 
problems in obtaining the renewal of licences, a crucial 
factor bearing in mind that Simat depended exclusively on 
the import of its product to do business. What is even more 
certain is that the market for items such as those imported 
by Simat would have suffered a severe diminution as a result 
of the sweeping social changes brought about by the Islamic 
Revolution. 
The impact of such developments on the value of the goodwill 
element of Simat's business by the time of the expropriation 
in 1979 must have been dramatic. Given the picture that 
emerges, Simat's prospects of continuing active trading 
after the Revolution were not in the view of the Tribunal, 
such as to justify treating Simat as a going concern so as 
to assign any value to goodwill. This decision to assign no 
value to Simat's goodwill suggests a similar result as to 
future lost profits, which also depend upon the business 
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prospects of a going concern. In addition, Simat had the 
briefest past record of profitability, having shown a loss 
in 1976, its irst year of trading, and a small profit the 
next year". 
(665 
Accordingly, the Tribunal did not assign any value to future lost 
profits and therefore did not decide the question whether and to what 
extent lost profit can be claimed in expropriation cases in addition 
to the going concern value. 
Although the Tribunal rejected the inclusion of future lost profit in 
its valuation of the expropriated business, at the same time it 
recognized that the business did have some market value and that the 
compensation to be awarded should be based on that value. It then 
proceeded to itemize what it saw as the elements of the business and 
place a value on each of these elements of the business and submitted 
by the claimant. Finally it concluded the market value consisted of 
$525,000 as the actual value of physical assets, including inventory, 
and a "reasonable estimate of accounts receivable... .,, 
(67) 
amounting 
to U. S. $100,000 for a total award of U. S. $625,000. This amounted 
to less than twenty percent of the U. S. $3,208,000 that had been 
claimed in the case. 
Another award belonging to this category was rendered by the Tribunal 
in the INA case. The Tribunal in this case regarded the original 
investment of the claimant as an estimate of the market value of the 
claimant's property as a going concern, as we shall now explain. 
8.3.5 THE AMOUNT OF ORIGINAL INVESTMENT AS AN ESTIMATE 
OF ITS MARKET VALUE 
On 17 December 1981 the INA Corporation, filed with the Tribunal a 
claim for compensation for the expropriation of its 20 percent share 
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holding in Bimeh Shargh (Public Joint Stock Company), an Iranian 
insurance company. INA claimed US $285,000 representing what it 
alleged to be the going concern value of its shares. 
(68) 
INA accepted that "its compensation would have been greater if a 
valuation had been made to project future profits and discount them 
to present value as of the date of nationalization". But the 
claimant considered that mthe expense of such a valuation was not 
warranted in view of the relatively small amount equal to its 
purchase price for the shar4ýs". 
(69) The Respondent however, 
contended that Shargh had a negative net worth between the date of 
purchase of the shares and the date of nationalization (i. e. June 
1978-1979). 
In order to show that nothing had occurred to lessen the value of the 
shares prior to nationalization, the claimant submitted balance 
sheets for the three years ending 20 March 1979. These were based in 
part on regular annual audits conducted by an Iranian firm of public 
accountants, Daghigh & Co. The statements showed that Shargh was 
financially sound and was gradually increasing its profitability. 
(70) 
The Respondent, on the other hand, based its contention on an audit 
conducted after nationalization by another Iranian firm of public 
accountants, Amin & Co. At the hearing the Claimant and the 
Respondent reached agreement on the basic figures shown in the 
financial statements submitted by the claimant. However, the 
Respondent contended that the audit by Amin, which covered only the 3 
months between the last Daghigh audit and the nationalization, 
revealed that the figures submitted by the claimant had to be 
qualified and supplemented, and that this resulted in a negative net 
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worth. The Respondent also contended that the last Daghigh report 
'itself contained footnotes indicating that Shargh was not profitable. 
The Tribunal examined the Daghigh and Amin reports and found that the 
balance sheets and testimony submitted by the claimant were 
convincing evidence that Shargh's value "had, if anything, increased 
in the year following INAs investment". 
(71) The Tribunal further 
pointed out that "neither the footnotes to the Daghigh report nor the 
Amin report deny this conclusion". Accordingly, it concluded that 
-the claimant's proposal to value the shares according to their 
-purchase price "appears not only reasonable but, in fact, 
conservative". 
(71) An amount corresponding to the original 
investment ($285,000) was consequently awarded as representing the 
ýfair market value of the shares. 
It is interesting to note that a similar method was used by an ICSID 
tribunal in Benvenut! et Bonfant v People's Republic of Congo case 
(1980). (72) In this case, the claimant, an Italian corporation, had 
agreed with the respondent to establish a bottle company ('Plascol) 
which commenced production in 1975. One year later, the claimant's 
interests was expropriated, or more precisely was subjected to what 
the Tribunal regarded as a kind of defacto expropriation. (73) The 
claimant asserted that the business should be valued as a going 
concern based on projected profits over the period for which it had 
been guaranteeA participation in the Congolese company. The Tribunal 
appointed an expert to value the Company based on its projected 
profits. The expert, however, considering the short operational 
history of Plasco and other circumstances, held that a valuation 
based on profit projection would be inappropriate. 
(74) Instead, the 
expert characterized the amount of the recent investment as "the best 
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objective criterion available". (75) Pellonp, 11 has pointed out that 
"in case of relatively new investments, which have not developed 
income producing capacity justifying the value of lost profits, the 
actual amount of the investment presumptively can be taken to reflect 
the full value of the property in the most objective way". 
(76 ) As we 
shall now see, the Iran-U. S. Tribunal has taken the same view. 
8.4 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (D. C. F. ) IN THE AWARDS OF THE TRIBUNAL 
Discounted cash flow is a basic approach to going concern valuation 
utilized in international arbitral practice, to determine the present 
value of the projected future profits which the undertaking is 
expected to generate in its lifetime. 
(77) This approach seems 
particularly useful where the property interest in question consists 
mainly or solely of future earning expectations. This was the case 
in Amco v Indonesia(78) which was decided by an ICSID arbitral panel. 
In this case, which concerned the revocation of an investment licence 
granted with a view to the construction and management of a hotel, 
the "only prejudice to be taken into account for awarding damages" 
was the loss of the right to operate the hotel. 
(79 ) The Tribunal in 
this case stated that: 
"While there are several methods of valuation of going- 
concerns, the most appropriate one in the present case is to 
establish the net present value of the business, based on a 
reasonable projection of the foreseeable net cash flow 
during the period to be considered, said net cash flow being 
discouýted in order to take into account the assessment of 
the damages at the time of the prejudice, while in the 
normal course of events, the cash flow would have been 
spread oý8O)the whole period of operation of the 
business". 
According to this case, DCF consists of: (a) the projection of the 
revenue (net cash flow) to be generated by an income producing asset 
over its lifetime, and (b) the discounting of this amount so as to 
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make it reflect the present value (or in the case of expropriation or 
nationalization, the value as of the date of the taking) of the 
future earnings. For the second element of the calculation a 
discount rate has to be determined which takes into account factors 
such as inflation and risks connected with the particular investment 
as investors require the projected cash flow of an asset to account 
for these factors. 
While DCF method was applied in the Amoco case the Iran-U. S. Claims 
Tribunal has taken different approaches. As we saw earlier with 
regard to the American International Group; Phelps Dodge; Sola Tiles; 
and Thomas Earl Payne cases, notwithstanding that claimants had 
claimed their compensation calculated on going-concern value, the 
Tribunal only approximated the full value of the properties in 
question. And in the Amoco International Finance Corporation(81) 
case, which was considered an enterprise with a long life expectancy, 
the Tribunal, as we shall see, expressly doubted the utility of this 
method in valuation. The DCF method has so far been used only in 
Starrerr(82) and Phillips Pecroleum(83) although in the latter case 
the Tribunal referred to a method described as "an underlying asset 
valuation approach", a method in assessing revenue-producing 
potential which accords more emphasis to actual investment than to 
forecasts of expected cash flows. 
(84) We shall examine the 
application of ýCF methods in these three cases in turn. 
8.4.1 D. C. F. IN STARRETT HOUSING CORPORATION V IRAN(85) 
In the Starrett case the main claimant, Starrett Housing Corporation, 
had been engaged in a big housing project adjacent to Tehran. To 
carry out the project, Starrett Housing Corporation had created 
6 
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through its subsidiary companies, an Iranian corporation called the 
Shah Goli Apartment Company of which it owned 79.9 percent. For 
management of the project Starrett Housing had created another 
Iranian subsidiary, called the Starrett Construction Corporation 
Family. 
In an interlocutory award in 1983, the Tribunal found that by 31 
January 1980, Starrett's interest in the two companies had been 
expropriated. 
(85) The Tribunal also found that the property interest 
expropriated by the Government of Iran must be deemed to comprise the 
"physical property as well as the right to manage the project and to 
complete the construction in accordance with the Basic Project 
Agreement and related agreements, and to deliver the apartments and 
collect the proceeds of the sales as provided in the Apartment 
Purchase Agreements". (86) In this award, in fact, the claimant's 
assertion of contractual rights, including the one to 'complete the 
project' and earn 'reasonable profits' as 'anticipated' were 
recognized and formulated by the Tribunal as the right to %manage' 
and 'complete' the project and to **deliver' the apartments and 
'collect the proceeds' of the sale as laid down in the agreement. 
(87) 
Proceeds of the sales would, of course, include profits; but the 
profits in the case constitute a component of the predetermined sale 
price of the apartments and are limited in time to the completion and 
sale. 
Recognizing that the valuation of such a property interest 'involves 
complex accounting matters' the Tribunal asked expert opinion on the 
value of the project "considering as he deems appropriate the 
discounted cash flow method of valuation" and "on the net profit" 
315 
The Tribunal and the Calculation of 'Full' Compensation 
that the claimant "would reasonably have received through the 
management fees paid" to it. 
(") 
The terms of reference were sharply criticized by both the American 
and the Iranian arbitrators. Judge Holtzmann characterized the terms 
of reference as "needlessly muddled and doubted whether the 
'discounted cash flow method' which is typically used to value going 
concern with a long future expectancy of continuing business" was 
appropriate for valuing a short term construction project such as the 
one involved in the Starrett claim. 
(89) The Iranian arbitrator, 
Judge Kashani, strongly criticized the act of appointing an expert to 
value a project that was far from complete and a "company in a state 
of insolvency and bankruptcy [that] can never be compared to that of 
a going-concern which is effectively maintaining its operations". 
(90) 
The expert valuation of the assets and property rights taken, was 
eventually presented to the Tribunal. It was based on the fair 
market value defined as "the price at which a willing seller would 
sell it on condition that none of the two parties are under any kind 
of duress and that both parties have good information about all 
relevant circumstances involved in the purchase". 
(91) The expert 
used two valuation methods: (1) the company's assets and liabilities 
were valued on the basis of its net book value; (2) the determination 
of the fair market value of the claimant in the company expropriated 
was done by suýtracting its adjusted book value from its fair market 
value, so as to determine the amount of profit it would have made, 
assuming its one -proj ect- status, the prospect of liquidation, etc. 
The claimants endorsed the expert's valuation model, in particular 
the application of the DCF method. The respondents did not oppose 
the expert's theoretical concept of fair market value as the model 
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employed for valuation, but contested the result of the valuation, 
especially the expert's estimate of future revenues. 
(92) The expert 
had determined the fair market value of the project by applying the 
DCF method, according to which the expected cash flow for the 
remaining lifetime of the project was determined and then discounted 
back to its present value. In order to establish the net cash flow 
of the project the expert had drawn up a forecast of future revenue 
and remaining cost. The main differences between the parties related 
to the expected revenues which were calculated by the expert by 
taking into account the number of apartments available for sale after 
the date of valuation; the price level of unsold apartments; the 
applicability of the exclusion clause; and the possibility of selling 
extra parking spaces. 
Based on the above elements, the expert calculated the future 
revenues to be Rials 14,800 (at approximately 70 Rials to a U. S. 
dollar) million, and the remaining costs at Rials 8,689 million. 
Discounting the project cash flow at the rate of 28 percent to 
account for (I) the rate of inflation, (II) the rate of real 
interest, and (III) the rate of risk, the expert calculated the fair 
market value of the project as of 31 January 1980 (the date 
determined by the Tribunal as when expropriation had taken place) to 
be Rials 4,754 million. 
(93) 
In calculating future revenues the expert and the Tribunal were 
confronted with the application of the principle mentioned earlier, 
namely that the expropriatory act itself and its effect on the value 
of the property in question should be disregarded, while general 
social and economic changes and their impact on the value of the 
property should be taken into account. 
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The issue of what falls under such general social and economic 
Changes arose in connection with the establishment of the 
hypothetical prices for apartments which would not be sold until 
after 31 January 1980. In this connection the expert looked for the 
last sales before the said date "that were representative and for 
which he was able to establish the pricesm, (94) then adjusted such 
prices so as to reflect inflation up to October 1980, when he 
estimated that a "reasonable businessman" would have offered the 
apartments for sale. The information available concerning the actual 
final sales before 31 January 1980 was from 1979, but the expert 
disregarded this on the ground that these sales represented 
abnormally low prices which were due to the temporary revolutionary 
turmoil, and as such were not representative of normal market prices. 
Instead, he selected as a basis the sale price levels in April 
1978(95) Accepting this, the Tribunal noted that: 
'While it is recognized that the general changes in social, 
political and economic conditions created by the Islamic 
Revolution would endure following 31 January 1980, these 
must be distinguished from the temporarily uncertain 
circumstances tha6 affected buyers in the unsettled wake of ( 6) the Revolution'. 
The principle that the situation as it was on the valuation date 
valuation (the date of the taking) is decisive was further emphasized 
by the expert's decision regarding the discount rate needed to 
account for the rate of inflation; the rate of real interest; and the 
rate of risk. Accordingly the expert's calculation of the net value 
of the Starrett Construction Company, 201 million rials ($2,847,025), 
was accepted by the Tribunal and was awarded without modification. 
The Tribunal also awarded the claimants $33,595,009 for the unpaid 
loans because the claimants had made the loan for the purpose of the 
housing project. Accordingly the damages awarded, in addition to the 
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value of the Starrett Housing Corporation's interest in the two 
Iranian Subsidiaries, included compensation for the loans and 
totalled some $36,689,342. 
(97) 
In the Amoco case, however, Chamber Three of the Tribunal expressed 
certain doubts concerning the suitability of the DCF method on the 
ground that it might lead to unjust enrichment of the investor. We 
shall therefore examine that ruling of the Tribunal next. 
8.4.2 THE APPLICATION OF DCF IN THE AMOCO CASE 
The claimant in this case claimed $183,232,986 as the alleged going 
concern value of Amoco's 50 percent share, calculated applying the 
discounted cash flow method. In doing that it calculated the future 
net cash flow of the company nationalized at $564,795,680 in 1979 
dollars and applying a 6.5 percent discount rate, estimated the 
present value at $360,076,230. 
(98) 
The Respondents rejected both the quantification and the methodology 
employed by the claimant. 
(99) The Respondents pointed out that the 
fair value of the nationalized assets was best represented by net 
book value. It was asserted that Amoco had made an investment of $6 
million in 1967 and 1968 for one-half share of the capital by the end 
of 1978, the net book value of the investment had increased to $29.3 
million, of which $14,65 million was Amoco's share. Moreover, the 
Company had earned, after taxes, $82.5 million by the end of 1978, 
that was $41,25 million in profits, which meant a return in excess 
of$50 million on an investment of $6 million. 
(100) The Respondents 
contended that award of compensation of $183.2 million, as claimed, 
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on top of that for loss of future profits would be the opposite of 
fairness and equity. 
(101) 
, The Tribunal assessed the valuations of the parties by reference to 
'the 
methodologies they had advocated. To ascertain the market value 
of the property taken, the Tribunal pointed out that market value was 
an ambiguous or misleading concept to be applied when an open market 
did not exist for the expropriated asset and its shares were not 
traded on a stock exchange. Determination of the price on which a 
hypothetical willing buyer and a hypothetical willing seller 
negotiating at arms length would eventually agree had to be based on 
"a pyramid of hypotheses". (102) Then the Tribunal pointed out that 
the DCF method widely used in business practice was "most usually 
employed in one of two situations: the purchase or merging of an 
enterprise, when no market price is available, and the decision to 
make a new and large investment". (103) The Tribunal added that "a 
nationalization cannot be equated to a normal business investment", 
nor was the Tribunal "in the position of a prospective investor. 
Rather the Tribunal must determine, ex post facto, the most equitable 
compensation required by the applicable law for a compulsory taking, 
excluding any speculative factor". 
(104) 
Accordingly, the claimant's calculation of the net value of the 
nationalized property ("exit damnum emergens") by a sole reliance on 
(105) the lucrum cessans was completely dismissed. The claimant, 
according to the Tribunal, had calculated the profitability of the 
investment (one of the elements of damnum emergens), by assessing the 
amount of the revenues that the undertaking, would have earned, year 
after year, up to 18 years (the contract period), and the forecasted 
revenues were actualized by way of a discounting calculation, and 
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capitalized as the method of determining the compensation to be paid. 
The Tribunal stated that this was inadmissible because "with such 
method, lucrum cessans becomes the sole element of compensation", and 
the projection of revenues to such a distant future, especially "to 
such a volatile factor as oil prices" would be "almost purely 
speculative". 
(106) 
The Tribunal also rejected the respondent's contention that the 
appropriate measure of compensation in the case of lawful 
expropriation was the net book value, without taking into account 
lost profits. 
Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that the proper method of valuing the 
expropriated undertaking was: "the full value of the asset taken" or 
"the full equivalent of the property", the expropriated asset 
considered as "a going concern", and the going concern value 
encompassing "not only the physical and financial assets of the 
undertaking, but also the intangible values which contribute to its 
earning power, such as contractual rights ... as well as goodwill and 
commercial prospects". (107) The Tribunal specified that intangible 
assets "are closely linked to the profitability of the concern, they 
cannot and must not be confused with the financial capitalization of 
the revenues which might be generated by such a concern after the 
transfer of property resulting from the expropriation (lucrum 
cessans)". 
(108), 
The rejection by the Tribunal of future profits as a legitimate 
component of compensation in the case of lawful expropriation and the 
dismissal of the DCF method as an appropriate method in the case 
amounted to a major concession to the Iranian contention and provoked 
the American arbitrator (Judge Brower) to criticize the award. The 
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award, according to him, had committed a "fundamental error.... in 
excluding as such lucrum cessans, or probable future profits, from 
the "value of undertaking". nWhat", asked Judge Brower, "does 'going 
concern value' mean other than the Concern's value as a producer of 
profits? ". "What are an enterprises' future prospects other than its 
potential profitability? "(109) 
While in the above case the non-application of the DCF method was 
primarily based on the lawfulness of the taking in question, in the 
next case, as we shall see, the Tribunal avoided making a distinction 
between lawful and unlawful nationalization and yet still found the 
application of DCF valuation method to be inadequate. 
8.4.3 D. C. F. METHOD OF VALUATION IN PHILLIPS PETROLEUM V IRAN 
Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran(110) a subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum 
Co. , brought a claim before the Tribunal against 
Iran and the NIOC 
seeking compensation -for the alleged nationalization of its rights 
under a joint agreement for the exploration and exploitation of 
petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf. The claimant in this case, 
using the DCF method of valuation, sought U. S. $159,199,000 as the 
full value of its nationalized rights. As we saw in Chapter 6, the 
Tribunal found the Treaty of Amity to be the relevant source of law 
and accordingly decided that the Claimant was entitled to just 
compensation, ýepresenting "the full equivalent of the property 
taken". As the Claimant's JSA (i. e. Joint Structure Agreement) 
rights were part of a going concern, the Treaty Standard required 
compensation which would make the claimant whole for the fair market 
value of its JSA interests at the date of taking. Because the Treaty 
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,. Standard was held to be applicable, it was not necessary for the 
Tribunal to address the customary law issues. 
In contrast to the Amoco case, the Tribunal also avoided deciding 
whether a different standard was applicable in the case of a lawful 
expropriation than in an unlawful expropriation because it ruled that 
the Treaty established a single standard of compensation and it did 
'not make any distinction between lawful and unlawful takings. 
(11) 
Having rejected Iran's arguments for a standard less then full 
compensation, and having decided that the claimant was entitled to 
compensation based on the fair market value of its nationalized 
interests, the Tribunal addressed the valuation issue. 
Iran had argued that the valuation should be based on the net book 
value of the property taken. Iran had noted there was no active and 
free market from which a market value could be derived for the 
particular interests involved in the case in question. The Tribunal 
declared it was necessary to resort to various analytical methods to 
construct the market value and to consider all factors relevant to 
the valuation. Two particular methods of valuation were presented. 
One, the DCF method as it had been presented by the Claimant, and 
two, the so-called "underlying asset valuation method", selected by 
the Tribunal itself as one "which can help the Tribunal verify its 
findings concerning the value of the claimant's JSA 
interest ....... 
(112) 
The Tribunal rejected the DCF method and disagreed with a number of 
the factors utilized in the claimant's DCF calculation, although it 
did not quantify, or give specific dollar values to, the items 
disagreed with. Instead, the Tribunal simply fixed the amount of the 
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compensation at U. S. $55 million and said this amount was confirmed 
by the Tribunal's application of its own valuation of the underlying 
assets. It further pointed out: 
"The above finding on the value of the claimant's JSA 
interests 
.... can 
be confirmed when an underlying asset 
valuation approach is used which takes as a starting point 
previous investment and dete m. yes future profitability 
based on historic performance". 
1) 
The Tribunal's own calculations on the basis of this approach 
produced a figure of U. S. $61 million which it declared was "in a 
comparable range to the compensation" arrived at. Accordingly, the 
awarded U. S. $55 million seems to have been reached on the basis of 
the Tribunal's own underlying asset valuation analysis using data 
provided by the claimant in its DCF calculations. Thus the Tribunal 
found the DCF valuation method, as used by the claimant in this case, 
to be inadequate, declaring that it "cannot agree that the method has 
resulted in a proper estimate of market value". 
(114) 
So far we have been dealing with the determination of the market 
value of the taken property in the cases of an on-going business. We 
saw that in almost all cases the Tribunal in principle has awarded 
the full equivalent of the property taken, or in other words, the 
fair market value of the property, assessed as of the date of the 
nationalization or expropriation. However, as far as the valuation 
of compensation in the pertinent cases is concerned, the Tribunal has 
been reluctant' to apply the DCF method, despite the claimant's 
suggestion of this method as the proper one for the valuation of 
compensation in an on-going business. This method has so far been 
used only in the Starrerr case, where the period for which the future 
net cash flow which had to be calculated was relatively short. 
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Nevertheless, the claimant in that case was awarded about one third 
of the claimed amount. 
In the above cases, the Tribunal, 
, 
instead of accepting a valuation 
method on modern accounting principles, has more often resorted to an 
approximation of the value, in which context some equitable 
considerations may have played a role, despite the acceptance of full 
compensation as the applicable general standard. (115) 
Another noteworthy feature of the Tribunal's valuation practice on- 
going business cases is that it clearly confirms that while the 
effects of the taking itself and related acts should be disregarded 
in the valuation, the effect on the value of general changes in the 
political, social and economic structures are taken into account. 
Surprisingly, even in valuation concerning tangible objects which are 
generally traded on the market, the Tribunal has repeated the above 
stand point that the general political and economic conditions in a 
country and their effect on the value of the property may be properly 
considered. The valuation applied in tangible assets and single 
property items will now be considered. 
8.5 VALUATION OF PROPERTY ITEMS OTHER THAN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
In valuation of single property items also, determining the actual 
market value is in principle the starting point. But the methods of 
valuation may differ according to whether or not tangibles are part 
of the assets belonging to an enterprise. However, in the valuation 
of such property, questions associated with the determination of lost 
future profits normally do not arise and the'fixed nature of tangible 
assets makes for a significantly simpler valuation process. 
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Generally speaking the methods of valuing tangible assets are non- 
controversial. (116) Nevertheless, the Tribunal has used a variety of 
methods to fix the value of such property and has usually relied in 
these cases on methods suggested by the claimants. To examine 
valuation of tangibles in the context of the Tribunal we will focus 
on the final award in the Sedco case(117) as this case is the leading 
one in this regard. The final award in Sedco involved the valuation 
of tangible assets as well as land. The claim in this case was for 
the value of the claimant's interests in two companies that had been 
carrying out oil drilling operations in Iran under contracts with 
Iranian governmental organizations. One of these companies was an 
Iranian subsidiary called Sediran which had operated ten land 
drilling rigs. In support of the drilling operations, Sediran 
constructed and operated extensive support facilities at Ahwaz in 
Southern Iran. Consequently, the expropriated properties to be 
valued consisted of oil rigs, equipment and warehouse stock, as well 
as the land and buildings. 
8.5.1 LIQUIDATION VALUE FOR COMPENSATING OIL RIGS, EQUIPMENT AND 
WAREHOUSE STOCK 
In the Sedco case the claimant had proposed that the 'liquidation 
value' be accepted on the assumption that the affairs of the 
enterprise had been wound up and its assets disposed of in the open 
market, but presumably with no discount from this value such as might 
occur in actual distress liquidation circumstances. 
(118) This 
criterion was accepted by the Tribunal. To prove the value of the 
assets on the open market the claimant had produced evidence, 
including data as to comparable sales and appraisals, the value 
placed on oil rigs in its insurance policies, what it would have cost 
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in 1979 to replace the rigs, the rigs current net book value on the 
books of accounts of the company and the appraisal of an expert. The 
respondent contested the amount claimed on this basis, giving a value 
of less than half that amount. 
Examining the respondent's contentions the Tribunal held that the 
respondent's figures were based on several incorrect assumptions and 
awarded about 79 percent of the amount claimed. 
(119) In doing that, 
the Tribunal adjusted the figure downward on the basis of its own 
analysis of the relationship between the claimant's net book value 
and actual value. In another aspect of the case, the Tribunal 
awarded as a part of the damnum emergens lost profits for the use of 
oil rigs for nine months - the time considered necessary to procure 
and assemble replacement rigs. 
(120) The Tribunal had decided to 
include this element in damnum emergens in the second interlocutory 
award in that case. In this case, the Tribunal found that in the 
case of discrete expropriation full compensation, meaning damnum 
emergens, had to be paid. 
(121) 
8.5.2 LAND IN SEDCO 
With regard to the valuation of expropriated or nationalized land, 
the Tribunal has so far been called upon to render judgement in only 
one award. As Iranian law limits the ownership of land by 
foreigners, (122) this might be the reason, at least in part, for the 
shortage of awards so far involving expropriation of land. The only 
award involving land was the final award in Sedco. In this case, the 
claimant argued for a determination of the fair market value of a 
variety of tangible assets as well as land, buildings and 
improvements which were located in two cities in Southern Iran, Ahwaz 
327 
The Tribunal and the Calculation of 'Full' Compensation 
and Bandar Abbas. In claiming the fair market value of the land in 
Ahwaz, the claimant requested an amount based on the price that had 
been paid for a similar parcel of land one year before the property 
was expropriated, alleging that land was selling for much higher 
prices around the time of the taking. For the land, buildings and 
improvements situated in Bandar Abbas, the claimant asked the 
Tribunal to award an amount based on a valuation method known as 
"current cost accounting". The Tribunal, when explaining the above 
mentioned method, stated: 
current cost accounting purportedly presents 
accurately the present value of an asset. It does so by (1) 
increasing the historical or book cost of an asset through 
application of an appropriate price index to arrive at an 
estimate of 'current cost new' of the asset, and (2) 
subtracting from the %current cost new' and 'current 
depreciation' amount derived by application of the same 
price index to the book depreciation of the asSet". 
(123) 
Thus in this case two different methods to establish the value of 
different parcels of land, building and improvements were used. The 
first involved the use of actual market information to determine fair 
market value and the second involved the use of accounting techniques 
which referred to published price indicators and depreciation rates 
used by the claimant in its books of account. As the respondent's 
only response was not reliable, the Tribunal accepted the claimant's 
valuation of both parcels of land along with the other fixed assets 
involved. 
8.6 VALUATION OF TANGIBLE ASSETS IN SOME OTHER CASES 
In Dames & Hoore v jrm, 
(124) 
which concerned expropriation of 
vehicles, office equipment, instruments and other equipment, the 
Tribunal valued the assets by using the original purchase price as 
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depreciated. In this case, the claimant claimed the actual purchase 
price of equipment, $354,924, as compensation. The Tribunal stated: 
"Claimant has submitted materials indicating that the 
original purchase price of all items stored in the 
warehouse, including the one field laboratory, was U. S. 
$354,924. However, there is no evidence regarding the 
relationship between the price of each item on the date of 
purchase and the value in the fall of 1980. Because of this 
gap in the evidence and the difficulties in quantifying the 
actual amount of damages in this respect with any precision, 
the Tribunal is justified in estimating such amounts. 
Considering all the circumstances, including the age of the 
equipment, the Tribunal decides that the approximate value 
of claimant's expropriated property is - S. $100,000, to (129) 
which amount claimant is now entitledý. 
The Tribunal's estimation here was due to the absence of evidence of 
the relationship between purchase price and the value at the date 
that the assets were expropriated. Otherwise perhaps the Tribunal 
would have decided differently. In case of tangible assets it is the 
calculation of the replacement cost that is commonly accepted as an 
appropriate method of arriving at the full value for compensation 
purposes. 
(126) Replacement value can be said to mean the net value 
of the asset(s) at current prices (i. e. the prices of new equipment), 
less actual depreciation. (127) This is how the value of the physical 
assets was assessed (as a part of the valuation of the whole 
enterprise as a going concern) in both the Aminoll and Liamco 
cases. 
(128) Likewise, in the Oil Field of Texas(129) case, 
concerning the taking of three blow out preventers, the Tribunal 
employed the replacement value approach as it had been claimed (and 
appraised) by the claimant. As Pellonpdd points out "This indicates 
that sometimes the amount of compensation may in an important manner 
depend on how the claimant has prepared its case". 
(130) 
In a similar way to the last case, in William L. Pereira Associates, 
Iran v Iran, 
(131) the Tribunal awarded Rials 1,000,000 for office 
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equipment and a company car, citing likely depreciation and nominal 
resale value for small items, although the claimant had asked for 
Rials 5,455,990 as the actual purchase price. However, in Computer 
S ciences Corpoz-ation, (132) the Tribunal awarded net book value of 
office equipment and furniture as had been requested by the claimant. 
In this case the Tribunal concluded that "the amount of such value, 
which the claimant has concluded on the basis of net book value and 
which was not contested by the respondent is $24,397". 
(133) 
According to the view of the United States, as we mentioned earlier, 
"book value or some variation of it, which... values assets at 
acquisition cost less depreciation is a figure which in most cases 
bears little relationship to their actual value". 
(134ý Nevertheless, 
in valuation of tangible assets, as it was in the Compucer Sciences 
Corporation case, (135) the net book value may provide an appropriate 
valuation method where evidence of any other basis is lacking, 
particularly where the owner refrains from claiming more than the net 
book value. 
Considering the valuation of land, buildings and other fixed or 
tangible assets, it can be concluded that the Tribunal has made use 
of a variety of valuation methods as proposed by the claimants in the 
disputed cases. 'In Sedco(136) the only award so far in which land 
and buildings were valued separately, the Tribunal looked to 
historical market data for one property and to a *current cost 
accounting' method for another, relying in both cases on data and 
arguments proposed by the claimants. In valuing oil rigs and other 
fixed assets in Sedco, the Tribunal used the claimant's current cost 
accounting approach, but adjusted the claimant's figures downward on 
the basis of its own analysis and what appeared reasonable on the 
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basis of the entire record in the case. A similar approach was taken 
in Dames & Moore (137) and Pereira. 
(138) With regard to these cases, 
figures presented by the claimant as to the original purchase price 
of office equipment, furniture, instruments and automobiles, were 
reduced by the Tribunal on the basis of the Tribunal's own estimation 
of the resale value of the assets on the date they were taken. 
However, in the Computer Sciences Corporation case(139) as the 
claimant requested only the net book value of office furniture and 
equipment, the Tribunal awarded the full amount claimed. 
CONCLUSIONS ON VALUATION 
Based on the above examination of the Tribunal's awards the following 
can be concluded: 
(I) In the nationalization cases, as well as in cases involving 
separate expropriation of business enterprises, the awards generally 
have ruled that- the full compensation standard requires a 
determination of the fair market value of the business involved. 
(II) The awards have also viewed businesses as going concerns, 
including determinable future profits. 
(III) However, in the awards a variety of valuation methods have been 
used and the amounts awarded have in most cases been substantially 
below the amounts claimed. As we saw in the American International 
Group (AIG) case the claimant had argued for U. S. $39 million but the 
Tribunal approximated his compensation to only $10 million, taking 
into account all relevant circumstances. Similarly, in the Phillips 
Petroleum case the claimant had asked for $159,000, calculated using 
the DCF method of valuation, but the Tribunal, denying the DCF 
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method, made its own 'Underlying asset valuation' which resulted in 
an award of only U. S. $55 million. In the Thomas Earl Payne case 
also the Tribunal approximated the due compensation to $900,000 
against the claimed amount of U. S. $3,001,180. 
(IV) The DCF method has only been used by the Tribunal once, in the 
Starrett case. In this case, the Tribunal's own appointed expert, 
using this method, valued the expropriated property at $41 million. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal reduced the amount of under $37 million by 
means of a process of %reasonable approximation' in the 
circumstances. 
(V) Apart from the above mentioned cases, in certain other cases in 
which the Tribunal was called upon to -determine the going concern 
value of business enterprises, the Tribunal has made it clear that 
while lost future profits are properly includable, they need not be 
included in all cases. As a result, in some cases future profits 
were excluded. The awards in Phelps Dodge, Sola Tiles and CBS are 
examples. In these three cases the Tribunal found that the 
businesses involved had not reached the point of a going concern. 
Moreover, in Thomas Earl Payne(140) future profits were excluded by 
reasoning that the profits were unlikely to exist due to the impact 
of the Islamic Revolution on a business which included the import and 
distribution of Cinema films from the West. In these four awards the 
Tribunal ruled that while the effect of the expropriatory act itself 
must be disregarded in the valuation, the general state of political, 
social and economic conditions and their effect on the value should 
be considered. As PellonpIA and Fitzmaurice point out: 
"Not only has the Tribunal confirmed the existence of this 
rule as a principle applicable to the valuation in general, 
but it has also given some important illustrations of the 
interpretation of the border-line between these events and 
332 
The Tribunal and the Calculation of 'Full' Compensation 
acts which should be considered in the valuation, o the )ýl) 
other hand, or those which should not, on the other". (' 
(VI) As with the valuation of alleged going concerns, in its 
valuation of tangible assets, the Tribunal has applied the principle 
that "the general political (and economic) conditions in a country 
and their effect on the value of property may be properly 
considered". (142) As a result, in the Sedco case the Tribunal, 
accepting the methods used by the claimants, adjusted the amounts 
downward on the basis of what the Tribunal deemed reasonable. 
(143) 
In Dames & Hoore(144) and Pereira(145) also, the Tribunal reduced the 
amounts claimed as the original purchase price of office equipment, 
furniture and automobiles on the basis of its own estimation of 
resale value on the date of the taking. However in the Computer 
Science Corporation case, (146) where the claimant had asked only for 
the net book value of office furniture and equipment, as we have just 
seen, the Tribunal awarded the full amount which had been claimed. 
In conclusion it can be said that the Tribunal's awards have provided 
an important clarification to the traditional rule that the 
nationalized property should be valued as of the date of the taking, 
making it clear that in circumstances where the takings occur as a 
result of a revolution, the post-taking impact of changes effected by 
the revolution may be taken into account. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this study I have been dealing with the awards of the Iran-U. S. 
Claims Tribunal issued in respect of expropriation and 
nationalization of American investments in Iran. However, as was 
mentioned in the first chapter, the main purpose of this study has 
been exploring the present status of the law of compensation in the 
awards of the Tribunal. The aim of this chapter is to review the 
findings of the study and to draw some general conclusions. 
9.1 THE TRIBUNAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
Following the Islamic Revolution American investments in Iran(') 
either were expropriated de facto, or were nationalized formally, and 
as a result hundreds of claims were filed in the United States Courts 
against Iran. A substantial portion of the Iranian assets which had 
been frozen by the U. S. in response to Hostage crisis, were attached 
in these judicial proceedings. 
(2) Restoration of the financial 
status of Iran required that these judicial attachments be nullified. 
Thus, as a substitute for the U. S. Courts' proceedings, the two 
governments agreed to establish an arbitral body to hear and 
adjudicate claims by U. S. nationals against Iran and, in addition, 
certain claims by Iranian nationals against the U. S. government and 
between the two governments. On 19 January 1981, the governments of 
the Islamic Rýpublic of Iran and the United States of America 
therefore established the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal. 
The Tribunal was established by virtue of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration (CSD) for the purpose of deciding: 
"claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and 
claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and 
any counter-claim which arises out of the same contract, 
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transaction of occurrence that constitutes the subject 
matter of that national's claim, if such claims or counter- 
claims are outstanding on the date of this Agreement, 
whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, 
contracts (including transactions which are the subject of 
letters of credit or bank guarantees), expropriations or 
other measures affecting property rights, excluding claims 
described in Paragraph 11 of the Declaration... and claims 
arising out of the actions of the United States in response 
to the conduct described in such paragraph, and excluding 
claims arising under a binding contract between the parties 
specially providing that any disputes there under shall be 
within the sole jurisdiction of the ýgmponent Iranian Courts 
in response to the Majlis position". 
) 
Article V of the CSD declares that the Tribunal has to decide the 
cases: 
"on the basis of respect for law applying such choice of law 
rules and principles of commercial and international law as 
the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into 
account relevant usages of (4ýhe 
Trade, contract provisions 
and changed circumstances". 
The requirement that the Tribunal's awards be made on the basis of 
law "evokes a particular conception of international arbitration"(5) 
and, as Robinson states, "the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal represents on 
the most ambitious and complex international claims adjudication 
(6) 
programmes ever undertaken". 
The status of the Tribunal, as has been seen, raises some interesting 
questions. Is the Tribunal an interstate Tribunal charged with 
ruling on the responsibility of the respondent state under public 
international law; or is the Tribunal a private arbitral Tribunal to 
hear private 1ýw claims against Iran and the U. S.; or is it, as a 
further possibility, performing both functions? 
While different academic lawyers have answered the above questions 
differently, the Tribunal's own statement in the Esphahanian(7) case 
indicates that in its own view, it is performing a dual function. 
Examining that case it can be concluded that the Tribunal is a hybrid 
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which rule on both the responsibility of the respondent state in 
international law- and on its liability in private law. 
In this connection it is relevant to recall that whereas Westberg 
points out that "the Tribunal was organized and operates on the 
pattern of earlier mixed international arbitral tribunals". 
(8) 
Lauterpacht, has concluded that "though the Tribunal was established 
by intergovernmental agreement and the two states parties each have 
an Agent supervising the conduct of cases before the Tribunal, the 
responsibility for the presentation of claims and the conduct of each 
case falls directly and exclusively upon the individual claimant. In 
this respect the Tribunal marked an advance over other claims 
commission". 
(9) 
The machinery for execution of awards is another special feature of 
the Tribunal. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Algiers Accords provided 
for the establishment of a Security Account. The sole purpose of 
this account is to pay and secure the payment of Tribunal awards 
against Iran and the awards against the U. S and Judge Lagergren has 
said that that "Security Account was established as compensation 
for 
the annulled attachments in the U. S. ". 
( 10) 
As Khan states, this enforcement machinery greatly strengthen the 
judicial character of the Tribunal. 
(") In arbitrations, although 
there is a biilding decision, there is usually no guarantee that the 
unsuccessful party will carry out its obligation to recognize the 
awards. This, of course, does not mean that arbitral awards are 
always disregarded. However, as Merrills points out, one of several 
ways in which the problem of enforcing arbitral awards may be avoided 
is providing a security account or fund". 
(12) It can therefore be 
further concluded that the successful functioning of the Iran-U. S. 
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Claims Tribunal has set a precedent for dealing with the problem of 
enforcing arbitral awards in the future. 
The Tribunal is exceptional in another respect as well. It is the 
first international arbitral tribunal to function under the UNCITRAL 
rules - with modification to conform those rules to the special 
circumstances of this arbitration. 
(13) 
Considering all these special features of the Tribunal we saw that 
Stewart and Sherman had concluded that: 
"The Tribunal is a unique institution, representing of the 
most ambitious and complex iffernational claims adjudication 
programmes ever undertaker. . 
14) 
Without doubt, the Tribunal represents a major challenge for the 
resolution of international disputes through arbitration. We can 
therefore agree with Robinson's observation that, "the Tribunal's 
ability to meet that challenge is very likely to have significant 
implications for the future use of arbitration... by 
governments". 
(15) 
9.2 THE TRIBUNAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Tribunal had addressed an enormous caseload. As Lillich has 
stated "in recent history no arbitral tribunal has faced the enormous 
task now before the Tribunal". 
(16) The cases filed by American 
claimants genqrally involved alleged breaches of contract and 
expropriations and nationalizations. However, we have dealt only 
with the expropriation and nationalization cases. 
In our view the Tribunal's judgements together with the separate and 
dissenting opinion of arbitrators provide a rich deposit of legal 
authority on international business transactions. But not everyone 
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shares this view. In a recent international commercial abitration an 
arbitrator stated that "the decisions of the Tribunal were not 
persuasive because the Tribunal after all involves a special type of 
arbitration". 
(17) Similarly, Professor Gray also reached the same 
conclusion and observed that the jurisprudence of the Tribunal "has 
little of importance to contribute to the development of 
international law in general and on the assessment of damages in 
particular". 
(18) 
We, however, agree with Amerasinghe who has stated that: 
"the cases decided by the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal ... have 
parti ýY4 r value as precedents in a subsidiary source of 
law". 
As we have seen throughout this study, public international law has 
been a significant source of law for the Tribunal and has been 
applied in a number of decisions. As Crook points out: 
" .... these should take on particular 
importance because of 
the rarity of modern interstate arbitrations and the 
difficultie in documenting contemporary state 
practice"TO) 
The Tribunal itself also has recognised the law-making significance 
of its decisions and in the Oil Field of Texas case, stated that: 
"The controlling rules have... to be derived from principles 
of international law applicable in analogous circumstances 
or from general principles of law. The development of 
international law has always been a process of applying such 
established. lZill principles to circumstances not previously 
encountered . 
By applying international law to the various cases of expropriation 
and nationalization, PellonpII has stated that "the Tribunal is 
likely to give precedents which, despite the fact that 'international 
law contains no stare decisis principle' , will be treated as 
authoritative statements of law by other Tribunals and decision- 
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makers". 
(22) This conclusion appears to be fully supported by our 
own review of the Tribunal's case law. 
As far as the legality of a taking in international law is concerned 
the Tribunal in several cases has re-affirmed that a taking should be 
for public purpose and the taking should be carried out with non- 
discriminatory manner. However, as we saw in Chapter 3, the Tribunal 
has expressed the view that: 
"A precise definition of the public purpose for which an 
expropriation may be lawfully decided has never been agreed 
upon in international law nor even suggested. It is clear 
that as a result of the modern acceptance of the right to 
nationalize, this term is broadly interpreted, and that 
states, in practice, are granted extensive discretion". 
(23) 
With regard to the condition of non- discrimination the Tribunal has 
suggested that while this is a condition of lawful expropriation, at 
the same time, however it recognises that it is not an absolute 
requirement. 
This approach by the Tribunal has caused Pellonpdd and Fitzmaurice to 
the important conclusion that: 
"While the requirements of 'public purpose' and 'non- 
discrimination' in takings are well established, a certain 
shift in favour of the state's economic sovereignty appears 
to be d scernible in the way they are interpreted 
today .i 
As far as the relevance of state contracts in a taking is concerned 
the Tribunal 'in the Amoco case stated that: 
"In international practice, and notably in the cases 
submitted to international arbitration, the dispute has 
focussed on the question of the so-called stabilization 
clauses. For the reasons set forth in the [case] it is not 
seriously questioned that, in the absence of such a 
stabilization clause, a contract does not constitute a bar 
to nationalization. That is an aspect of the evolution of 
international law in this area and of the eneral 
recognition of the right of states to nationalize .- 
fl 
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However, in the same case the Tribunal stated that the language of a 
contract provision, in order to make that provision a 'stabilization 
clause' , should 
be quite explicit in obliging the state not to use 
its legislative power to terminate contractual relationship. The 
Tribunal added that "this can be seen as another aspect of the 
evolution of international law in the area and of the general 
recognition of the right of states to nationalize". 
(26) 
As far as the meaning of a taking is concerned, we saw in Chapter 3, 
that in the- Tippects case, the Tribunal pointed out that a taking may 
occur under international law "through interference by a state in the 
use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even 
where legal title to the property is not affected". Furthermore, the 
Tribunal stated that "a positive intention to expropriate foreign 
property is not always required to constitute a taking under 
international lawm. (27) Yet it emphasized that "the form of measures 
of control or interference is less important that the reality of 
their impact". (28) 
The Tribunal's pronouncements on the question of the degree of 
interference necessary to a finding of a taking have been slightly 
different. In certain cases the Tribunal has used the formula of 
unreasonable interference in the use of the property rights or 
control of the property. In others it has described the standard as 
requiring an interference... to such an extent that these (property] 
rights are rendered to useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriatedw. 
(29) In still further cases it has declared that a 
taking occurs whenever an owner is 'deprived of fundamental rights of 
ownership' and the deprivation is not merely ephemeral". 
(30) Judge 
Brower, the American member of the Tribunal, has pointed out that 
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"the most common bench mark of the Tribunal's decision in this 
regard, has been unreasonableness". 
(31) 
However, as we saw in Chapter 3, the Tribunal's discussion of the 
degree of interference necessary to constitute a taking, has not 
focussed on semantics, but rather on the reality of the impact of the 
alleged taking. As a result, "the standard both explicitly and 
implicitly adopted by the Tribunal requires an unreasonable 
interference with property rights caused by actions attributable to 
the government". 
(32) 
As far as the issue of attributability is concerned, generally 
speaking, the Tribunal has found that attributability requires at 
least one deliberate governmental assertion of control over the 
corporations, such as the substitution of government-appointed 
managers. However the Tribunal has added that for the appointment of 
managers by the government to be considered as a taking, the managers 
should have assumed a functionally'permanent role. 
As a result the Tribunal has been consistent in finding an 
expropriation has taken place in cases where the appointment of 
temporary managers by the government was accompanied by facts or 
circumstances indicating that the essential rights of share ownership 
had been permanently interfered with. As we can see, the case law of 
the Tribunal has thus established that a taking can occur even 
without a physical confiscation of a foreign investment. 
9.3 THE POLICY ELEMENT IN THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISIONS 
One of the ways to evaluate the decisions of the Tribunal is in the 
light of 'preferred community policy goals' . This could be defined 
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as "a world public order in which values are shaped and shared more 
by persuasion than by coercion, and which seeks to promote the 
greatest production and widest possible sharing, without 
discriminations irrelevant of merit, of all values among all human 
beings". (33) 
Accordingly, a Preferred Community Policy has three major goals. (I) 
The discouragement of use of force; (II) maximizing the likelihood of 
economic development; (III) recognizing the sovereign nature of the 
host state. 
We saw that the Tribunal defined a taking as an interference with 
property that renders that property so useless that it must be 
considered to have been expropriated. It seems that such 
construction of the taking standard comports with preferred Community 
Policy goals. It provides the host state with adequate competence to 
rule effectively by requiring that state interference reach a very 
high level before a taking will be found. It provides foreign 
investors with much needed protection from acts that destroy the 
value of their investment. 
(34) Also, this should help to encourage 
more investment and development and as Swanson points out, that 
"provides a relatively certain basis on which taking determination 
may be based, which should reduce the likelihood of a resort to 
coercive measures,,. 
(35) 
Also, we saw the Tribunal stated that a taking will be found when an 
investor is deprived of fundamental rights of ownership of his 
property has become useless. These are all positive developments 
when considered in the light of preferred Community Policy goals. 
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As far as the date of the taking is concerned, as we saw in Chapter 4 
of this study, the Tribunal pointed out that the taking of an ongoing 
business might occur through a chain of events. For example, it 
might begin with minor management interference and culminate in the 
transfer of title. The Tribunal stressed that the taking however 
will not necessarily be found to have occurred at the time of either 
the first or the last such event. The Tribunal has been of the view 
that "expropriation of an on-going business occurs when the 
interference becomes an "irreversible deprivation". 
(36) 
In the Starrett case, the claimant had argued that the anti-American 
policies of the Iranian government amounted to an unlawful 
expropriation of his property rights, presumably at the time of the 
revolution in late 1978 and early 1979. 
(37) The Tribunal rejected 
that argument and stated that investors assume the risks of 
revolutions which do not by themselves constitute a taking giving 
rise to a claim for compensation under international law. 
(38) 
Finally it settled the date of the expropriation on the date by which 
it considered the expropriation process to have become 
irreversible. (39) It could be said that in these cases the Tribunal 
has persisted "with the causative theory". 
(40) As a result the 
Tribunal has dismissed vague allegations of disorder and harassment 
as inadequate to engage the responsibility of a state. 
(41) 
Examining the case law of the Tribunal, Khan has concluded that the 
Tribunal "was willing to consider with sympathy and understanding 
some inconveniences and even losses caused to foreign investors by 
the revolutionary conditions in Iran. It was, consequently, willing 
to concede a certain-measure of control exercised by the government 
and its instrumentalities over foreign investments". (42) 
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As a result several significant expropriation claims were rejected by 
the Tribunal. Examples of these cases are the in the cases of Mobil 
Oil Xran, (43) Houston Contracting Co., (44) and Motorola. 
(45) In the 
Moto. rola case, for instance, the Tribunal found that interference by 
Iranian officials in the relationship between the claimant and its 
Iranian subsidiary was not factually sufficient to constitute a 
taking, although it is worth noting that dissenting arbitrator, 
Brower declared that this decision "Completely misreads the 
documentary evidence in the record and ignores the reality 9f Iran's 
involvement". (46) 
9.4 THE TRIBUNAL AND THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 
In Chapter 5 of this study we described the process of determination 
of compensating the claimant for his lost property as an area of 
controversy in expropriation cases. We said that these 
determinations necessarily involve an inquiry into what type of 
remedy should be employed as well as the scope of that remedy. We 
mentioned that in international law there is a broad range of 
remedies available to investors whose property interests have been 
taken. However, virtually all of the Tribunal's decisions focus 
solely on the return of the claimant of the value of the interest 
lost. In any of the Tribunal's' awards, restitution or specific 
performance has. not been discussed. Even in the Starrett case while 
Iran formally offered restitution as the appropriate remedy for 
settling the case, the Tribunal refused that. 
(47) 
As far as the issue of determining of the scope of compensation is 
concerned, in the context of the Tribunal the issue has related to 
only two standards: full and partial compensation. Iran as the 
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respondent in the cases before the Tribunal has not denied the very 
principle of compensation although it has an in almost all cases 
challenged the scope of it. (48) 
In determination of the scope of compensation the principal issue is 
determination of the applicable law, as by application of that law, 
the scope of compensation can be determined. Therefore, in 
expropriation cases the Tribunal has had to deal with two issues: 
first the question of applicable law, Iran's domestic law, the Treaty 
of Amity, between the United States and Iran, or customary 
international law; and secondly the question of the precise content 
of that law. 
As we saw earlier, in expropriation cases the Tribunal has applied 
international law. The Tribunal has rarely applied national rules of 
either of the participating states in any case, even in cases where 
the parties might arguably have agreed on them as the rule of 
decision. 
The Tribunal decisions to date have not supported Iran's contentions 
that its own domestic law governs the standard of compensation 
payable for nationalized or expropriated property. As a result the 
Tribunal, when determining the standards of compensation, has mainly 
relied on customary international law. In some cases it has relied 
on both customary international law and the Treaty of Amity, and in a 
few cases exclusively on the Treaty of Amity. 
However, the content of customary international law is not clear cut. 
As we indicated in the first chapter, the customary rules in the area 
of nationalization of foreign property, particularly with respect to 
due compensation, have always been controversial and remain 
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controversial in the relationship between foreign investors and host 
states, especially third world ones. While Western developed states, 
along with many legal writers, claim that the traditional rule of 
customary international law (i. e. the standard of full compensation), 
still exists, the Third World states, along with some jurists in 
these countries, argue that the customary law in this regard has 
changed at least to a principle of less than full compensation. 
(49) 
In this study, however, we have been dealing primarily with the 
decisions of the Iran-U. S. Tribunal in order to see whether customary 
international law has changed in the light of the arguments of the 
parties befor e the Tribunal. We examined many cases of the Tribunal 
as well as some decisions of ICSID arbitration in expropriation 
cases. What conclusions may be drawn from this case-law? 
The Tribunal in small claims involving tangible business assets such 
as office equipment etc, has not discussed any applicable rule and 
simply has awarded the value of the taken property, upholding the 
principle of full compensation. 
(50) In claims of large scale 
nationalization or big claims of expropriation, however both parties 
have discussed the applicable law issue and the Tribunal inevitably 
has been forced to examine these sources. In these cases, the 
Tribunal in its search for customary international law has examined 
settlement practice and the relevance of U. N. Resolutions, as well as 
international and arbitral awards. However the Tribunal has rejected 
the former two and has mainly relied on the international and 
arbitral awards. 
In the Sedco case, when examining both settlement agreements and 
lumpsum agreements, between states the Tribunal stated that: 
"both types of agreements can be so greatly inspired by non- 
judicial considerations - e. g. resumption of diplomatic or 
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trading relations - that it is extremely difficult to draw 
from them conclusions as to opinlo jurls, i. e. the 
determination that the content of such settlements was 
thought by the states involved to be required by 
international law". 
The Tribunal added that: 
"The International Court of Justice and international 
arbitral tribunals have cast serious doubt on the value of 
such settlements as evidence of custom". 
ffiý 
However, as Bowett points out "if all state practice had to be 
isolated from factors other than elements of law, there would be 
little evidence of state practice - in this or in any other field - 
which could be used as evidence of custom". (52) 
The Tribunal also declared that: 
'United Nationals General Assembly Resolutions are not 
directly binding upon states and generally are not evidence 
of customary law. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted 
that such resolutions in certain specified circumstances may 
be regarded as evidence of customary international law or 
can contribýite - among other factors - to the creation of 
such laws': (53) 
In addition, in examining the Resolution 1803, the Tribunal admitted 
that the Resolution (with its requirement of "appropriate 
compensation... in accordance with international law") is itself 
ambiguous and does not give an answer to any of the existing 
questions concerning the amount of compensation. (54 ) The Resolution, 
as the Tribunal pointed out, "has been argued, on the one hand, to 
express the t; aditional standard with different words and on the 
other hand to signify an erosion of this standard". 
(55) Accordingly, 
the formula of appropriate compensation as used in the Resolution 
1803 is of an elusive nature. Nonetheless, the Tribunal admitted 
that the reference to "international law" suggested that the 
delegates who had adopted the Resolution intended no break with 
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prevailing customary' international law. 
(56) Moreover, to the 
Tribunal the Cravaux preparatories were a confirmation that the 
drafters had used the word 'appropriate' in the sense of 
adequate. (57) 
Accordingly, for the Tribunal the relevance of U. N. Resolutions to 
customary law has been regarded as rather limited. The Tribunal's 
awards have therefore been backed up by other authorities such as 
judicial and arbitral precedents; legal writings; and its own earlier 
awards. Thus in its awards the Tribunal has made references to 
classical cases, newer arbitral awards as well as to some ICSID and 
ICC arbitration awards. However the judgement of the P. C. I. J. in the 
Chorzow Factory case, 
(58) despite the fact that it is sixty years 
old, has been the most authoritative for the Tribunal in making 
decisions about the compensation due in expropriation and 
nationalization cases. 
In the Amoco case, the Tribunal examined the judgement of the 
Permanent Court and confirmed that. in an unlawful expropriation there 
is an obligation of reparation of all the damages incurred by the 
owner of the expropriated property. It further explained that in a 
case of -unlawful expropriation the rules of international law 
relating, to international responsibility of states will be applied. 
To the Tribunal these rules provide for resticutio In Integrum, i. e. 
restitution 
ýn 
kind, or if that is impossible, its monetary 
equivalent. It continued by stating that "a lawful expropriation 
must give rise to the payment of fair compensation or of the just 
price of what was expropriated. Such an obligation is imposed by a 
specific rule of international law of expropriation". 
(59) 
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9.5 THE TRIBUNAL AND THE STANDARD OF COMPENSATION 
As we saw in Chapter 1 in 1982 as the Tribunal was getting underway, 
the traditional international law rules requiring full compensation 
in cases of expropriation and nationalization were being challenged. 
While many authorities could be cited for the view that full 
compensation remained the accepted standard of international law, 
other authorities, including the scholarly American Law Institute in 
its Restatement (Third) (60) and the important decision of federal 
appeals court of the U. S. Second Circuit in the Cuba v Chase 
Manhattan Bank case(61), had acknowledged that a new contemporary 
standard might be in the making that would permit less than full 
compensation in some cases. on this key issue the awards of the 
Tribunal have ruled decisively in favour of the traditional full 
compensation standard. The only possible exception might be the 
decision of the Tribunal in the Sola Tiles 
(62) 
award. In this case 
the Tribunal preferred to use the term 'appropriate' rather than 
'*full, standard. Apart from this case every award of the Tribunal to 
address the issue has endorsed the full compensation standard. 
In application of the "appropriate standard" the Tribunal however 
declared that "the debate that has divided the respective 
protagonists of terms such as "prompt, adequate and effective,, 
'fair', "Just' or 'appropriate'. Compensation has been concluded at 
a theoretical level. An examination of the attempts of various 
tribunals to invest these terms with a concrete meaning reveals, 
however that the distance between rhetoric and reality is narrower 
than might at first appear n. 
(63) 
Examining this decision of the Tribunal, Khan states "If the 
Tribunal's intention was to suggest - which it did not - that the 
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varying terminologies were elastic enough to offer it sufficient 
flexibility and discretion to subsume under each different component 
of compensation, there would not have been a great problem. Many 
component writers have supported a flexible standard of compensation, 
although the Hull formula of 'prompt, adequate and effective' 
compensation is supposed to militate against a flexible standard. 
The trouble with the Tribunal's formulation is that it considered 
that the sources identified obliged to apply the 'full compensation 
standard', regardless of the variations in terminology, and there, as 
it is said, hangs a tale". (64) 
The Tribunal's reliance in Sola Tiles on the U. N. General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 and its dismissal of the debate over the terminology 
employed - "appropriate', 'adequate, 'Just', etc, as theoretical 
represents a slant towards the position of the capital -exporting 
states in general and the position of the United States in 
particular. 
(65) Thus generally speaking in expropriation and 
nationalization cases, the Tribunal has concluded that under 
customary international law the claimant must receive full 
compensation for its expropriated or nationalized interest. 
It must be pointed out, however, that while in respect of 
expropriation cases the Tribunal has required full compensation, with 
regard to lawful nationalizations it has indicated that less than 
full compensation in some circumstances might be appropriate. 
Nevertheless it should be pointed out that according to the Tribunal, 
if any departure from the full compensation standard is going to 
happen, this should be limited and affect only compensation for 
lucrum cessans. 
(66) 
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However so far the practice of the Tribunal does not suggest that the 
Tribunal has applied a standard lower than full compensation. 
Nevertheless Lagergren's obiter dictum in the INA case suggested that 
something less than full compensation might be awarded when the 
taking involved large scale nationalization of a lawful character. 
However Lagergren's view in this regard, resulted in the lengthy 
separate opinion of Judge Holtzman (another arbitrator in the case) 
against that proposition. 
(67) 
In the Amoco partial award, the Tribunal applied the standard of full 
compensation, but further suggested that there may be an adjustment 
of damages for lucz-um cessans where a case can be characterised as a 
part of nationalization programme, and concerns a lawful taking of 
property rights relevant to Iran's natural resources. 
(68) 
Accordingly, while the standard of full compensation in the 
Tribunal's decisions is clearly the main rule in international law, 
some exceptions to it do not appear totally excluded. 
9.6 THE TREATY OF AMITY IN THE TRIBUNAL'S CASE LAW 
In application of the full compensation standard in the awards of the 
Tribunal, the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the U. S. has also been 
a source of law. As there are many such treaties currently in force, 
this is another important feature of the Tribunal's practice in 
relation to the law governing compensation. 
As we saw in the Chapter 6, the parties to the Treaty have made and 
are, still making extensive reference to the Treaty in their 
litigation before the Tribunal. American claimants constantly have 
contended that Iranian expropriations do not comply with obligations 
included in the Treaty. Iranian respondents on the other part, in 
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some cases, have argued that the Treaty has been terminated by 
implication as a result of economic and military sanctions imposed on 
Iran by the U. S. in late 1979 and 1980 and in some other cases they 
have denied the applicability of the Treaty as a result of the 
changes in the Iran-U. S. relations since the Iranian Revolution and 
signing of the Claims Settlement Declaration (CSD). 
The Tribunal has consistently treated the Treaty as valid and by 
taking this position has preserved the investment protection rules 
contained in the Treaty. (69 ) As we saw in the pertinent Chapter, the 
Tribunal almost in all of its compensation awards has applied the 
provisions contained in the Treaty. Securing recognition by the 
Tribunal of the Treaty of Amity as a source of law between Iran and 
the U. S. was thus a significant achievement for the U. S. 
With regard to the initial cases, i. e. American Incernational 
Group; (70) Sealand Services; (72) and Tippetts, 
(72) the Tribunal 
referred to customary international law as the source of applicable 
standards. In application of customary international law to the 
above cases the Tribunal found that that source of law required full 
compensation for an expropriated property. However in the INA(73) 
case the Tribunal preferred to reach that same result by applying the 
Treaty of Amity. 
In this case the Tribunal declared that: 
for the purpose of this case we are in the presence of 
a lex specialls, in the form of the Treat which er 
in principle prevails over general rulesm. 
743f 
Amity, 
This obviously means that whatever the general rules might be on the 
law of nationalization, and whatever be the developments regarding 
the standard of compensation, the Tribunal was obliged to apply the 
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Treaty of Amity. In later cases too the Tribunal consistently 
applied the Treaty of Amity and its standard of 'Just compensation'. 
To sum up, the provisions of the Treaty have been considered as a 
firm ground for applying the full compensation standard for 
expropriation and nationalization cases. However this full 
compensation standard according to the Tribunal can be applied either 
via application of the Treaty of Amity or by reference to customary 
international law. This conclusion is consistent with the desire of 
investors to be protected firmly and, as the American arbitrator 
Brower points out, "under scores the strong support manifested today 
for the principle of full compensation". 
(75) 
9.7 THE TRIBUNAL'S INTERPRETATION OF "FULL' COMPENSATION 
The two parties of the cases before the Tribunal have interpreted the 
full compensation standard differently. As we saw in Chapter 7 
American claimants have argued that full compensation means full 
value, or going-concern value, or market value of the property taken, 
plus the value of lost profits. 
(76) However, with regard to the 
cases involving an international economic agreement or state contract 
(as in the Amoco and PhillIps Petroleum cases) the American claimants 
argued that these types of case belong to a special category of 
"international contracts*. By distinguishing international contracts 
from other exi; ting contracts the claimant tried to make out a case 
for a higher full value than for other contracts. 
(77) 
In contrast, nationalizing and expropriation cases before the 
Tribunal, Iran has argued for the requirement of market value. Iran 
has argued that the fair market value of the nationalized assets is 
best represented by the net book value. Moreover, in the Amoco case, 
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Iran argued that the net book value standard was in conformity with 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment, state practice in the oil industry 
and legitimate expectation of the parties. 
(78) 
However the Tribunal rejected these arguments. With regard to the 
principle of unjust enrichment the Tribunal dismissed this theory on 
the ground that the concept was used "as a raclo legis of the 
applicable rule rather than as the rule itself". 
(79) And with regard 
to the state practice in the oil industry the Tribunal in the 
Phillips Petroleum case noted that "such settlements do not 
constitute an opinio juris". 
(80) 
In respect of the concept of the legitimate expectation of the 
parties, while in the Amoco case the Tribunal recognized that 
legitimate expectations was a concept that was central to the Aminoll 
award, it rejected its application to the Amoco, on the ground that 
"the high level of returns obtained on the investment in the first 
years of the Khemco Agreement would normally have given birth to 
expectations of substantial revenues for the following years and 
accordingly, of a higher level of compensation in cases of 
expropriation". (81) The Tribunal was not convinced that these 
expectations were limited to the net book value of the undertakings. 
As a result, it ruled that the correct method of valuing of the 
expropriated undertaking was "the full value of the asset taken" or 
"the full equivalent of the property". 
(82) 
9.8 THE TRIBUNAL AND THE PRINGIPLES OF VALUATION 
While the case law of the Tribunal has affirmed that international 
law requires the payment of full compensation, the actual amount due 
may depend not only on the general standard adopted but also on the 
362 
Conclusions 
more particular methods concerning the valuation of the property. 
Thus the acceptance of full compensation as the applicable standard 
does not necessarily determine the amount of the compensation save by 
indicating certain lower and upper limits. 
As we saw in Chapter 8, in the awards in which land and tangible 
assets were valued, the Tribunal has generally accepted the methods 
proposed by the claimants, but examined the claimants' evidence and 
arguments closely when fixing the actual amounts of the properties 
involved. In the Sedco case(83) in which land, and buildings as well 
as oil drilling rigs were involved, the Tribunal accepted the methods 
used by the claimants but adjusted the amounts downwards on the basis 
of what the Tribunal deemed reasonable. In the Computer Sciences 
Corpora tion (84) case the Tribunal awarded net book value of office 
equipment and furniture as had been requested by the claimant, but in 
Dames and Moore(85) in which the claimant had requested US $354,924 
as the actual purchase price of vehicles and office equipment, the 
Tribunal awarded an estimated value of US $100,000, in the absence of 
evidence of the relationship between the purchase price and the value 
on the date the assets were expropriated. 
In the nationalization cases and several of the cases involving 
separate expropriations of business enterprises, the Tribunal has 
generally ruled that the full compensation standard required a 
determination ýf the fair market value of the business involved, 
viewed as going concerns, including determinable future profits. 
However a variety of valuation methods have been used, and the 
amounts awarded have in most cases been substantially below the 
amounts claimed. 
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As the full value means the fair market value, i. e. "the amount which 
a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller", in a free and 
effective market, the matter is relatively straightforward. However 
in the absence of a market the valuation is problematic, especially 
where the property taken is an income producing asset. Under these 
circumstances the full compensation (in the sense of the closest 
equivalent to the actual market value), has to be computed on the 
basis of going concern approach. 
There are several ways of establishing the going concern value, and, 
as we have seen, the practice of the Tribunal provides some good 
illustrations of the different methods. In the American 
International Group(86) case the award indicated that full 
compensation in this case meant fair market value of the claimant's 
share interests in the enterprise as a going concern, including 
goodwill and likely future profitability, that any effects of the 
nationalization or subsequent events should not be considered in 
arriving at value, but that the impact of changes in the political, 
economic and social conditions as a result of events which took place 
prior to the nationalization should be included in measuring that 
value. The method of valuation used by the Tribunal was that of 
of approximation" based on evidence produced by the parties. 
In the Phillips Petroleum Company of Iran case, the claimant had 
presented its ýlaim based on the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, 
while the respondent had argued in favour of the net book value as 
the amount of compensation. The Tribunal declared that it was 
necessary to resort to various analytical methods to construct the 
market value of the property and employed the underlying asset 
valuation method. The Tribunal disagreed with several factors used 
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in the claimant's DCF calculation. Finally, it awarded the claimant 
about 32 per cent of what. had been claimed on the basis of the DCF 
method, after itself reducing the figure reached on its own 
calculations based on the method of valuation preferred by it. (87) 
It is notable in this case that the claimant had requested for U. S. 
$159,19; 000, using the DCF method of valuation, but the Tribunal 
awarded only U. S. $55 million, based on its own underlying asset 
valuation method. 
In the case of ongoing business enterprises it will be recalled that 
the approach taken by the Tribunal has been different. In the 
Starrert Housing Corporatlon(88) case, the Tribunal found that the 
DCF method had been highly emphasised by the expert to whom the 
matter had been referred by the Tribunal in circumstances in which 
the respondent did not object to the use of the method. This case is 
the only case that the use of DCF method was totally accepted as a 
means of establishing the market value even though the claim had 
drastically been reduced. 
In the Phelps Dodge Corporation(89) and in the SolaT! les(90) cases, 
involving the expropriation of on-going business enterprises, the 
Tribunal rejected going concern value as the measure of compensation 
on the grounds that the businesses in those cases were not going 
concerns on the day they were expropriated. This meant that no value 
would be assigýed to goodwill or future profitability. However, in 
the Starrec, American International Group and Phillips Petroleum 
cases lost future profits were awarded. Nevertheless the ultimate 
amounts awarded in the cases were substantially below what the 
claimants had argued for. 
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One factor cited in some of these cases for the lower amounts awarded 
was the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the businesses concerned. 
Similarly, in the more recent CBS Inc. 
(91) 
case the Tribunal found 
that because of the effects of the revolution upon the nature of the 
business which had been expropriated the business had a negative net 
worth at the time of the taking. A valuation based on the past net 
profits or on an estimate of profits which induced the investment was 
therefore rejected and no compensation was awarded. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, it was laid down in the Lighthouses(92) 
arbitration that when assessing going concern value of expropriated 
business enterprises, calculations of future profits should be made 
as of the date of the taking without consideration of subsequent 
events. It is therefore very significant that several Tribunal 
awards have now shown that this does not mean that the post-taking 
effects or pre-taking events may never be taken into account. Thus 
as Westberg points out, "the Tribunal awards have provided an 
important clarification to the traditional rule that expropriated 
property should be valued as of the date of the expropriation, making 
clear that in circumstances where the takings follow as the result of 
a revolution, the post-taking impact of changes affected by the 
revolution may be taken into account". 
(93) 
Accordingly it can be concluded that while the Tribunal's case law 
has given suýport for the continuing existence of the full 
compensation standard, at the same time it demonstrates that the 
application of this standard is not wholly unconditional. The 
standard rather has been applied with certain flexibility and so as 
to take account of developments such as the principle of every 
state's permanent sovereignty over natural resources and economic 
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activities in its territory. This is shown not only in the rather 
general rejection of resticutio in integrum as a proper remedy in the 
context of taking, but also by the acceptance of the principle that 
general changes caused by a revolution or other socio-economic 
changes, although attributable to the respondent government, should 
be reflected according to their actual impact in the going concern 
valuation of the expropriated or nationalized property. 
This has caused that PellonpAA and Fitzmaurice to conclude that: 
"the Tribunal practice cannot be said to support any rigid 
%acquired rights, theory as the doctrinal foundation of the 
duty to pay compensation. This practice, while it 
recognizes the principle of the foreign owner's right to 
full compensation, at the same time respects the state's 
economic sovereignty in that it has put beyond any doubt the 
state's power to formulate its economy policy without having 
to pay compensation for such diminution of the market value 
as it is brought about by (94) changes in the socio-economic 
orientation of the state". 
Affirmation of full compensation standard may be explained by the 
increasingly widespread recognition that such a standard fosters 
foreign investment vital to economic development. Thus is a separate 
opinion in the INA case, Judge Holtzman stated "in an economically 
interdependent world the law should encourage investment, not 
discourage it by increasing the riskn. 
(95) Likewise, in the Aminoll 
award the Tribunal declared that "Compensation... must be calculated 
on a basis such as to warrant the upkeep [sic] of a flow of 
investment in the future". (96) This is a recognition by the Tribunal 
of the role of policy in this part of international law. Today 
investors are widely accepted as critical to the economic development 
of Third World states. For as Norton points out "Foreign investors 
are far more likely to invest in such states if they believe their 
assets can be taken only with the payment of compensation". (97) 
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9.9 A FINAL ASSESSMENT 
It is notable that many Third Word states have entered into bilateral 
treaties specifically requiring the payment of full compensation. By 
1989, over three hundred of these treaties have been concluded. The 
signatories of these treaties included all of the world's principal 
capital-exporting states and approximately eighty developing 
nations. (98) Thus, the decisions of the Tribunal have been given 
against a background of the increasing recognition of the need for 
foreign investment in the Third World countries. As we have seen 
throughout this study, the Tribunal has added vastly to the body of 
international law, having dealt with such issues as the conditions of 
a nation's right to expropriate the foreign owned property; what 
actions may amount to an expropriations; what constitutes a 
stabilization clause; the issue of foreign exchange control, the 
issue of applicability of the Treaty of Amity; and finally the 
important issue of compensation for an expropriation and the 
valuation of an expropriated or nationalized property. 
As the countries of the developing world continue their struggle for 
increased economic and political independence, there can be no 
question that many issues faced by the Tribunal will be revisited and 
the Tribunal's exposition of the relevant legal norms will be invoked 
time and again. 
(99) It may, of course, be argued that the existence 
of dissenting -opinions may demonstrate that the Tribunal has not 
reached the proper result in all cases, 
(100) 
either between the 
parties or as a matter of international law. Nevertheless, it can, 
we suggest, be concluded that the Tribunal has been "a remarkable 
institution that successfully met the substan tial challenges it faced 
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and managed both to apply and to advance principles of international 
law, in the context of arbitration". 
(101) 
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APPENDIX I 
General Declaration 
1. DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR 
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA. 
(General Declaration), 19 January 1981 
The Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 
having been requested by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and the United States of America to serve as an intermediary in 
seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of the crisis in their 
relations arising out of the detention of the 52 United States 
nationals in Iran, has consulted extensively with the two governments 
as to the commitments which each is willing to make in order to 
resolve the crisis within the framework of the four points stated in 
the Resolution of November 2,1980, of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly of Iran. On the basis of formal adherences received from 
Iran and the United States, the Government of Algeria now declares 
that the following interdependent commitments have been made by the 
two goverrunents: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The undertakings reflecting in this Declaration are based on the 
following general principles: 
A. Within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two 
Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of Algeria, the United States will restore the financial position of 
Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 
14,1979. In this context, the United States commits itself to 
ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within 
its jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9. 
B. It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of an 
pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, to terminate all 
litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals 
of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of 
all such claims through binding arbitration. Through the procedures 
provided in the Declaration relating to the Claims Settlement 
Agreement, the United States agrees to terminate all legal 
proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States 
persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to 
nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit 
all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the 
termination of such claims through binding arbitration. 
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POINT I: NON-INTERVENTION IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS 
1. The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the 
policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs. 
POINT II AND III: RETURN OF IRANIAN ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF U. S. 
CLAIMS 
2. Iran and the United States (hereinafter "the parties") will 
immediately select a mutually agreeable Central Bank (hereinafter 
"The Central Bank") to act, under the instructions of the Government 
of Algeria and the Central Bank of Algeria (hereinafter "the Algerian 
Central Bank") as depositary of the escrow and security funds 
hereinafter prescribed and will promptly enter into depositary 
arrangements with the Central Bank in accordance with the terms of 
this Declaration. All funds placed in escrow with the Central Bank 
pursuant to this Declaration shall be held in an account in the name 
of the Algerian Central Bank. Certain procedures for implementing 
the obligations set forth in this Declaration and in the Declaration 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter "the Claims 
Settlement Agreement") are separately set forth in certain 
Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the 
Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 
3. The depositary arrangements shall provide that, in the event that 
the Government of Algeria certifies to the Algerian Central Bank that 
the 52 U. S. nationals have safely departed from Iran, the Algerian 
Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank to transfer 
immediately all monies or- other assets in escrow with the Central 
Bank pursuant to this Declaration, provided that at any time prior to 
the making of such certification by the Government of Algeria, each 
of the two parties, Iran and the United States, shall have the right 
on seventy-two hours notice to terminate its commitments under this 
Declaration. If such notice is given by the United States and the 
foregoing certification is made by the Government of Algeria within 
the seventy-two hour period of notice, the Algerian Central Bank will 
thereupon instruct the Central Bank to transfer such monies and 
assets. If the 72 hour period of notice by the United States expires 
without such a certification having Seen made, or if the notice of 
termination is delivered by Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will 
thereupon instruct the Central Bank to return all such moneys and 
assets to the United States, and thereafter the commitments reflected 
in this Declaration shall be of no further force and effect. 
Assets in the Federal Reserve Bank 
4. Commencing upon completion of the requisite escrow arrangements 
with the Central Bank, the United States will bring about the 
transfer to the Central Bank of all gold bullion which is owned by 
Iran and which is in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, together with all other Iranian assets (or the cash equivalent 
thereof) in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to 
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be held by the Central Bank in escrow until such time as their 
transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3 above. 
Assets in Foreign Branches of U. S. Banks 
5. Commencing upon the completion of the requisite escrow 
arrangements with the Central Bank, the United States will bring 
about the transfer to the Central Bank, to the account of the 
Algerian Central Bank, of all Iranian deposits and securities which 
on or after November 14,1979, stood upon the books of overseas 
banking offices of U. S. banks, together with interest thereon through 
December 31,1980, to be held by the Central Bank, to the account of 
the Algerian Central Bank, in escrow until such time as their 
transfer or return is required in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this 
Declaration. 
Assets in U. S. Branches of U. S. Banks 
6. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to 
this Declaration and the Claims Settlement Agreement attached hereto, 
and following the conclusion of arrangements with the Central Bank 
for the establishment of the interest -bearing Security Account 
specified in that Agreement and Paragraph 7 below, which arrangements 
will be concluded within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, 
the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the Central 
Bank, within six months from such date, of all Iranian deposits and 
securities in U. S. banking institutions in the United States, 
together with interest thereon, to be held by the Central Bank in 
escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required 
by 
Paragraph 3. 
7. As funds are received by the Central Bank pursuant to Paragraph 
6 
above, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct the Central Bank to 
(1) 
transfer one-half of each such receipt to Iran and (2) place the 
other half in a special interest -bearing Security Account 
in the 
Central Bank, until the balance in the Security Account has reached 
the level of U. S. $1 billion. After the U. S. $1 billion balance has 
been achieved, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct all 
funds 
received pursuant to Paragraph 6 to be transferred to Iran. All 
funds in the Security Account are to be used for the sole purpose of 
securing the payment of, and paying, claims against 
Iran in 
accordance with the Claims Settlement Agreement. 
Whenever the 
Central Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the balance 
in the 
Security Account has fallen below U. S. $500 million, Iran shall 
promptly make new deposits sufficient to maintain a minimum 
balance 
of U. S. $500 million in the Account. The Account shall 
be so 
maintained until the President of the arbitral tribunal established 
pursuant to the Claims Settlement Agreement has certified to the 
Central Bank of Algeria that all arbitral awards against Iran have 
been satisfied in accordance with the Claims Settlement Agreement, at 
which point any amount remaining in the Security Account shall 
be 
transferred to Iran. 
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Other Assets in the U. S. and Abroad 
8. Commencing with the adherence of Iran and the United States to 
this Declaration and the attached Claims Settlement Agreement and the 
conclusion of arrangements for the establishment of the Security 
Account, which arrangements will be concluded within 30 days from the 
date of this Declaration, the United States will act to bring about 
the transfer to the Central Bank of all Iranian financial assets 
(meaning funds or securities) which are located in the United States 
and abroad, apart from those assets referred to in Paragraphs 5 and 6 
above, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until their transfer 
or return is required by Paragraph 3 above. 
9. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to 
this Declaration and the attached Claims Settlement Agreement and the 
making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in 
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will arrange, subject to the 
provisions of U. S. law applicable prior to November 14,1979, for the 
transfer to Iran or all Iranian properties which are located in the 
United States and abroad and which are not within the scope of the 
preceding paragraphs. 
Nullification of Sanctions and Claims 
10. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 
revoke all trade sanctions which were directed against Iran in the 
period November 4,1979, to date. 
11. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification 
described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will promptly 
withdraw all claims now pending against Iran before the International 
Court of Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution 
against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a 
United States national arising out of events occurring before the 
date of this Declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United 
States nationals on November 4,1979, (B) their subsequent detention, 
(C) injury to the United States property or property of the United 
States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran 
after November 3,1979 and (D) injury to the United States nationals 
or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the 
Government of Iran. The United States will also bar and preclude the 
prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States of any 
pending or future claim asserted by persons other than the United 
States nationals arising out of the events specified in the preceding 
sentence. 
POINT IV: RETURN OF THE ASSETS OF THE FAMILY OF THE FORMER SHAH 
12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification 
described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will freeze, and 
prohibit any transfer of, property and assets in the United States 
within the control of the estate of the former Shah or any close 
relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in U. S. litigation 
brought about by Iran to recover such property and assets as 
380 
belonging to Iran. As to any such defendant, including the estate of 
the former Shah, the freeze order will remain in effect until such 
litigation is finally terminated. Violation of the freeze order 
shall be subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by 
U. S. law. 
13. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification 
described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will order all 
persons within U. S. jurisdiction to report to the U. S. Treasury 
within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all information known to 
them, as of November 3,1979, and as of the date of the order, with 
respect to the property and assets referred to in Paragraph 12. 
Violation of the requirements will be subject to civil and criminal 
penalties prescribed by U. S. law. 
14. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification 
described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will make known, to 
all appropriate U. S. courts, that in any litigation of the kind 
described in Paragraph 12 above the claims of Iran should not be 
considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity principles or 
by the act of state doctrine and that Iranian decrees and judgments 
relating to such assets should be enforced by such courts in 
accordance with United States law. 
15. As to any judgment of a U. S. court which calls for the transfer 
of any property or assets to Iran, the United States hereby 
guarantees the enforcement of the final judgment to the extent that 
the property or assets exist within the United States. 
16. If any dispute arises between the parties as to whether the 
United States has fulfilled any obligation imposed upon it by 
Paragraphs 12-15, inclusive, Iran may submit the dispute to binding 
arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in accordance with 
the provisions of, the Claims Settlement Agreement. If the tribunal 
determines that Iran has suffered a loss as a result of a failure by 
the United States to fulfill such obligation, it shall make an 
appropriate award in favor of Iran which may be enforced by Iran in 
the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws. 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
17. If any other dispute arises between the parties as to the 
interpretation or performance of any provision of this Declaration, 
either party may submit the dispute to binding arbitration by the 
tribunal established by, and in accordance with the provisions of, 
the Claims Settlement Agreement. Any decision of the tribunal with 
respect to such dispute, including any award of damages to compensate 
for a loss resulting from a breach of this Declaration or the Claims 
Settlement Agreement, may be enforced by the prevailing party in the 
courts of any national in accordance with its laws. 
Initialed on January 19,1981 
by Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his Government as deposited 
with the Government of Algeria. 
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APPENDIX II 
Claims Settlement Declaration 
2. DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR 
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF ALGERIA CONCERNING 
THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
(Claims Settlement Declaration), 19 January 1981 
The Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, on 
the basis of formal notice of adherence received from the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of the United 
States of America, now declares that Iran and the United States have 
agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of the claims 
described in Article II by the parties directly concerned. Any such 
claims not settled within six months from the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement shall be submitted to binding third-party 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. The 
aforementioned six months' period may be extended once by three 
months at the request of either party. 
Article II 
1. An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of 
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals 
of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises 
out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes 
the subject matter of that national's claim, if such claims and 
counter-claims are outstanding on the date of this Agreement, whether 
or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts 
(including transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or 
bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights, excluding claims described in Paragraph 11 of the Declaration 
of the Government of Algeria of January 19,1981, and claims arising 
out of the actions of the United States in response to the conduct 
described in such paragraph, and excluding claims arising under a 
binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any 
disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the 
competent Iranian courts, in response to the Majlis position. 
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of 
the United States and Iran against each other arising out of 
contractual arrangements between them for the purpose and sale of 
goods and services. 
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3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in Paragraphs 
16-17 of the Declaration of the Covernment of Algeria of January 19, 
1981, over any dispute as to the interpretation or performance of any 
provision of that Declaration. 
Article III 
1. The Tribunal shall consist of nine members of such larger multiple 
of three as Iran and the United States may agree are necessary to 
conduct its business expeditiously. Within ninety days after the 
entry into force of this Agreement, each government shall appoint 
one-third of the members. Within thirty days after their 
appointment, the members so appointed shall by mutual agreement 
select the remaining third of the members and appoint one of the 
remaining third President of the Tribunal. Claims may be decided by 
the full Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the Tribunal as 
the President shall determine. Each such. panel shall be composed by 
the President and shall consist of one member appointed by each of 
the three methods set forth above. 
2. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall 
conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
except to the extend modified by the Parties or by the Tribunal to 
ensure that this Agreement can be carried out. The UNCITRAL rules 
for appointing members of three-member tribunals shall apply mucaris 
mucandis to the appointment of the Tribunal. 
3. Claims of nationals of the United States and Iran that are within 
the scope of this Agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either 
by claimants themselves or, in the case of claims of less than 
$250,000, by the government of such national. 
4. No claim may be filed with the Tribunal more than one year after 
the entry into force of this Agreement or six months after the date 
the President is appointed, whichever is later. These deadlines do 
not apply to the procedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17 of 
the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19,1981. 
Article IV 
1. All decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and 
binding. 
2. The President of the Tribunal shall certify, as prescribed in 
Paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of 
January 19,1981, when all arbitral awards under this Agreement have 
been satisfied. 
3. Any award which the Tribunal may render against either government 
shall be enforceable against such government in the courts of any 
national in accordance with its laws. 
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Article V 
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, 
applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and 
international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking 
into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and 
changed circumstances. 
Arricle VI 
1. The seat of the Tribunal shall be The Hague, The Netherlands, or 
any other place agreed by Iran and the United States. 
2. Each government shall designate an Agent at the seat of the 
Tribunal to represent it to the Tribunal and to receive notices or 
other communications directed to it or to its nationals, agencies, 
instrumentalities, or entities in connection with proceedings before 
the Tribunal. 
3. The expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne equally by the two 
governments. 
4. Any question concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement shall be decided by the Tribunal upon the request of either 
Iran or the United States. 
Article VII 
For the purpose of this Agreement: 
1. A "national" of Iran or of the United States, as the case may be, 
means (a) a natural person who is a citizen of Iran or the United 
States; and (b) a corporation or other legal entity which is 
organized under the laws of Iran or the United States or any of its 
states or territories, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, if, collectively, natural persons who are citizens of 
such country hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in such 
corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its 
capital stock. 
2. "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the United States, as the case 
may be, means claims owned continuously, from the date on which the 
claim arose to the date on which this Agreement enters into force, by 
nationals of that state, including claims that are owned indirectly 
by such nationals through ownership of capital stock or other 
proprietary interests in juridical persons, provided that the 
ownership interests of such nationals, collectively, were sufficient 
at the time the claim arose to control the corporation or other 
entity, and provided, further, that the corporation or other entity 
is not itself entitled to bring a claim under the terms of this 
Agreement. Claims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of 
the date of filing of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the 
United States, or of any other court. 
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3. "Iran" means the Covernment'of Iran, any political subdivision of 
Iran, and any agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the 
Covernment of Iran or any political subdivision thereof. 
4. The "United States" means the Government of the United States, any 
political subdivision of the United States, and any agency, 
instrumentality or entity controlled by the Government of the United 
States or any political subdivision thereof. 
Article VIII 
This Agreement shall enter into force when the Government of Algeria 
has received from both Iran and the United States a notification of 
adherence to the Agreement. 
Initialed on January 19,1981 
by Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his Government as deposited 
with the Government of Algeria. 
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APPENDIX III 
UNDERTAKINGS 
3. UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO THE 
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC 
OF ALGERIA, 
19 January 1981 
1. At such time as the Algerian Central Bank notifies the Governments 
of Algeria, Iran, and the United States that it has been notified by 
the Central Bank that the Central Bank has received for deposit in 
dollar, gold bullion, and securities accounts in the name of the 
Algerian Central Bank, as escrow agent, cash and other funds, 
1,632,917.779 ounces of gold (valued by the parties for this purpose 
at U. S. $0.9397 billion), and securities (at face value) in the 
aggregate amount of U. S. $7.955 billion, Iran shall immediately bring 
about the safe departure of the 52 U. S. nationals detained in Iran. 
Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification 
described in Paragraph 3 of the Declaration, the Algerian Central 
Bank will issue the instructions required by the following 
paragraphs. 
2. Iran having affirmed its intention to pay all its debts and those 
of its controlled institutions, the Algerian Central Bank acting 
pursuant to Paragraph 1 above will issue the following instructions 
to the Central Bank. 
(A) To transfer U. S. $3.667 billion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to pay the unpaid principal of and interest through December 31, 
1980 on (1) all loans and credits made by a syndicate of banking 
institutions, of which a U. S. banking institution is a member, to the 
Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumentalities or controlled 
entities, and (2) all loans and credits made by such a syndicate 
which are guaranteed by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies 
instrumentalities or controlled entities. 
(B) To regain U. S. $1.418 billion in the Escrow Account for the 
purpose of paying the unpaid principal of and interest owing, if any, 
on the loans and credits referred to in Paragraph (A) after 
application of the U. S. $3.667 billion and on all other indebtedness 
held by United-States banking institutions of, or guaranteed by, the 
Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumentalities or controlled 
entities not previously paid, and for the purpose of paying disputed 
amounts of deposits, assets, and interest, if any, owing on Iranian 
deposits in U. S. banking institutions. Bank Markazi and the 
appropriate United States banking institutions shall promptly meet in 
an effort to agree upon the amounts owing. In the event of such 
agreement, the Bank Markazi and the appropriate banking institution 
shall certify the amount owing to the Central Bank of Algeria which 
shall instruct the Bank of England to credit such amount to the 
account, as appropriate, of the Bank Markazi or of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York in order to permit payment to the 
386 
appropriate banking institution. In the event that within 30 days 
any U. S. banking institution and the Bank Markazi are unable to agree 
upon the amounts owed, either party may refer such dispute to binding 
arbitration by such international arbitration panel as the parties 
may agree, or failing such agreement within 30 additional days after 
such reference, by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The 
presiding officer of such panel or tribunal shall certify to the 
Central Bank of Algeria the amount, if any, determined by it to be 
owed, whereupon the Central Bank of Algeria shall instruct the Bank 
of England to credit such amount to the account of the Bank Markazi 
or of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to permit payment 
to the appropriate banking institution. After all disputes are 
resolved either by agreement or by arbitration award and appropriate 
payment has been made, the balance of the funds referred to in this 
Paragraph (B) shall be paid to Bank Markazi. 
(C) To transfer immediately to, or upon the order of, the Bank 
Markazi all assets in the Escrow Account in excess of the amounts 
referred to in Paragraphs (A) and (B). 
Initialed on January 19,1981 
by Warren M. Christopher 
Deputy Secretary of State of the Government of the United States 
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his Government as deposited 
with the Government of Algeria. 
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE 
WASHINGTON 
Algiers, January 19th, 1981 
Dear Mr. Minister, 
You have drawn my attention to the omission of the words "not less 
than" before the figure of U. S. $7.955 in the Declaration of the 
Government of Algeria designated: "Undertakings of the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Government of 
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria". 
I agree and authorize you on behalf of the United States to issue 
this correction. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Sgd. ) Warren M. Christopher 
Mr. M. Benyahia 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
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